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Introduction
Business startups account for a significant portion of aggregate job creation and
industry dynamics. Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013) show that each new
cohort of entrants makes a long-lasting contribution to aggregate employment. This
pattern masks substantial heterogeneity among entrants. While the majority of
new businesses either fails quickly or has no ambitions to grow (Hurst and Pugsley,
2011), a small subgroup of entrants expands quickly.1
Given the importance of entrepreneurial entry for job creation and industry dy-
namics, there is an ongoing interest in the causes and consequences of entrepreneurial
entry. This dissertation provides three empirical studies of two determinants of en-
trepreneurial entry. While chapter one provides an analysis of the role of aggregate
economic conditions for firm entry, chapters two and three contain analyses of the
effect of entry costs resulting from a specific regulatory restriction to firm entry.
Each chapter is supposed to be self-containing and can be read independently. In
the following, I briefly motivate each chapter and summarize the core results.
The 2007-09 great recession and subsequent slow recovery have reinvigorated the
interest in the cyclical dynamics of entrepreneurial entry and the growth of young
firms (Fort et al., 2013). Recent evidence points towards highly persistent negative
effects of adverse aggregate economic conditions at birth for the initial size and
subsequent growth of firm cohorts (Moreira, 2016; Sedlacek and Sterk, 2017). One
factor which may shape this pattern are systematic differences in the quality of
firms entering during expansions and recessions. Yet, robust empirical evidence
on the influence of aggregate conditions on the individual decision to engage in
entrepreneurship and how this may affect the composition of entrepreneurs is scarce.
1 Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013) provide a detailed analysis of up-or-out em-
ployment growth dynamics in young firms.
1
One reason is that such an analysis requires a controlled setting in which potential
entrepreneurs are quasi-randomly exposed to varying economic conditions.
In chapter one2 I propose such a setup. I estimate the effect of economic
conditions on the decision to engage in entrepreneurship among college graduates in
the first years after graduation. This setting is well suited for a study of the effect
of economic conditions on entrepreneurship, for three reasons. First, at the time of
graduation, students typically enter the full-time labor market and make their initial
choice between paid employment and entrepreneurship. Second, college graduates
constitute a particularly relevant pool of potential entrepreneurs, since they are
disproportionately likely to start firms which eventually grow large. Finally, during
their college education students typically acquire field-specific skills which prepare
them for a specific set of employer industries. This enables the use of variation in
field-specific economic conditions over time. I proxy for field-specific business cycle
conditions by mapping industry-level growth rates to fields of study, using as weights
the observed industry - college major distribution. Changes in these field-specific
conditions at graduation are arguably unanticipated, since students are unable to
predict changes in these conditions when deciding for a field of study.3
The effect of improved aggregate economic conditions on entry into entrepreneur-
ship is a priori ambiguous as they may on the one hand increase the value of business
opportunities through product market demand or capital costs. On the other hand,
they raise the attractiveness of the outside option paid employment through in-
creased labor demand.
Using administrative survey data for Germany, I find that a one percentage
point increase in employment growth in the year of graduation raises entry into
entrepreneurship by about 30% in the first year after graduation. The effect of ini-
tial growth halves in the second year and is close to zero in the third and fourth
year after graduation. Exit from entrepreneurship decreases slightly. Together with
the procylical variation of entry into self-employment, this indicates that college
cohorts which graduate under favorable economic conditions are more likely to be
2 This chapter has been published as Beiler, Hendrik. 2017. “Do You Dare? The Ef-
fect of Economic Conditions on Entrepreneurship among College Graduates.” Labour
Economics, 47: 64–74. DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2017.05.003 Copyright Elsevier 2017.
3 A similar identification strategy has been used by Kahn (2010); Oreopoulos, von Wachter
and Heisz (2012) and Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2016) to study the effect of regional
economic conditions on college graduates’ labor market outcomes.
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self-employed and that this effect persists at least during the first four years there-
after.
The procyclical entry pattern suggests that college graduates do not view en-
trepreneurship as an outside option in times of adverse labor market conditions, but
as an opportunity whose payoffs are strongly affected by macroeconomic factors at
start up. The absence of any effect of initial economic conditions on entry in the
third and fourth year after graduation allows for two possible interpretations: on
the one hand, initial increases in entry do not occur at the cost of subsequent entry
but indicate additional entry at the cohort level. On the other hand, graduates who
decided to take up paid employment due to adverse economic conditions at gradu-
ation seem to stick to their initially taken occupational choice. As highly educated
are generally more likely to start firms which eventually grow large, many promis-
ing businesses may not get set up during recessions, with a negative effect on the
composition of new firms during downturns and potentially adverse consequences
for economic recoveries (Pugsley and Sahin, 2015).
Chapters two and three are part of joint work with Susanne Prantl. They
address the influence of a specific firm entry restriction on entry into self-employment
and related outcomes. Firm entry restrictions are a widespread type of product
market regulation that raise business entry costs (Djankov et al., 2002). The role of
entry restrictions in shaping firm entry, industry dynamics and job creation attracts
substantial interest from economists, policy makers and the general public alike.4
The second and third chapter provide an investigation of the effect of firm entry
restrictions based on a reform to a substantial entry restriction. The restriction
follows from the German Trade and Crafts Code, which up to the reform imposed
a mandatory standard on potential entrants in a specific set of affected product
markets. With the reform, the master craftsman certificate lost that role, leading to
a substantial decrease in entry costs in some product markets, while others remained
unaffected. The reform is particularly well suited for a causal evaluation of the
effects of entry costs: On the one hand, the cross-sectional structure of affected
product markets was fixed for a very long time. On the other hand, the reform
4 For example, restrictions to firm entry have been recently considered as a potential
contributor to a secular decline in firm entry and employment dynamics in the U.S.
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014; Decker et al., 2014; Sedlacek, 2016).
3
was triggered by events which were unrelated to trends in firm entry and related
industry outcomes.
In chapter two we make use of this reform to estimate the effect of firm entry
deregulation on the decision to enter entrepreneurship and on the composition of
entrepreneurs. Based on comprehensive survey data used also in chapter one, we
implement a difference-in-differences approach which compares changes in outcome
variables over time in product markets with different deregulation intensities.
In line with our expectations, we find a strong positive effect of the reform on
entry into self-employment, which is mostly driven by solo-entrepreneurs. This result
implies that the master craftsman requirement was indeed a binding constraint to
firm entry. Interestingly, we find no change in the entrants’ level of general education
in consequence of the abolished mandatory standard for entry. This result has
potential implications for industry dynamics, because entrepreneurs’ schooling has
been found to be a predictor of future entrepreneurial success (Hombert et al., 2014).
The unchanged composition of entrants with respect to schooling offers an in-
teresting insight into the theoretical link between entry costs and selection into
entrepreneurship. The result supports the view that entrepreneurial ability is not
fully privately known to prospective entrepreneurs before startup but is revealed only
after starting a firm (Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Poschke, 2010). Un-
der this view, a reduction in entry costs does not affect the composition of entrants
with respect to entrepreneurial ability and may be efficiency enhancing.
To investigate the effects of the deregulation reform on the longevity and propen-
sity to hire of the new establishments, as well as effects on incumbent establishments,
we turn to administrative establishment level panel data in chapter three.
We find a substantial increase in the number of new establishments, which con-
firms the individual-level result on entry into entrepreneurship in chapter two. We
further estimate that the new establishments are similarly stable. However, the
new establishments are more likely to start with only one employee (rather than
two or more). Consistent with these findings, the number of jobs created by new
establishments does not change in consequence of the reform. Finally, we show that
due to the reform, incumbents with less than five employees became significantly
more likely to shrink and fail, while larger incumbents remained similarly large and
stable. This result points towards increased within industry factor reallocation.
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Chapter 1
Do You Dare? The Effect of Economic
Conditions on Entrepreneurship among
College Graduates∗
This chapter has been published as Beiler, Hendrik. 2017. “Do You Dare?
The Effect of Economic Conditions on Entrepreneurship among College Grad-
uates.” Labour Economics, 47: 64–74. DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2017.05.003
Copyright Elsevier 2017.
1.1 Introduction
How do economic conditions affect the decision to start a firm? Despite increas-
ing evidence on the association between aggregate economic fluctuations and firm
creation, the causal effect of economic conditions on firm creation is poorly under-
stood. This lack of robust evidence is surprising, given that adverse shocks to the
size and composition of firm cohorts are found to be highly persistent and to slow
∗ Financial support provided by the German Research Foundation (DFG) for the research
presented in this chapter is gratefully acknowledged (DFG PR 1238/1-1, DFG SPP
1764).
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down recoveries.1 One main reason is that it is difficult to find a controlled setting
in which potential entrepreneurs are quasi-randomly exposed to varying economic
conditions.
I address this gap by analyzing the individual decision to enter into and exit out
of entrepreneurship in the first four years after graduation from college in Germany.2
This group starts a relevant share of firms that eventually grow large: While about
9% of all entrepreneurs entered self-employment in the first four years after gradua-
tion from college, about 17% of all entrepreneurs with 50 or more employed entered
self-employment within the first four years after graduation (table 1.1).3
At the time of graduation, individuals enter the full-time labor market and choose
for the first time between paid employment and starting a firm. I examine how
this decision is affected by economic conditions at graduation that are specific to
each graduate’s field of study.4 A main advantage is that the specific conditions
are arguably unanticipated at enrolment when students select their field. While
students may select their field partly based on a general assessment of their employ-
ment prospects, they are hardly able to anticipate the specific conditions they will
encounter four to six years later at graduation.5 In a series of robustness checks, I
demonstrate that there is indeed no empirical association between student enrolment
and field-specific economic conditions in the year of graduation. After controlling
for fixed cohort and field effects, I thus obtain exogenous variation in economic con-
ditions at graduation. This identification strategy is closely related to Kahn (2010);
Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012) and Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2016),
who study the effect of regional economic conditions on college graduates’ initial
earnings path in paid employment.
1 See, e.g., Sedlacek and Sterk (2017) and Moreira (2016) on the association between
aggregate conditions at firm birth and employment in firm cohorts. Clementi and
Palazzo (2016) analyze the link between aggregate shocks, firm dynamics and recoveries
from recessions.
2 My proxy for entrepreneurship is individual level self-employment, which is an early
and broad measure of entrepreneurship, since it includes owners of firms of all sizes,
including sole proprietors.
3 Source: German Micro Census. The statistics refer to a sample of self-employed aged
30 to 65 and are averaged over 2003-2011.
4 I approximate economic conditions with industry employment growth, mapped to the
field of study level using the average industry - college major distribution.
5 In Germany, the average student completes a Bachelor’s degree in 4 years and a Master’s
or Diploma degree in 5 to 6 years (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014).
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1.1. INTRODUCTION
The effect of changing economic conditions on graduates’ decision to start a firm
is a priori ambiguous. The startup decision is determined by the relative utility
from returns to self-employment, compared to the outside options paid employment
and unemployment (Lucas, 1978; Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979).6 Adverse economic
conditions affect the returns from both self-employment and paid employment. On
the one hand, lower demand and higher demand uncertainty decrease the expected
level and increase the expected volatility of returns as self-employed. These expected
returns need to cover the initial costs of starting a firm, such as capital costs which
are at least partially irreversible.7 Further, costs of capital may rise during recessions
due to decreases in bank lending (Siemer, 2014).
On the other hand, adverse shocks may also affect the field of study specific labor
market, lowering graduates’ potential earnings in paid employment (e.g. Kahn, 2010;
Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz, 2012). This makes self-employment relatively
more attractive. The impact of economic conditions on the start-up decision will
depend on the relative magnitude of these two effects, as well as on their perception
by the graduate.
Apart from the immediate effect at graduation, initial economic conditions may
affect cohorts’ subsequent pattern of entry into and exit from self-employment. In
particular, graduates from “recessionary” cohorts may delay the investment decision
involved in firm entry to wait for information about market conditions (Pindyck,
1991). This mechanism may lead to a subsequent reversal of the initial effect.
To obtain empirical evidence on these effects, I use data from the main German
administrative population survey (Micro Census) on college cohorts of the years 2003
to 2010. Because the survey contributes to official government statistics, response
to most questions is mandatory, which implies high response rates. I analyze entry
into and exit out of self-employment in the first four years after graduation as a
function of changes in economic conditions in 42 fields of study. I construct field
6 In a related theoretical analysis, Parker (1997) models the effect of aggregate risk on the
self-employment choice in a setting where the returns of both self-employment and paid
employment are uncertain. Then, the expected effect of economic conditions (modeled
as changes in aggregate risk) depends on the specific assumptions of its impact in the
two sectors.
7 Note that various types of capital adjustment costs tend to complicate entering on a very
small scale and subsequently adjusting the size of the business (Cooper and Haltiwanger,
2006).
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of study specific growth rates from 2-digit industry employment growth, which I
map into the field of study level using a time-invariant industry distribution of
college graduates.8 The approach relies on the idea that students obtain field of
study specific knowledge which prepares them for employment in a particular set of
related industries (Liu, Salvanes and Sørensen, 2016). This makes them susceptible
to economic conditions in these industries. To illustrate the approach, figure 1.1
shows the industry distribution of graduates, aggregated to 9 broad industry sectors,
for the 8 largest fields of study. For example, while 45% of graduates from computer
science work in the IT sector, only small shares of graduates from other fields do.
In consequence, economic conditions of graduates from computer science will be
disproportionately affected by conditions in the IT sector. I approximate economic
conditions mainly with industry employment growth, since it reflects changes in
both business opportunities and labor demand.
The empirical analysis results in the following main findings: first, a one percent-
age point increase in field-specific employment growth at graduation (0.77 of one
standard deviation) raises entry into self-employment by about 30% relative to the
mean in the first year and about 20% in the second year after graduation. This
effect is economically significant and reasonable, given an average yearly entry rate
of about 3% among recent graduates. This finding suggests that on average, col-
lege graduates decision to enter entrepreneurship is positively affected by favorable
field-specific economic conditions.
Second, field-specific economic conditions at graduation have no significant effect
on entry in the third and fourth year after graduation. The pattern of coefficients
allows for two possible interpretations: on the one hand, initial increases in entry
do not occur at the cost of subsequent entry but indicate additional entry at the
cohort level. On the other hand, graduates who decided to take up paid employment
due to adverse economic conditions at graduation may stick to their initially taken
occupational choice. A possible reason is occupational experience that cannot be
fully transferred from paid employment to self-employment (Evans and Leighton,
1989; Taylor, 1999).
Third, economic conditions in the subsequent years after graduation have no effect
8 This measure is closely related to the mapping of national industry employment growth
to the state level based on the state industry composition, which was first proposed by
Bartik (1991) with the aim of identifying changes in local labor demand.
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on contemporaneous entry, while the positive effect of economic conditions in the
year of graduation on entry in the first two years after graduation remains strong.
This underlines that the graduates’ self-employment decision is influenced mainly by
economic conditions at graduation, rather than by current shocks. This finding is in
line with Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012), who find long lasting negative
effects of initial adverse conditions on college graduates’ earnings path even when
controlling for subsequent aggregate economic conditions.
Finally, exit out of self-employment among all graduates is negatively affected in
the third year after graduation and insignificant in all other years. Together with the
procylical variation of entry into self-employment, this result suggests that college
cohorts which graduate under favorable economic conditions are more likely to be
self-employed and that this effect persists at least during the first four years after
graduation that I examine.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section I describe links to the
literature. I explain the econometric framework and illustrate the data in section 1.3.
Section 1.4 contains the empirical results and shows that they are robust to a number
of alternative explanations. I conclude in section 1.5.
1.2 Related literature
My analysis mainly relates to three strands of literature. First, I relate to an emerg-
ing macro literature on the link between the aggregate economic fluctuations and
firm entry. While it is well established that the number of new firms varies procycli-
cally (Campbell, 1998, Lee and Mukoyama, 2015 and Pugsley and Sahin, 2015),
Sedlacek and Sterk (2017) and Moreira (2016) documented only recently that busi-
nesses born in downturns also start on a smaller scale and remain smaller over their
lifecycle. Both papers link this size persistence primarily to demand side constraints.
Sedlacek and Sterk (2017) argue that a positive demand shock helps firms devoted
to mass markets to expand, shifting the composition towards firms that have the
potential to grow large. Moreira (2016) finds that the sectoral degree of product
differentiation and the sectoral share of total inputs spent on advertising are signifi-
cantly related to the persistence of size differences across cohorts. Interestingly, the
slow growth of firms started during recessions cannot be explained by systematic
9
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differences in the quality of businesses. In contrast, firms born during recessions
seem to be more productive (Moreira, 2016).9 Taken together, the slow growth of
firms born during recessions helps explain slow recoveries (Clementi and Palazzo,
2016).
Second, several studies investigate the association between aggregate economic
fluctuations and the individual decision to take up entrepreneurship. The empirical
evidence is mixed. Using a panel of 23 OECD countries, Blanchflower (2000) explores
the relationship between the national share of self-employed and the unemployment
rate, finding both positive and negative associations for subsets of countries. Based
on similar data, Koellinger and Thurik (2012) find that the national unemployment
cycle tends to positively predict the national self-employment cycle, while there
is no association between national GDP growth and self-employment. Closest to
my paper, Yu, Orazem and Jolly (2014) focus on entrepreneurial entry by college
graduates. The authors use an alumni survey of a US university to estimate the
effect of the unemployment rate at graduation on entrepreneurship. In line with
my results, the authors find a procyclical variation of entry in the first years after
graduation.
I contribute to the previous two strands of literature mainly by proposing a novel
identification approach of the effect of economic conditions on entrepreneurship.
Rather than investigating cyclical patterns of self-employment in the general popu-
lation, I focus on college graduates in their first years after graduation. They form
a well-defined pool of potential entrepreneurs, whose composition is arguably ex-
ogenous to economic conditions as the graduates selected their field on average 4-5
years ago. This empirical specification allows me to address two empirical challenges.
First, the use of field-specific variation in economic conditions allows controlling for
cohort and year fixed effects, thereby holding constant unobserved confounding ef-
fects such as aggregate shifts in labor supply preferences, technological change or
policy shifts. Second, because the year of graduation constitutes a reference year
in which most graduates enter the full time labor market for the first time, I can
investigate whether changes in economic conditions create systematic patterns of
delay or pre-dating of entrepreneurial entry.
Third, my paper is related to the literature that investigates the role of cohort
9 The same applies to firms started during a credit shortage (Ates and Saffie, 2016).
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effects in the labor market. Early contributions include Baker, Gibbs and Holm-
strom (1994) who find lasting effects of aggregate conditions in the year of hiring on
workers’ wages. More recently, a series of studies investigated the effect of adverse
regional labor market conditions on college graduates’ early career outcomes (Kahn,
2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz, 2012; Altonji, Kahn and Speer, 2016).
They find consistent evidence that entering the labor market during a recession
leads to declines in graduates’ earnings which last up to 10 years. The initial effect
is driven partially by decreased wages and partially by a reduced ability to find
full-time work. The persistence of the earnings effect stems both from imperfect
mobility towards better paying employers and a slow cohort wage growth within
firms. Liu, Salvanes and Sørensen (2016) find that a large part of the long-term
earnings loss is explained by a countercyclical mismatch between college graduates’
skills acquired during their studies and the skills demanded by hiring industries.
My paper expands this literature to the entrepreneurial entry decision and shows
that entry is also procyclically affected by economic conditions. The procyclical
effect on entrepreneurship is likely to increase the number of graduates who search
for paid employment during recessions and decrease it during expansions. This
contributes to the earnings effect documented in this literature. Further, in line
with the consistently found high persistence of the earnings effect, I show that
initial effects on the probability of entering self-employment do not reverse.
1.3 Empirical strategy and data
1.3.1 Empirical model
The growth measure I estimate the effect of initial economic conditions faced
by a college graduation cohort on the decision to become self-employed. Economic
conditions affect the entrepreneurial entry decision of graduates through changes
in the value of both business opportunities and employment opportunities. For
identification of the effect of economic conditions, I exploit the fact that fields of
study prepare college students for a set of typical employer industries. Graduates
who work in an industry which does not demand the skills that they acquired during
their studies face considerable earnings losses (Liu, Salvanes and Sørensen, 2016).
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Building on these costs of skill mismatch, I make use of variation in aggregate
economic conditions at the field of study level. To this end, I calculate the industry
employment shares of recent graduates from a given field of study as an empirical
measure of the relative importance of each industry for a field of study. I then use
these shares as weights to build a measure of field of study economic conditions by
mapping industry employment growth to the field of study level:
growthfc =
∑
j
wjf × employment growthjc
with
employment growthjc =
#employeesjc
#employeesj,c−1
− 1
where f indexes one of 42 fields of study, c the year of graduation (cohort) and
j one of 37 2-digit industry groups spanning all industry sectors. The variable
employment growthjc denotes the growth of the number of employees at the in-
dustry level from the year before graduation to the year of graduation. The variable
wjf indicates the time-invariant share of graduates up to five years after graduation
from field of study f who work as paid employee in industry j (averaged over the
sample period). I describe the sample with which the weights are calculated in
section 1.3.2.
This empirical measure proxies for changes in economic conditions in industries
which are closely related to each field of study. I focus on employment growth as
a proxy for economic conditions because college graduates decide about entering
entrepreneurship based on changes in both business opportunities and employment
opportunities. Business opportunities are spurred by favorable economic condi-
tions through increased product demand. Rising product demand is reflected in
employment changes if firm labor demand leads to increased hiring.10 I measure
employment growth as annual change in the number of paid employees rather than
hours worked, since changes in the number of employees better reflects the labor
market conditions for college graduates in a field. The use of hours worked as a
10 I show in appendix table 1.B.9 that the use of annual real GDP growth as proxy for
economic conditions yields similar results.
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proxy for economic conditions shows similar results (table 1.B.8). Intensive margin
labor adjustments featured prominently in the German employers’ reaction to the
2008-09 economic recession, in particular in the export-oriented manufacturing sec-
tor (Burda and Hunt, 2011). Note that I do not use the number of all employed
(including self-employed) as proxy for economic conditions to avoid any potential
simultaneity issues, as entry into and exit out of self-employment are the dependent
variables.11
The construction of the measure builds on Bartik (1991), who isolates local la-
bor demand changes by mapping national industry employment growth to the local
level using weights that reflect the local industry composition.12 Since recent college
graduates account for only a small share of overall employment and their preference
for given employer industries is mostly determined by their field-specific skills, the
constructed proxy is arguably unaffected by recent graduates’ labor supply. I sup-
port this reasoning with an alternative analysis using an employment growth proxy
which excludes fresh college graduates (appendix table 1.B.2). The effect size is al-
most identical in the measure that includes fresh college graduates and the measure
which excludes fresh college graduates, which suggests that the contribution of fresh
college graduates to industry employment growth does not drive the effect on the
decision to enter and exit entrepreneurship.
The empirical variation in the constructed proxy stems from the combination
of differences in the industry composition across fields of study on the one hand
and differences in employment growth across industries on the other. To illustrate
differences in the industry composition across fields, panel (a) of figure 1.1 shows
employment shares recent graduates in broad industry groups, separately for the
eight largest fields of study. For example, the information and communication tech-
nology (IT) sector attracts about 45% of graduates from computer science, but much
smaller shares of graduates from other fields. Therefore, the approximated economic
conditions of graduates from computer science will be disproportionately affected
by employment growth in the IT sector.
Panel (b) of figure 1.1 shows the differences in employment growth across industry
sectors. The sample period covers two economy-wide downturns in 2003-2005 and
11 Results based on all employed are very similar (table 1.B.11).
12 Related measures have been widely used as instrumental variables. See, e.g., Moretti
(2010), Notowidigdo (2019) or Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015).
13
CHAPTER 1
2009-2010 and a period of expansion in 2006-2008. While the first downturn followed
the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the second recession in 2009-2010 was caused by
the global financial crisis. The most cyclical sectors are manufacturing, construction
and the service sectors, while the public sector and finance and real estate show little
cyclical variation (see also Burda and Hunt, 2011).
This sectoral variation in economic conditions translates into rich variation in the
constructed field level proxy, which I illustrate for the eight largest fields of study in
figure 1.2. As expected, changes in economic conditions in fields such as engineering
and computer science are strongly influenced by the growth of the manufacturing
and IT sectors, respectively. In contrast, subjects with a large share of employment
in the public sector such as law exhibit little cyclical variation.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first who uses a Bartik measure at the field
of study level as explanatory variable. The only study with a related approach is
Altonji, Kahn and Speer (2016), who map industry-occupation unemployment rates
to the field level and use this measure as dependent variable in an investigation of
its cyclical association with the national unemployment rate.
Baseline model specification Using repeated cross-sectional data, I follow
cohorts of college graduates over time. Cohorts are defined by year of graduation
from college. The baseline model specification is as follows:
yifct =
4∑
n=1
βcngrowthfc × 1(e = n) + θf + µn + χc + φt + X ′ifctγ + ifct. (1.1)
The dependent variable yifct is entry into or exit out of self-employment for indi-
vidual i from graduation cohort c observed in year t with a major in field of study f .
The main explanatory variable is the constructed proxy for field-specific economic
conditions in the year of graduation, growthfc. It is interacted with 1(e = n),
which is a set of indicator variables for each of the first four years n of potential
labor market experience after graduation. The resulting four interactions measure
the effect of a change in economic conditions in the year of graduation on entry
and exit, depending on the graduate’s number of years of potential labor market
experience.
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Tracking cohorts of graduates from different fields over time allows controlling for
unobservable experience, cohort and time fixed effects. Fixed effects for years of
potential work experience since graduation µn control for the regular evolution of
the probability of entry and exit in the first years after graduation. Cohort fixed
effects χc capture unobserved secular trends and changes in cohort characteristics
which lead to permanent shifts of cohorts’ self-employment paths. Examples include
changes in cohort size or labor supply preferences. Calendar year fixed effects φt
control for macro shocks that synchronously but temporarily move all cohorts off
their paths.
Since potential experience is calculated as the difference between the calendar year
and the year of graduation, cohort effects, year effects and experience effects can-
not be separately identified without an additional restriction (Heckman and Robb,
1985). Because I am mainly interested in the effect of field-cohort specific economic
conditions and not the coefficients of the fixed effects, I follow Oreopoulos, von
Wachter and Heisz (2012) in simply dropping one additional cohort effect from the
regression.13,14
Additional covariates are field of study fixed effects and individual characteristics.
Field effects θf account for permanent unobserved field characteristics such as stu-
dent characteristics and conditions in related industries. The set of individual level
controls Xifct include dummy variables for gender, for having children in the year
of graduation, foreign nationality and a dummy which indicates whether the indi-
vidual graduated from a university or a university of applied sciences. While most
traditional German universities have a strong focus on research and theory-based
teaching, universities of applied sciences concentrate on teaching job-related skills.
To keep with the terminology used in the related literature, I refer to universities as
“colleges”.15
13 Alternatively restricting year effects to sum to zero and to be orthogonal to a linear
time-trend as suggested by Deaton (1997) leads to identical results.
14 The qualitative results are robust to using more parsimonious sets of fixed effects (table
??).
15 The tertiary education systems of the U.S. and Germany differ in many respects. For
example, several programs offered at U.S. colleges are offered as apprenticeship pro-
grams in Germany. Therefore, the distributions of graduates from U.S. colleges and
German universities differ in several aspects. These differences include the distribution
of educational attainment (Appendix table 1.B.1, panel A) or the field-composition of
graduates with tertiary education (Appendix table 1.B.1, panel C). However, the wage
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Standard errors are clustered at the field of study level to account for unrestricted
error correlation within 42 fields of study, such as serial correlation.
Given the inclusion of experience, cohort, time and field of study fixed effects, the
four estimated β coefficients measure changes to the regular path of entry into and
exit from self-employment in the first four years after graduation. The identifying
variation results from national employment growth in typical employer industries of
each field of study, with industry growth being mapped to the field level based on
the average employment distribution of graduates as explained above. I interpret
the variation in employment growth as a measure of economic fluctuations that
is driven by a combination of cyclical demand shocks in related industries that
affect both product market and labor market conditions. From the perspective of
college graduates, the proxy measures the combined cyclical change in both business
opportunities and job finding prospects.
Dynamic specification College graduates’ decision to enter or exit en-
trepreneurship is not only affected by economic conditions in the year of graduation
but also by subsequent conditions. Therefore, the estimates of the specification
above measure the combined effect of economic conditions at graduation and cor-
related subsequent conditions. Stated differently, the previous specification may
capture the fact that a bad year is likely to be followed by another bad year. In an
alternative model specification, I also estimate the effect of economic conditions at
graduation, net of subsequent conditions. To this purpose, I additionally control for
the contemporaneous effect of field-specific growth in each year after graduation:
yifct =
4∑
n=1
βcngrowthfc × 1(e = n) +
4∑
n=1
βc+ngrowthf,c+n × 1(e = n) +X ′ifctγ
+θf + µn + χc + φt + ifct.
(1.2)
In this specification, the added second summation interacts field-specific economic
wage premium of workers with a college degree (excl. short cycle degrees) compared to
non-college workers is broadly similar in Germany and the U.S. (Appendix table 1.B.1,
panel B).
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conditions in each of the first four years after graduation, growthf,c+n, with a
dummy variable for each of the first four years after graduation, en.
16 The inter-
action disaggregates the effect of contemporary growth by years of potential labor
market experience.
Identification The model estimates can be interpreted as causal effect of field-
specific economic conditions as long as the economic conditions are unrelated to the
field-cohort composition of graduates’ unobservable characteristics, conditional on
the individual covariates and experience, cohort, time and field fixed effects.
There are two particular channels which may create an association of the field-
cohort composition with economic conditions at graduation. First, individuals may
selectively enroll into fields of study if they are able to successfully anticipate field-
specific changes in economic conditions at graduation. Such anticipation is unlikely,
since university education takes several years to complete and economic conditions
in employer industries vary considerably over time.
Second, the cohort composition may be endogenous in field level economic condi-
tions at graduation if students strategically postpone or pre-date their graduation
to avoid negative earnings effects. While pre-dating graduation is mostly practically
infeasible, postponement needs to be weighed against forgone earnings.
In section 1.4.2 I show that there is indeed no empirical association between
economic conditions on the one hand and student enrolment and age at graduation
on the other hand.
1.3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Data source and regression sample I use repeated cross sectional micro
data from a comprehensive and large German population survey, the Micro Cen-
sus. The survey provides several advantages for the purposes of my study: first, it
contains information on higher education such as field of study and year of gradu-
ation, as well as detailed labor market related information. Second, the data is of
particularly high quality, which is reflected in low non-response rates (response to
most questions is legally required) and high comparability of items across survey
16 Note that growthf,c+n may also be written as growthft.
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waves.17 Finally, the survey is comparably large. Its yearly coverage of between
600,000 and 700,000 individuals (about 1% of the German population) allows to
combine individual level outcomes with rich variation in economic conditions at the
field of study - cohort level.18
I work with data from the survey years 2003 to 2011, since consistent information
on college education is available only from 2003 onward. Graduation cohorts are de-
fined by year of graduation from college. I use an unbalanced sample of graduates in
the first through fourth calendar year after graduation from cohorts 2003 to 2010.19
The main estimation sample includes college graduates who obtain their degree
when aged 23 to 32.20 Further, I drop graduates from PhD programs21 and fields
of study which are closely linked to the primary or public sector.22 Finally, I drop
all individuals who do not respond to all of the survey questions used to construct
the variables.23 This leads to a regression sample of 20,407 graduates in 42 fields of
study. Note that the sample includes non-employed and graduates enrolled in post-
graduate education because labor force participation and post-graduate education
are affected by economic conditions.
Construction of the main variables The main dependent variables are con-
structed as follows. I define entry into self-employment as being self-employed in
period t and having worked as an employee or non-employed in t − 1 (12 months
17 The Micro Census contributes to many official national and EU-level statistics such as
the EU Labor Force Survey.
18 I use the Scientific Use File which contains a 70% sub-sample. See the data appendix A
for details.
19 The results hold when using a balanced sample of cohorts 2003-2007 in which all grad-
uates can be observed during the first four years after graduation (table 1.B.3).
20 I exclude very young and old graduates since these are likely to be special cases who
either pursued exceptionally short programs or obtained multiple degrees. 83% of all
college graduates obtain their college degree in the used age range.
21 Note that during the sample period German universities replaced diploma programs
with bachelor and master programs, which lead to a decrease in average college duration
because not all bachelor graduates move on to a postgraduate degree. However, there is
no reason to expect any systematic relationship with the economic conditions in a field’s
related industries because the timing of degree replacement was mostly determined by
long-lasting administrative procedures at the state and university level.
22 I use a classification of fields of study as provided by the German Statistical Office. See
appendix A for further documentation. In appendix table 1.A.2 I show all used fields
of study.
23 See appendix A for information on response rates.
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ago). Exit is defined as working as an employee or being non-employed in t and
having been self-employed in t − 1.24 These definitions are applied to graduates
in year one to four after graduation. In the case of fresh college graduates (year
one after graduation), the employment status refers to the last year of college. In
consequence, graduates which are self-employed in the first year after graduation
are only counted as entrants if they were not self-employed alongside their studies.
Self-employed are individuals that are (partial) owners of a firm to which they ded-
icate most of their employment activity. The employment status in t − 1 is asked
retrospectively.
Table 1.2 shows sample means of the two main dependent variables entry and
exit, as well as the self-employment status in t and t-1, in the first four years after
graduation. The probability of entry into self-employment in a given year after
graduation is highest in the first year (3.6%) and averages to 2.6% in the first four
years. The probability of exiting self-employment in a given year is roughly constant
at 0.7%. The share of entrepreneurs among recent graduates increases steadily
throughout the first four years to about 9% in the fourth year after graduation.
Mapping industry employment to the field level The above described
construction of field-specific employment growth involves a mapping of national
industry employment growth to the field of study level. To this purpose, I construct
time-invariant field-industry employment weights from the Micro Census data on
recent college graduates.25 I use employment information of graduates in years one
to five after graduation, to focus on graduates’ typical first employment industries.
As in the regression sample, I restrict the sample to those who obtained their degree
aged 23 to 32 and drop PhD graduates. Unlike in the regression sample, I drop
individuals in post-graduate education to exclude students working alongside their
studies. I use graduates surveyed in waves 2008 to 2011 (graduation cohorts 2003-
2010), since these waves contain industry information classified by NACE rev. 2.
The main advantages of this classification over NACE rev. 1.1 are that it enables a
match to administrative industry employment data up to 2014 and provides a finer
24 Note that I code helping family members as employees, but the results are insensitive
to this categorization.
25 In appendix figure 1.B.2 I show field-industry employment weights over time for 6 fields
of study.
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classification of the service sector, which accounts for a large share of high skilled
employment.26 This leads to a weighting sample of 14,251 observations.
Administrative industry employment data I take industry employment
data from the official publications of the German Statistical Office (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2015, table 3.2.14). It is based on administrative records on the number
of employees and is published at the level of 2-digit NACE rev. 2 industries. Because
otherwise the number of college graduates in some industry - field of study cells of
the weighting matrix is small, I pool adjacent 2-digit NACE rev. 2 industries.27
This leads to a set of 37 industries (shown in table 1.A.3).
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Main results
Entry into entrepreneurship As discussed in the introduction, the effect of
economic conditions on the decision to become self-employed is ex-ante ambiguous,
since favorable economic conditions may increase the value of both business and
labor market opportunities. Table 1.3 shows the corresponding empirical results of
model 1.1. The coefficients reported in column 1 indicate a statistically significant
positive effect of field-specific employment growth in the year of graduation on entry
into self-employment in the first and second year after graduation. The estimates
imply that a one percentage point increase in employment growth (0.77 of one
standard deviation) in the year of graduation raises the probability of entry by
1.1 percentage points (sign. at 1%) in the first year after graduation and by 0.5
percentage points in the second year (sign. at 10%). These effects correspond to
substantial relative increases of 31% and 24% over the respective sample means of
3.6% in the first and 2.1% in the second year after graduation. During the sample
period, an increase of field-specific employment growth by one standard deviation
26 The results are similar when creating a set of consistent NACE 1.1 - NACE 2 industry
groups and constructing the weighting matrix for individuals surveyed in years 2003-
2011 (table 1.B.14).
27 The joined industries are 1-3, 16-18, 19-20, 22-23, 24-25, 29-30, 31-33, 35-37, 45-47,
49-53, 58-59, 64-66, 77-79, 90-93, 94-97. The results are very similar when using the
original industry classification (appendix table 1.B.13).
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describes a typical expansion.28 The coefficients are unchanged when additionally
controlling for gender, foreign nationality, children at graduation and the type of
university (column 2). This implies that potential changes in the composition of
graduates with respect to these characteristics have no effect on the decision to
start a firm.
The positive effect on entry in the first and second year after graduation im-
plies that improving economic conditions seem to “pull” college graduates into self-
employment.29 This result is in line with the positive association between self-
employment by the highly educated and local vacancy rates found by Svaleryd
(2015) and the well-established procyclical variation of the number of new employer
firms (Chatterjee and Cooper, 1993; Campbell, 1998; Lee and Mukoyama, 2015).
Possible channels for the procyclical entry behavior are cyclical demand affecting
firms’ growth prospects (Moreira, 2016; Adelino, Ma and Robinson, 2017) and cap-
ital availability (Siemer, 2014). Taken together, entrepreneurial activity of college
graduates is therefore best characterized as “opportunity entrepreneurship” (Schoar,
2010; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011).
The coefficient estimates for the effect of economic conditions at graduation on
entry in the third and fourth year after graduation are economically small and
fail standard significance tests. This implies that the entrepreneurial decision in the
third and fourth year after graduation is not sensitive to initial economic conditions.
The pattern of coefficients allows for two interpretations. First, the increase in entry
in the first and second year does not occur at the cost of a subsequent decrease
in entry, such as pre-dating of planned entrepreneurship that would have taken
place anyway. If this was the case, the coefficient on initial growth should have
been negative in the third or fourth year. Second, graduates who decided not to
enter due to adverse conditions at graduation are not more likely to enter in the
immediately following periods. This “lock-in” in the initially chosen occupational
28 An increase of field-specific employment growth in the year of graduation by one standard
deviation corresponds to an increase in entry of about 1.5 percentage point (40% relative
to the mean).
29 In an additional analysis, I find that the industry wage growth in the year of graduation
mapped to the field of study level shows a negative association with entry into self-
employment, which is independent of the effect of employment growth (table 1.B.9,
columns 3-4). This suggests that also the outside option paid employment may influence
the value of starting a firm.
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sector may be due to occupational experience which cannot be fully transferred from
paid employment to self-employment.30
As discussed in section 1.3, the previous estimates capture not only the effect of
economic conditions at graduation but also the combined effect of economic con-
ditions and correlated influences a certain cohort faces over its life cycle, such as
a prolonged recession. By directly controlling for contemporaneous growth rates,
however, I can isolate the effect of economic conditions at the time of graduation
from the effect of economic conditions in the years after graduation on the contem-
poraneous entry and exit decision (model 1.2). The results in column 3 of table
1.3 show that growth in years one to four after graduation has no contemporane-
ous effect on entry into entrepreneurship. When controlling for current growth, the
coefficients on growth in the year of graduation are very similar to the baseline
specification (column 4). I obtain analogous results when I alternatively control
for lagged growth in the years after graduation or include a full set of interacted
field-year fixed effects (appendix table 1.B.10). This result implies that economic
conditions at graduation seem to be more important for the decision of recent grad-
uates to become self-employed than current economic conditions in the subsequent
years. The result is in line with the effects of initial and later economic conditions
on the size of firms (Moreira, 2016) and earnings of college graduates (Oreopoulos,
von Wachter and Heisz, 2012; Altonji, Kahn and Speer, 2016).
Exit from entrepreneurship In another set of estimations, I evaluate the
effect of economic conditions on graduation cohorts’ probability to exit from self-
employment during the first four years after graduation. While a thorough analysis
of firm growth and survival patterns goes beyond the scope of this paper, I will focus
on individual level exit from entrepreneurship in the main sample of recent college
graduates.
Exit from entrepreneurship is influenced by current economic conditions through
their effect on current product demand, and by previous economic conditions
30 This was also documented in cross-sectional data by Evans and Leighton (1989), who
find that the return to wage experience in self-employment is lower than in wage work
and lower than the return to self-employment experience in self-employment. Similarly,
Taylor (1999) documents that previous time spent in paid employment increases survival
in self-employment less than previous time spent in self-employment.
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through their effect on selection into entrepreneurship and potentially changes in
the survival rate of these entrants.
Column 1 of table 1.4 refers to the baseline model (i.e. without controls for
current growth in years 1-4 after graduation and without individual covariates). A
one percentage point increase in field-specific employment growth in the year of
graduation leads to a 0.28 percentage point decrease in exit from self-employment
in the third year after graduation (sign. at 5%). Coefficients on the other years
after graduation are negative but do not reach statistical significance. The effect
in the third year after graduation corresponds to a 30% relative decrease, given the
sample mean of 0.7% (as a share of all graduates). This negative coefficient on
(lagged) growth in the year of graduation seems not to be a result of correlated
current growth. Even though current growth has a negative effect on exit in years
three and four after graduation (column 3), adding controls for contemporaneous
growth to the estimation of effects of initial economic conditions (model 1.2) does
not change the negative effect of initial growth (column 4).
Taken together, the results suggest that the economic conditions which induced an
increase in entry into entrepreneurship did not increase exit from entrepreneurship
among fresh college graduates.
Two mechanisms may be simultaneously at play. The first mechanism is changes
in the composition of college graduates which enter entrepreneurship, such as a
cyclical shift in entrepreneurial ability and ambitions which may affect subsequent
exit rates. The evidence on such cyclical composition changes is mixed. Survey
data on new self-employed in 22 OECD countries shows that the share of those
who indicate to have started their business because they saw a profitable business
opportunity rather than seeing entry into self-employment as the only option for
work decreases during recessions (Lamballais Tessensohn and Thurik, 2012). On
the contrary, Moreira (2014) offers evidence that the likelihood that someone be-
comes an entrepreneur out of necessity does not vary substantially with aggregate
economic conditions. Firm level data on US employer firms indicates that firms
started during recessions are on average more productive and more concentrated in
sectors that require a greater amount of technical skill than firms started during
economic expansions (Moreira, 2016).
The second mechanism implies that favorable initial conditions positively influ-
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ence the businesses’ subsequent ability to grow, conditional on the composition of
the entering entrepreneurs. Potential mechanisms are faster demand accumulation
via the building of a customer base (Moreira, 2016; Foster, Haltiwanger and Syver-
son, 2016) and weaker financial constraints which facilitate capital accumulation
(Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Siemer, 2014).
1.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Robustness The model estimates can be interpreted as causal effect of field-
specific economic conditions as long as these conditions are unrelated to the field-
cohort composition of graduates’ unobservable characteristics, conditional on ex-
perience, cohort, time and field fixed effects. In this section, I will discuss two
mechanisms which may lead to endogeneity of the cohort composition in economic
conditions.
First, students may choose their field of study in anticipation of economic condi-
tions at graduation. This would require that on the one hand prospective students
base their field choice to a large extent on expected earnings differences between
fields, rather than their tastes and abilities. Recent evidence for France and the US
shows that while expected earnings are a small but statistically significant deter-
minant of the college major choice, heterogeneous preferences for particular fields
are the dominant determinant (Arcidiacono, 2004; Beffy, Fougere and Maurel, 2012;
Wiswall and Zafar, 2015). On the other hand, given the inclusion of field and cohort
fixed effects, selection on cyclical changes in earnings expectations requires the suc-
cessful anticipation of changes in field-specific economic conditions at graduation.
The large over-time variation of field-specific conditions (figure 1.2, panel b) and
the fact that university education in Germany takes about 4-6 years to complete
suggest that the anticipation of economic conditions at graduation is unlikely.31
To test explicitly for selective enrolment, I regress the number of first year students
and their composition with respect to gender and nationality on field growth in
the year of enrolment and future growth rates.32 Since there is no information
on enrolment in the Micro census data, I rely on publicly available administrative
31 In Germany, the average student completes a Bachelor’s degree in 4 years and a Master’s
or Diploma degree in 5 to 6 years (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014).
32 Gender and nationality are the only two available characteristics.
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data at the level of fields of study (see appendix A.3 for details). The results
in table 1.5 document a significant positive effect of current growth in a field’s
related industries on the number of enrolled first year students, indicating that
students select into fields partly based on currently observed employment growth in
related employer industries.33 There is no correlation, however, between enrolment
and future growth rates, suggesting that students have difficulties in anticipating
economic conditions at graduation. Also, the share of females among first year
students is not significantly associated with future field-specific growth. Only the
share of foreign students among the newly enrolled exhibits a statistically significant
correlation with field-specific current growth and growth in t+5, though the implied
effect is economically small.34 Related evidence on the selection of college majors
based on aggregate economic conditions has been found by Blom, Cadena and Keys
(2015), who show that students shift to higher-return college majors when economic
conditions are worse at age 20.
In line with these results, controlling for lagged economic conditions, economic
conditions at age 19 (the typical enrolment age in Germany) or the field-specific
cohort size directly in the entry and exit models leaves the main coefficients un-
changed (appendix table 1.B.4). Furthermore, the qualitative results do not change
when controlling for linear field of study trends (appendix table 1.B.5). This implies
that first year students do not select their field based on anticipated long-run trends
in industry conditions related to the field. Note that once enrolled, students may
also change to another field of study in response to economic conditions. Changes
beyond closely related fields of study, however, require starting over in the first year
- again essentially ruling out any selection on economic conditions at graduation.
Changing to a closely related field, which also usually requires taking several addi-
tional courses, does not allow reacting to economic conditions either, since related
fields are subject to similar economic conditions due to a typically similar employer
industry structure.
A second mechanism that may lead to endogeneity of the field-cohort compo-
33 Given the low correlation of industry growth over time, field-specific economic conditions
at enrolment and graduation should not be correlated (figure 1.2).
34 A one percentage point increase in employment growth (0.77 of one standard deviation)
five years after enrolment raises the share of foreign students at enrolment by 0.3 per-
centage points (sign. at 5%). This corresponds to a relative increase of 1.7% over the
sample mean of 17%.
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sition to economic conditions is strategic timing of graduation. Students close to
graduation may systematically move forward or postpone their graduation date to
avoid adverse initial economic conditions. Predating graduation is unlikely because
of the above described difficulties in anticipating field-specific economic conditions
and the fact that it is often infeasible to spontaneously reorganize a college curricu-
lum. The benefit of postponing graduation in response to observed adverse economic
conditions at planned graduation has to be weighed against the opportunity cost of
forgone earnings.
Information on the students’ age at graduation allows to empirically investigate
such selective timing of graduation. If it occurred, growth in a given year would prob-
ably change the age structure of current and future graduation cohorts. Regressions
of graduates’ age on field-specific current and lagged growth show no indications
of such optimizing behavior (table 1.6). Indeed, growth at graduation has no eco-
nomically or statistically significant effect on graduates’ age. Consequently, directly
controlling for a quadratic polynomial in age at graduation or dummy variables for
graduating older than 28 or younger than 25 does not change the main estimates
either (appendix table 1.B.6). This is in line with Oreopoulos, von Wachter and
Heisz (2012) and Liu, Salvanes and Sørensen (2016), who also find no evidence of
strategic timing of graduation dates.
Specification checks Next, I document that my results are not driven by se-
lective migration. Wozniak (2010) shows that US college graduates are more likely
to migrate to US states which experience positive labor demand shocks. Analo-
gously, young and highly educated international migrants might select Germany as
their destination country based on current national demand shocks in industries
related to their college education. This would affect the field-cohort composition
of young college degree holders. To explore whether this mechanism affects my
results, I exclude foreigners who immigrated less than 2 years before graduation
from the estimation sample. This restriction ensures that migrants in this restricted
sample arrived at least 2 years before migration and are subject to the here consid-
ered economic conditions at graduation. The results remain qualitatively unchanged
(table 1.B.7, columns 3-4).
In a final set of regressions, I verify the robustness of my results to the use of
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alternative industry growth measures. I show in table 1.B.8, columns 1-2, that the
results are quantitatively similar when using deviations from long-term trends in
the number of employees. To separate the cyclical component of the time-series, I
use the conventional Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).35
Similar to the main specification, an increase in the detrended number of employees
by its interquartile range leads to a rise in the probability of entry in the year after
graduation by about 30% relative to the mean.
Further, I obtain similar results when using the HP-filtered cyclical component
of the logarithm of total hours worked (table 1.B.8, columns 3-4). While employ-
ment growth constitutes the extensive margin of labor adjustment, changes in hours
worked additionally account for adjustments along the intensive margin. Intensive
margin labor adjustments featured prominently in German employers’ reaction to
the 2008-09 economic recession (Burda and Hunt, 2011).
Finally, I also investigate the effect of annual real GDP growth and hourly wage
growth on entry into entrepreneurship (table 1.B.9). I find a positive effect of GDP
growth in the year of graduation on entry in the first year after graduation (sign.
at 5%). The coefficient size is comparable to the main coefficient on employment
growth due to a larger variation of GDP growth relative to employment growth.
There is no effect in the subsequent years. The effect of GDP growth disappears
when controlling for employment growth, suggesting high multicollinearity. Wage
growth has a negative effect on entry in the first year after graduation (sign. at
10%). This negative effect of wage growth is stable when controlling for GDP or
employment growth, which suggests that field of study specific wage growth has no
close contemporaneous correlation with field of study level GDP and employment
growth. The results suggest that the main employment based growth proxy seems
to capture mainly cyclical conditions in product markets related to a given field of
study, which positively affect the decision to start a firm. Wage growth may relate
to favorable conditions in labor markets, which in turn reflect improving outside
options in paid employment and therefore decrease the value of self-employment.
35 Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), I set the smoothing parameter of the annual data to
6.25.
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1.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I estimate the effect of economic conditions on college graduates’
decision to enter entrepreneurship. For identification I make use of the fact that
graduates’ field of study specific knowledge prepares for employment in particular
industries. This setup allows me to proxy for field of study level economic conditions
using weighted employment growth in the respective typical employer industries. I
find a significant procyclical effect of economic conditions at graduation on entry
into entrepreneurship in the first and second year after a cohort’s graduation, but
no effect on entry in later years. Interestingly, current growth in later years has
no effect, which demonstrates that college graddduates’ entrepreneurial decisions
are mostly influenced by economic conditions at the time of graduation. Exit from
entrepreneurship is slightly countercyclical, which points towards persistent effects
on cohort-level entrepreneurship.
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1.6 Figures and tables
Table 1.1: Share of entrepreneurs by firm size and entrepreneurial characteristics
Firm size
Entrepreneur characteristics 50+ 6-49 1-5 All
Started self-employment within 4 years after college 17.4 12.6 8.2 9.1
Started self-employment before college 30.7 25.2 19.0 20.2
or 5 or more years after college
Entrepreneur with no college degree 51.9 62.2 72.8 70.7
Total 100 100 100 100
Notes: In this table, I show a tabulation of all entrepreneurs aged 30-65 by firm size
(columns) and entrepreneurial characteristics by three groups: entrepreneurs which entered
self-employment within four years after graduation (row 1), entrepreneurs which entered
self-employment before graduation or more than four years after graduation (row 2) and
entrepreneurs without college education (row 3). Firm size is measured in the year the
owner is interviewed and includes the owner. It relates to the main self-employment activity.
Data: German Micro Census, pooled over 2003-2011. Survey weights used.
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Figure 1.1: Sectoral distribution of the 8 largest fields and annual growth by
sectors
(a) Industry distribution for the 8 largest fields of study
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(b) Employment growth by broad industry groups
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1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing (A)
2 Manufacturing, mining and utilities (B, C, D, E)
3 Construction (F)
4 Retail, transportation, accommodation and food (G, H, I)
5 Information and communication technologies (J)
6 Finance, insurance and real estate (K, L)
7 Professional, scientific, technical and support service (M, N)
8 Public administration, education, health and social work (O, P, Q)
9 Other services (R, S, T, U)
Industry group (NACE Rev. 2)
Notes: In panel (a) I illustrate the industry distribution of college graduates from the 8
largest fields of study. The used 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 industries are joined into 9 groups for
illustrative purposes. The calculation is based on college graduates in paid employment in
years 1-5 after graduation (weighting sample). Data: German Micro Census. In panel (b)
I show the annual growth of the number of employees by industry groups. Data: German
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015, Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.4, table 3.2.14).
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Figure 1.2: Annual growth rate for the 8 largest fields of study
(a) Actual growth rate
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Notes: In the upper panel I show the yearly growth rate of the number of employees for
the 8 largest fields of study. In the lower panel I show the growth rate net of year and field
of study fixed effects. The growth rate is constructed from annual growth of the number of
employees at the 2-digit NACE rev. 2 industry level, weighted to fields of study using the
average industry-field distribution for graduates in paid employment in years 1 to 5 after
graduation.
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Table 1.2: Means of dependent variables by years since graduation
Years since graduation 1 2 3 4 Total
Entry 0.036 0.021 0.021 0.026 0.026
Self-employed 0.062 0.075 0.084 0.090 0.075
Self-employed t-1 0.032 0.061 0.070 0.071 0.056
Exit 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007
Observations 6456 5720 4604 3627 20407
Notes: In this table I show sample means of the two main dependent variables Entry
and Exit as well as the current and lagged self-employment status used to construct the
variables. The sample means are presented separately for each of the first four years after
graduation. Entry is defined as being self-employed in year t and an employee or non-
employed in t − 1. Exit is defined as being an employee or non-employed in year t and
self-employed in t − 1. Sample: College graduates in the first four years after graduation,
aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I
exclude fields of study directly related to the primary or public sector.
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Table 1.3: The effect of economic conditions on entry into entrepreneurship
Dependent variable: Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growthfc × e1 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0034)
growthfc × e2 0.0050∗ 0.0050∗ 0.0064∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0026)
growthfc × e3 -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0001
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0029)
growthfc × e4 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0007
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0037)
growthf,c+1 × e1 0.0048 0.0020
(0.0046) (0.0036)
growthf,c+2 × e2 0.0052 0.0061
(0.0043) (0.0039)
growthf,c+3 × e3 0.0047 0.0056
(0.0038) (0.0038)
growthf,c+4 × e4 -0.0020 0.0012
(0.0030) (0.0036)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates no yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table, I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions in the year of graduation on entry into entrepreneurship. The sample covers
college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding
PhDs, from cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of study directly related
to the primary or public sector. Entry is defined as being self-employed in year t and an
employee or non-employed in t−1. Mean of entry: 0.027. growthfc denotes annual industry
growth in the number of employees in the year of graduation, mapped to the field level using
a fixed industry-field distribution of graduates 1 to 5 years after graduation. growthfc×en
denotes the interaction with a dummy for graduates n years after graduation, so that all
results are presented separately for each of the first four years after graduation. growthf,c+n
indicates growth n years after graduation (accordingly, column 3 reports results on current
growth). 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79.
Standard deviation: 1.3. Covariates: dummies for gender, foreign, children at graduation
and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study, cohort, year surveyed and
number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at field of
study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.4: The effect of economic conditions on exit from entrepreneurship
Dependent variable: Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growthfc × e1 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0015
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016)
growthfc × e2 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0014
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
growthfc × e3 -0.0028∗∗ -0.0028∗∗ -0.0028∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
growthfc × e4 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0017
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
growthf,c+1 × e1 -0.0006 -0.0007
(0.0012) (0.0011)
growthf,c+2 × e2 0.0010 0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0008)
growthf,c+3 × e3 -0.0022∗ -0.0027∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0013)
growthf,c+4 × e4 -0.0027∗ -0.0025∗
(0.0014) (0.0015)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates no yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table, I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions in the year of graduation on entry into entrepreneurship. The sample covers
college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding
PhDs, from cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of study directly related
to the primary or public sector. Exit is defined as being an employee or non-employed in
year t and self-employed in t− 1. Mean of exit: 0.007. growthfc denotes annual industry
growth in the number of employees in the year of graduation, mapped to the field level using
a fixed industry-field distribution of graduates 1 to 5 years after graduation. growthfc×en
denotes the interaction with a dummy for graduates n years after graduation, so that all
results are presented separately for each of the first four years after graduation. growthf,c+n
indicates growth n years after graduation (accordingly, column 3 reports results on current
growth). 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79.
Standard deviation: 1.3. Covariates: dummies for gender, foreign, children at graduation
and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study, cohort, year surveyed and
number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at field of
study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.5: Evidence on the correlation between economic conditions and enrolment
into fields of study
Dependent var: ln(No 1st year students) Share female Share foreign
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
growthft 0.0461
∗∗ 0.0005 -0.0024∗
(0.0182) (0.0016) (0.0014)
growthf,t+1 0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0005
(0.0078) (0.0010) (0.0015)
growthf,t+2 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0024
(0.0149) (0.0009) (0.0024)
growthf,t+3 0.0044 -0.0003 0.0007
(0.0163) (0.0012) (0.0015)
growthf,t+4 0.0042 0.0150 -0.0008 -0.0006 0.0018 0.0009
(0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0013)
growthf,t+5 0.0053 0.0100 -0.0013 -0.0015 0.0034
∗∗ 0.0025∗
(0.0146) (0.0105) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0013)
Mean depvar 0.458 0.458 0.170 0.170
FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates no no no no no no
Observations 418 418 418 418 418 418
Notes: In this table, I provide linear probability model estimates on the association between
field of study specific enrolment and economic conditions. I use aggregate data on 38 fields
of study in years 1998-2008, compiled from administrative records by the German Statistical
Office. Observations are weighted by cell-size. growthft denotes annual industry growth
in the number of employees in the year of enrolment, weighted to the field level using a
fixed industry-field distribution of graduates 1 to 5 years after graduation. growthf,t+n
indicates growth n years after enrolment. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range
of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79. Standard deviation: 1.3. FE: Fixed effects for field of study
and year of enrolment. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at field of study level.
∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.6: Evidence on strategic timing of graduation from college
Dependent variable: Age at grad. Aged 28+ at grad. Aged 25- at grad.
(1) (2) (3)
growthfc -0.0500 -0.0084 0.0026
(0.0362) (0.0076) (0.0081)
growthf,c−1 -0.0363 -0.0054 0.0012
(0.0326) (0.0059) (0.0069)
growthf,c−2 0.0143 -0.0010 0.0087
(0.0352) (0.0071) (0.0098)
growthf,c−3 -0.0042 -0.0016 -0.0021
(0.0204) (0.0044) (0.0039)
growthf,c−4 -0.0148 -0.0013 0.0055
(0.0255) (0.0053) (0.0055)
Mean depvar 26.495 0.308 0.386
FE yes yes yes
Covariates no no no
Observations 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table, I provide linear probability model estimates on the association between
economic conditions in the year of graduation and the age at graduation. The sample
covers college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation,
excluding PhDs, from cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of study
directly related to the primary or public sector. Age at grad. is the age in the year of
graduation. Age ≥ 28 at grad. is 1 if the individual is aged 28 or above at graduation, 0
else. Age ≤ 25 at grad. is 1 if the individual is aged 25 or less at graduation. growthfc
denotes annual industry growth in the number of employees in the year of graduation,
weighted to the field level using a fixed industry-field distribution of graduates 1 to 5 years
after graduation. growthfc×en denotes the interaction with a dummy for graduates n years
after graduation, so that all results are presented separately for each of the first four years
after graduation. growthf,c−n indicates growth n years before graduation. 1st quartile, 3rd
quartile and interquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79. Standard deviation: 1.3. FE:
Fixed effects for field of study and cohort. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at
field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Appendix 1.A Data appendix
1.A.1 Micro Census data
The Micro Census is a household survey sampling 1% of the German population.36 I
use the Scientific Use File which contains a 70% sub-sample of the households in the
Micro Census.37 The sampling frame of the survey comprises all persons living in
Germany who have a right of residence. Households are sampled at the level of small
sampling districts, comprising on average 15 individuals. Each sampling district
remains in the survey for four years so that in each year a quarter of the sampling
districts are replaced. The data are collected mostly via personal interviews. Only
if not possible otherwise, respondents can answer a self-administered questionnaire
(ca. 20% of all respondents). Individuals are interviewed in April in the survey
years 2003 and 2004 and on a randomized date throughout the year in subsequent
survey years. In all regressions I use weighting factors provided in the data set,
which adjust the sample to the population based on distributions of age groups,
nationalities and gender. Table 1.A.1 contains definitions and summary statistics
for the sample described in the data section.
Most survey questions are mandatory to respond to, leading to response rates
close to 100%. The following variables are based on non-mandatory survey ques-
tions (average item non-response rates and non-mandatory survey years in brackets):
employment status 12 months ago (4%, all years), field of study (4%, years 2003 and
2004) and graduation year (17%, 2003 and 2004). Unit-non-response amounts to
2.4% - 3.0% in the used survey years. Since the question eliciting the employment
status 12 months ago is asked to a 45% sub-sample in 2003 and 2004, I use this
sub-sample in these two survey years.
1.A.2 Classification of fields of study
The used classification of fields of study builds directly on the classification which is
provided in the Micro census data and constitutes the answer categories of the cor-
responding survey question (Hauptfachrichtung, HFR03). I exclude fields which
36 English documentation is available at http://www.gesis.org/missy/en/study/
37 Scientific Use File des Mikrozensus, FDZ der Statistischen A¨mter des Bundes und der
La¨nder, 2003-2011
37
CHAPTER 1
Table 1.A.1: Definitions of variables and summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean/ Standard
share deviation
Entry 1: self-employed in t, employee or non-
employed in t-1, 0: else
0.026
Exit 1: employee or non-employed in t, self-
employed in t-1, 0: else
0.007
Growthfc 2-digit NACE rev. 2 employment growth
of college graduation cohort c, weighted
to 42 fields of study f using the average
industry-field distribution for graduates
surveyed in 2008-2011 (graduation years
2003-2010)
0.709 1.300
Gender 1: female, 0: male 0.440
Foreign 1: non-German citizenship, 0: German
citizenship
0.096
Children at graduation 1: children present in the household,
which have been born in the year of grad-
uation or earlier, 0: else
0.075
Full university 1: individual graduated from a re-
search university (Universita¨t), 0: grad-
uated from an applied university (Fach-
hochschule)
0.623
Age at graduation age in the year of graduation 26.522 2.322
Notes: In this table I provide non-weighted summary statistics for all graduates in the
regression sample of 20407 college graduates. The sample covers graduates in the first
four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010,
observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of study directly related to the primary or public
sector.
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prepare directly for employment in the primary or public sector, since these sectors
are strongly regulated. Examples include majors in agriculture, education, health,
the social sector and public administration. I consistently join fields which are
joined in any of the scientific use file waves due to small cell sizes. Furthermore,
I join closely related fields with few observations. The results are robust to this
modification. Table 1.A.2 shows the used fields of study and the number of obser-
vations for each field in the regression sample. As explained in the main text, I use
the distribution of employer industries to construct weights that aggregate industry
employment growth to the field of study level.
1.A.3 Data on first year students
To investigate the association between economic conditions and field of study en-
rolment, I use publicly available administrative data at the field level. The data
are reported by the universities and compiled by the German Statistical Office.38 I
manually match the fields of study to the classification used in the Micro Census
data. First year students are defined as those who enroll in the first semester of
a field of study, including multiple enrolments. The data refers to enrolments for
the winter term, which is the principal enrolment term. Students typically have to
apply in July and take up their studies October.
38 Table 21311-0012 in the online data base at www.destatis.de/genesis
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Table 1.A.2: List of used fields of study
Field of study Obs. Perc. Field of study Obs. Perc.
Other social sciences 840 4.1 Chemistry 234 1.2
Philosophy 87 0.4 Biology 637 3.1
History 208 1.0 Geography 275 1.4
Library and information
studies
94 0.5 Nutrition and food science 167 0.8
Journalism 220 1.1 Mechanical engineering 954 4.7
Latin and Greek language
and literature
32 0.2 Precision mechanics 171 0.8
German (language and lit-
erature) studies
610 3.0 Electrical engineering 549 2.7
English language and liter-
ature
310 1.5 Electronics and telecom-
munication
325 1.6
Roman languages 100 0.5 Chemical engineering 318 1.6
Psychology 395 1.9 Automotive engineering 200 1.0
Sports 220 1.1 Other engineering 104 0.5
Law 1,625 8.0 Architecture 691 3.4
Economics 324 1.6 Civil engineering 493 2.4
Business administration 4,429 21.7 Tourism 77 0.4
Marketing 131 0.6 Environmental sciences 112 0.6
Finance 296 1.5 Art history 102 0.5
Accounting 125 0.6 Fine arts 99 0.5
Business and engineering 587 2.9 Performing arts 120 0.6
Mathematics and statistics 999 4.9 Music 240 1.2
IT science 1,785 8.8 Design 266 1.3
Physics 292 1.4 Audiovisual techniques 564 2.8
Total 20,407 100
Notes: The table shows the used fields of study and the number of observations for each
field in the regression sample. The sample covers college graduates in the first four years
after graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed
up to 2011. I exclude fields of study directly related to the primary or public sector. 20407
observations.
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Table 1.A.3: Industry classification
NACE 2.0 Industry description
code
1-3 Agriculture, forestry and fishing
5-9 Mining and quarrying
10-12 Manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco products
13-15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and shoes
16-18 Manufacture of wood and paper products; printing
19-20 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products; chemicals
21 Manufacture of pharmaceutical products
22-23 Manufacture of rubber, plastic and other non-metallic mineral products
24-25 Manufacture of metal products, except machinery and equipment
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29-30 Manufacture of motor vehicles and other transport equipment
31-33 Manufacture of furniture; Other manufacturing; Repair and installation of
machinery
35-39 Energy and water supply, sewerage, waste and remediation activities
41-43 Construction
45-47 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
49-53 Transportation and storage
55-56 Accommodation and food service activities
58-60 Publishing; motion picture, video, TV and music production; broadcasting
61 Telecommunications
62-63 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; IT services
64-66 Financial and insurance activities
68 Real estate activities
69-70 Legal and accounting activities; management consultancy activities
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
72 Scientific research and development
73 Advertising and market research
74-75 Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities
77-79 Rental and leasing activities; employment activities; travel services
80 Security and investigation activities; Services to buildings and landscape
activities; other business support activities
84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
85 Education
86 Human health activities
87-88 Residential care activities; social work activities
90-93 Arts and entertainment; cultural activities; gambling; sports and recreation
94-98 Other service activities; activities of households
Notes: Industry classification used for calculation of industry-field of study weights as
described in section 1.3.2. 41
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Appendix 1.B Additional figures and
tables
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Figure 1.B.1: Distribution of field-specific annual employment growth
(a) Distribution of field employment growth
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Notes: In panel (a) I show a histogram of field-specific employment growth in the regression
sample. In panel (b) I show the residuals of a regression of field-specific employment growth
on field and year fixed effects. The figure illustrates the variation of the annual field-specific
employment growth used as main proxy for economic conditions.
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Figure 1.B.2: Industry weights of the six largest fields of study
(a) Business administration
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(b) Computer science
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(c) Law
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(d) Mathematics and statistics
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(e) Mechanical engineering
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(f) Architecture
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Notes: In this figure I show the evolution of the field of study - industry weights for the
largest six fields of study. For each field, I show the employment share of each of the
three largest industries and the joined employment share of all remaining industries. The
calculation is based on employees surveyed in years 2003 to 2011 who graduated up to five
years ago. All other sampling restrictions as in the main weighting sample described in
chapter 1.3.2.
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Table 1.B.1: OECD statistics on tertiary education for Germany and the United
States
Panel A: Educational attainment
ISCED 2011
education
level
Below upper
secondary
education
Upper
secondary
education
Post-
secondary
non-tertiary
education
Short-cycle
tertiary
education
Bachelor’s
or
equivalent
education
Master’s,
Doctoral or
equivalent
education
Germany 13.5 46.0 11.9 0.5 15.2 12.9
U.S. 9.4 44.3 10.9 22.5 13.0
OECD Av-
erage
21.1 38.5 5.7 7.4 17.0 13.6
Panel notes: Age 25-64, year 2017.
Source: OECD.Stat, Table “Share of population by educational attainment”
Panel B: Relative earnings - Upper secondary education = 100
ISCED 2011
education
level
Below upper
secondary
education
Upper
secondary
education
Post-
secondary
non-tertiary
education
Short-cycle
tertiary
education
Bachelor’s
or
equivalent
education
Master’s,
Doctoral or
equivalent
education
Germany 86.2 100.0 109.5 133.0 164.4 174.9
U.S. 76.3 100.0 111.2 162.7 220.2
OECD Av-
erage
82.2 100.0 .. 121.8 143.7 186.6
Panel notes: Full-time full-year earners, year 2016.
Source: OECD.Stat, Table “Relative earnings, by educational attainment”
Panel C: Graduates by field
Field Educa-
tion
Arts &
human-
ities
Social
sci-
ences &
jour-
nalism
Business,
adminis-
tration
& law
Natural
sci-
ences &
mathe-
matics
IT Engi-
neering
Agri-
culture
Health
&
welfare
Ser-
vices
Ger-
many
10.4% 11.9% 7.1% 24.1% 8.4% 4.6% 22.5% 1.8% 6.3% 2.7%
U.S. 8.3% 12.2% 14.9% 22.3% 7.9% 3.9% 7.0% 1.0% 16.3% 6.2%
OECD
Aver-
age
9.9% 11.6% 11.9% 24.8% 6.9% 2.9% 12.8% 1.4% 13.8% 3.8%
Panel notes: Full-time full-year earners, year 2016. Source: OECD.Stat, Table “Graduates by field”
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Table 1.B.2: Alternative employment growth proxy which excludes fresh graduates
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growth based onMCfc × e1 0.0050∗∗ -0.0003
(0.0023) (0.0010)
growth based onMCfc × e2 -0.0002 0.0003
(0.0019) (0.0008)
growth based onMCfc × e3 -0.0001 0.0013
(0.0024) (0.0011)
growth based onMCfc × e4 0.0026 -0.0003
(0.0024) (0.0013)
growth excl rec gradfc × e1 0.0054∗∗ -0.0002
(0.0023) (0.0009)
growth excl rec gradfc × e2 -0.0008 -0.0001
(0.0020) (0.0008)
growth excl rec gradfc × e3 -0.0007 0.0014
(0.0023) (0.0011)
growth excl rec gradfc × e4 0.0014 -0.0002
(0.0024) (0.0013)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I first calculate industry employment growth from Micro Census survey
data instead of using administrative data (growth based onMCfc, col. 1 and 2). I then
modify this proxy by excluding recent college graduates (graduates within last 10 years,
about 6% of all employees) so that the second proxy growth excl rec gradfc is based on
employees with no college and graduates with completed college more than 10 years ago
(col. 3 and 4). Both proxies are measured as annual year on year growth at the 2-digit
industry level and smoothed using a moving-average filter with equal weight on the current
value and the first lag, because of a small number of observations in some industry-year-
cells. These series are subsequently mapped to the field of study level in the same way as the
main employment based proxy. To obtain consistent industry groups over the years 2002
to 2011, I constructed a correspondence from the NACE rev. 1.1 industry classification
(survey waves 2002-09) to the NACE rev. 2 industry classification (survey waves 2009-
11) using the algorithm proposed by Pierce and Schott (2012). 1st quartile, 3rd quartile
and interquartile range of growth based onMCfc: 0.741, 2.726, 1.985. 1
st quartile, 3rd
quartile and interquartile range of growth excl rec gradfc: 0.080, 2.307, 2.227. Entry is
defined as being self-employed in year t and an employee or non-employed in t− 1. Mean
of entry: 0.027. Exit is defined as being an employee or non-employed in year t and
self-employed in t − 1. Mean of exit: 0.007. The sample covers college graduates in the
first four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-
2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of study directly related to the primary or
public sector. Covariates: dummies for gender, foreign, children at graduation and type of
university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study, cohort, year surveyed and number of years
since graduation. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗
denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.B.3: Balanced sample: cohorts 2003-2007
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growthfc × e1 0.0181∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0020∗ -0.0037∗∗
(0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0011) (0.0015)
growthfc × e2 0.0066 0.0072∗ -0.0009 -0.0010
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0014)
growthfc × e3 -0.0047 -0.0029 -0.0012 -0.0016
(0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0017)
growthfc × e4 -0.0047 -0.0028 -0.0010 -0.0005
(0.0052) (0.0043) (0.0022) (0.0020)
growthf,c+1 × e1 0.0043 0.0008
(0.0058) (0.0017)
growthf,c+2 × e2 0.0067 0.0011
(0.0049) (0.0012)
growthf,c+3 × e3 0.0052 -0.0030∗
(0.0038) (0.0018)
growthf,c+4 × e4 0.0035 -0.0035∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0012)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Observations 14696 14696 14696 14696
Notes: In this table I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions on entry into and exit from entrepreneurship for a balanced sample which covers
the cohorts 2003 to 2007. The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after
graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. I exclude fields of study directly
related to the primary or public sector. Entry is defined as being self-employed in year
t and an employee or non-employed in t − 1. Mean of entry: 0.028. Exit is defined as
being an employee or non-employed in year t and self-employed in t − 1. Mean of exit:
0.007. growthfc denotes annual industry growth in the number of employees in the year of
graduation, weighted to the field level using a fixed industry-field distribution of graduates
1 to 5 years after graduation. growthfc × en denotes the interaction with a dummy for
graduates n years after graduation, so that all results are presented separately for each of the
first four years after graduation. growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after graduation.
1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79. Standard
deviation: 1.3. Covariates: dummies for gender, foreign, children at graduation and type
of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study, cohort, year surveyed and number of years
since graduation. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗
denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.B.4: Additional covariates which aim at controlling for selective enrolment
Depvar: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
growthfc × e1 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014)
growthfc × e2 0.0050∗ 0.0049∗ 0.0054∗ 0.0050∗ -0.0016 -0.0016∗ -0.0017 -0.0016
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)
growthfc × e3 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0028∗∗ -0.0026∗∗ -0.0028∗∗ -0.0028∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013)
growthfc × e4 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0023
(0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
ln(# grad.)fc -0.0061 0.0032
(0.0052) (0.0028)
growthage19 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0003)
growthf,c−2 0.0012 -0.0001
(0.0022) (0.0010)
growthf,c−4 -0.0005 0.0001
(0.0022) (0.0007)
FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20264 20407 20407 20407 20264 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions on entry into and exit from entrepreneurship controlling for additional covariates.
ln(# grad.)fc denotes the field-cohort size in the year of graduation. growthage19 denotes
field-specific growth at age 19, the typical enrolment age in Germany. It is constructed
from annual industry growth in the number of employees, weighted to the field level using
a fixed industry-field distribution of graduates 1 to 5 years after graduation. growthf,c−2 is
field-specific growth two years before graduation. growthf,c−4 is field-specific growth four
years before graduation. growthfc denotes field-specific growth in the year of graduation.
growthfc×en denotes the interaction with a dummy for graduates n years after graduation,
so that all results are presented separately for each of the first four years after graduation.
growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after graduation. 1
st quartile, 3rd quartile and in-
terquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79. Standard deviation: 1.3. Entry is defined
as being self-employed in year t and an employee or non-employed in t− 1. Mean of entry:
0.027. Exit is defined as being an employee or non-employed in year t and self-employed in
t− 1. Mean of exit: 0.007. The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after
graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to
2011. I exclude fields of study directly related to the primary or public sector. Covariates:
dummies for gender, foreign, children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed ef-
fects for field of study, cohort, year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust
standard errors in brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%,
∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.B.5: Controlling for linear field of study trends
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growthfc × e1 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0009 -0.0011
(0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0016) (0.0017)
growthfc × e2 0.0043 0.0061∗∗ -0.0013 -0.0009
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0013)
growthfc × e3 -0.0028 -0.0007 -0.0025 -0.0024
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0015)
growthfc × e4 -0.0031 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0012
(0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0018)
growthf,c+1 × e1 0.0015 -0.0003
(0.0038) (0.0012)
growthf,c+2 × e2 0.0057 0.0010
(0.0040) (0.0009)
growthf,c+3 × e3 0.0048 -0.0023∗
(0.0038) (0.0013)
growthf,c+4 × e4 0.0007 -0.0022
(0.0035) (0.0014)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Linear trends yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions on entry into and exit from entrepreneurship controlling for a full set of linear
field of study trends. Entry is defined as being self-employed in year t and an employee
or non-employed in t − 1. Mean of entry: 0.027. Exit is defined as being an employee or
non-employed in year t and self-employed in t− 1. Mean of exit: 0.007. growthfc denotes
annual industry growth in the number of employees in the year of graduation, weighted
to the field level using a fixed industry-field distribution of graduates 1 to 5 years after
graduation. growthfc × en denotes the interaction with a dummy for graduates n years
after graduation, so that all results are presented separately for each of the first four years
after graduation. growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after graduation. 1
st quartile, 3rd
quartile and interquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79. Standard deviation: 1.3.
The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at
graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of
study directly related to the primary or public sector. Covariates: dummies for gender,
foreign, children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study,
cohort, year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors in
brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at
10% level.
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Table 1.B.6: Controlling for age at graduation in order to account for strategic
graduation
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
growthfc × e1 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗∗ -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
growthfc × e2 0.0052∗ 0.0051∗ 0.0050∗ -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
growthfc × e3 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0027∗∗ -0.0027∗∗ -0.0028∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
growthfc × e4 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0023
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Age at grad. -0.0019 0.0019
(0.0085) (0.0049)
Age at grad. squared 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Age 28 + at grad. 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0018)
Age 25− at grad. -0.0096∗∗ -0.0024∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0012)
FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions on entry into and exit from entrepreneurship controlling for different functions
of age at graduation. Age at grad. is the age at graduation. Age ≥ 28 at grad. 1 if the
individual is aged 28 or above at graduation, 0 else. Age ≤ 25 at grad. is 1 if the individual
is aged 25 or less at graduation. Entry is defined as being self-employed in year t and
an employee or non-employed in t − 1. Mean of entry: 0.027. Exit is defined as being
an employee or non-employed in year t and self-employed in t − 1. Mean of exit: 0.007.
growthfc denotes annual industry growth in the number of employees in the year of gradu-
ation, weighted to the field level using a fixed industry-field distribution of graduates 1 to 5
years after graduation. growthfc× en denotes the interaction with a dummy for graduates
n years after graduation, so that all results are presented separately for each of the first four
years after graduation. growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after graduation. 1
st quartile,
3rd quartile and interquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79. Standard deviation: 1.3.
The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at
graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of
study directly related to the primary or public sector. Covariates: dummies for gender,
foreign, children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study,
cohort, year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors in
brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at
10% level.
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Table 1.B.7: The effect of economic conditions on entrepreneurship among natives
Sample: Baseline Drop late immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Entry Exit Entry Exit
growthfc × e1 0.0112∗∗∗ -0.0012 0.0095∗∗∗ -0.0013
(0.0036) (0.0014) (0.0031) (0.0015)
growthfc × e2 0.0050∗ -0.0016 0.0035 -0.0016
(0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0011)
growthfc × e3 -0.0017 -0.0028∗∗ -0.0025 -0.0018
(0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0013)
growthfc × e4 -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0023
(0.0041) (0.0018) (0.0041) (0.0020)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 19560 19560
Notes: In columns 3-4, I exclude non-German citizens who immigrated less than 2 years
before graduation from college. Estimations are performed as linear probability models.
The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged 23-32
at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields
of study directly related to the primary or public sector. Entry is defined as being self-
employed in year t and an employee or non-employed in t− 1. Mean of entry: 0.027. Exit
is defined as being an employee or non-employed in year t and self-employed in t−1. Mean
of exit: 0.007. growthfc denotes annual industry growth in the number of employees in
the year of graduation, weighted to the field level using a fixed industry-field distribution
of graduates 1 to 5 years after graduation. growthfc × en denotes the interaction with a
dummy for graduates n years after graduation, so that all results are presented separately
for each of the first four years after graduation. growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after
graduation. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79.
Standard deviation: 1.3. Covariates: dummies for gender, foreign, children at graduation
and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study, cohort, year surveyed and
number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at field of
study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.B.8: HP-filtered number of employees and total hours worked as proxies
for economic conditions
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
employed (HP )fc × e1 0.7694∗∗ -0.1905
(0.3777) (0.1513)
employed (HP )fc × e2 0.0444 -0.2284
(0.4411) (0.1424)
employed (HP )fc × e3 -0.3182 -0.2922∗
(0.3787) (0.1566)
employed (HP )fc × e4 -0.1345 -0.1296
(0.5569) (0.1844)
hoursworked (HP )fc × e1 0.4781∗∗ -0.0809
(0.1967) (0.1035)
hoursworked (HP )fc × e2 0.0578 -0.1579
(0.2489) (0.1236)
hoursworked (HP )fc × e3 -0.2280 -0.1850
(0.3461) (0.1577)
hoursworked (HP )fc × e4 0.1535 -0.1889
(0.4173) (0.1862)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of eco-
nomic conditions on entry into and exit from entrepreneurship using HP-filtered num-
ber of employees and total hours worked as proxies for economic conditions. The vari-
ables employees (HP )fc and hoursworked (HP )fc denote the cyclical components from
HP-filtered logarithms of annual industry-level number of employees and hours worked,
weighted to the field of study level. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of
employees (HP )fc: -0.008, 0.003, 0.011. 1
st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range
of hoursworked (HP )fc: -0.011, 0.011, 0.022. Entry is defined as being self-employed in
year t and an employee or non-employed in t − 1. Mean of entry: 0.027. Exit is defined
as being an employee or non-employed in year t and self-employed in t− 1. Mean of exit:
0.007. The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged
23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude
fields of study directly related to the primary or public sector. Covariates: dummies for
gender, foreign, children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of
study, cohort, year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors
in brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and
∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.B.9: GDP and wage growth as proxies for economic conditions
Dependent var.: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP gr.fc × e1 0.0013∗ 0.0008 0.0018∗∗ 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0004)
GDP gr.fc × e2 0.0013 0.0006 0.0009 0.0005
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0005)
GDP gr.fc × e3 0.0012 0.0011 0.0009 -0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0006)
GDP gr.fc × e4 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0017 -0.0001
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0007)
empl gr.fc × e1 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0010
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0015)
empl gr.fc × e2 0.0052∗ 0.0048∗ -0.0019∗
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0010)
empl gr.fc × e3 -0.0027 -0.0009 -0.0033∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0014)
empl gr.fc × e4 -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0020
(0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0020)
wage gr.fc × e1 -0.0061∗∗ -0.0056∗ -0.0079∗∗ -0.0019∗ -0.0021∗
(0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0011) (0.0011)
wage gr.fc × e2 -0.0008 -0.0030 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0020
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0015)
wage gr.fc × e3 0.0029 0.0007 0.0032 -0.0018 -0.0024
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0013) (0.0017)
wage gr.fc × e4 -0.0064 -0.0073∗ -0.0066 0.0002 0.0004
(0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0056) (0.0016) (0.0018)
FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I use annual year on year growth of real GDP (GDP growthfc) and
hourly wage growth (wage growth fc) in the year of graduation as alternative proxies for
economic conditions. Both proxies are measured at the 2-digit industry level and subse-
quently mapped to the field of study level in the same way as the main employment based
proxy. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of GDP growthfc: -1.635, 4.044,
5.679. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of wage growth fc: 0.831, 2.285,
1.454. Dependent variables and sample as in tables 3 and 4. Covariates: dummies for
gender, foreign, children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of
study, cohort, year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors
in brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and
∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.B.10: Controlling for lagged effects of growth in years 1-4 after graduation
and interacted field - calendar year fixed effects
Additional Controls Interacted Field-Year FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Entry Exit Entry Exit
growthfc × e1 0.0129∗∗∗ -0.0012 0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0015
(0.0035) (0.0014) (0.0038) (0.0013)
growthfc × e2 0.0056∗∗ -0.0023 0.0050 -0.0022∗
(0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0012)
growthfc × e3 0.0002 -0.0030∗ -0.0014 -0.0015
(0.0039) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0015)
growthfc × e4 0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0004
(0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0043) (0.0017)
growthf,c+1 × e1 0.0022 -0.0006
(0.0036) (0.0012)
growthf,c+1 × e2 0.0031 0.0017
(0.0022) (0.0013)
growthf,c+1 × e3 -0.0008 0.0000
(0.0043) (0.0022)
growthf,c+1 × e4 -0.0050 -0.0015
(0.0045) (0.0022)
growthf,c+2 × e2 0.0058 -0.0001
(0.0042) (0.0009)
growthf,c+2 × e3 0.0046 0.0010
(0.0035) (0.0016)
growthf,c+2 × e4 0.0030 -0.0024
(0.0049) (0.0025)
growthf,c+3 × e3 0.0041 -0.0030∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0015)
growthf,c+3 × e4 -0.0024 0.0017
(0.0038) (0.0020)
growthf,c+4 × e4 0.0017 -0.0045∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0023)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Field-year FE no no yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions on entry into and exit from entrepreneurship controlling for contemporaneous
and lagged effects of growth in the years after graduation (columns 1-2) and interacted field
- calendar year fixed effects (columns 3-4). Both specifications aim at accounting flexibly
for correlated subsequent economic conditions. growthfc× en denotes the interaction with
a dummy for graduates n years after graduation, so that all results are presented separately
for each of the first four years after graduation. growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after
graduation. Sample as in the main results. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered
at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.B.11: Employment growth based on all employed
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
alt.growthfc × e1 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0007 -0.0009
(0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0014) (0.0015)
alt.growthfc × e2 0.0059∗∗ 0.0070∗∗ -0.0014 -0.0010
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0010)
alt.growthfc × e3 -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0025∗ -0.0024∗
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0014)
alt.growthfc × e4 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0012
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0022) (0.0021)
alt.growthf,c+1 × e1 0.0012 -0.0005
(0.0035) (0.0012)
alt.growthf,c+2 × e2 0.0053 0.0009
(0.0038) (0.0009)
alt.growthf,c+3 × e3 0.0063 -0.0025∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0012)
alt.growthf,c+4 × e4 0.0018 -0.0025∗
(0.0039) (0.0014)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions on entry into and exit from entrepreneurship. Different from the main specifi-
cation, I construct alt.growthfc from annual growth in the number of all employed rather
than only paid employees in an industry. Industry employment growth is weighted to the
field level using the average industry-field distribution of graduates 1 to 5 years after grad-
uation. alt.growthfc × en denotes the interaction with a dummy for graduates n years
after graduation, so that all results are presented separately for each of the first four years
after graduation. alt.growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after graduation. 1
st quartile,
3rd quartile and interquartile range of alt.growth: 0.17, 1.74, 1,57. Entry is defined as
being self-employed in year t and an employee or non-employed in t − 1. Mean of entry:
0.027. Exit is defined as being an employee or non-employed in year t and self-employed in
t− 1. Mean of exit: 0.007. The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after
graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to
2011. I exclude fields of study directly related to the primary or public sector. Covariates:
dummies for gender, foreign, children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed ef-
fects for field of study, cohort, year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust
standard errors in brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%,
∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 1.B.12: The effect of future economic conditions on entry into entrepreneur-
ship
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growthfc × e1 0.0111∗∗∗ -0.0016
(0.0039) (0.0016)
growthfc × e2 0.0052∗∗ -0.0015
(0.0026) (0.0010)
growthfc × e3 -0.0017 -0.0027∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0014)
growthfc × e4 -0.0017 -0.0021
(0.0042) (0.0018)
growthf,c+2 × e1 -0.0035 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0009
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0009) (0.0011)
growthf,c+3 × e2 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004
(0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0011) (0.0011)
growthf,c+4 × e3 -0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0008
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.0009)
growthf,c+5 × e4 -0.0024 -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0013
(0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0011)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table, I provide linear probability model estimates on entry into entrepreneur-
ship in each of the first four years after graduation. Column 1 shows the effect of employ-
ment growth in the subsequent year on entry in each of the first four years after graduation.
Column 2 adds the effect of employment growth in the year of graduation. Columns 3 and
4 show the equivalent results for exit from entrepreneurship. Entry is defined as being
self-employed in year t and an employee or non-employed in t − 1. Mean of entry: 0.027.
Exit is defined as being an employee or non-employed in year t and self-employed in t− 1.
Mean of exit: 0.007. growthfc denotes annual industry growth in the number of employees
in the year of graduation, weighted to the field level using a fixed industry-field distribution
of graduates 1 to 5 years after graduation. growthfc × en denotes the interaction with a
dummy for graduates n years after graduation. growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after
graduation. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79.
The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at
graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of
study directly related to the primary or public sector. Covariates: dummies for gender,
foreign, children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study,
cohort, year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors in
brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at
10% level.
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Table 1.B.13: Employment growth at the original NACE rev. 2 industry level,
weighted to fields of study
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growthfc × e1 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0029∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0010) (0.0012)
growthfc × e2 0.0039 0.0050∗∗ -0.0025∗∗ -0.0022∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0011) (0.0011)
growthfc × e3 -0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0033∗∗ -0.0034∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0015) (0.0014)
growthfc × e4 -0.0031 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0020
(0.0044) (0.0036) (0.0020) (0.0020)
growthf,c+1 × e1 -0.0005 -0.0007
(0.0036) (0.0013)
growthf,c+2 × e2 0.0057 0.0006
(0.0043) (0.0009)
growthf,c+3 × e3 0.0062 -0.0031∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0015)
growthf,c+4 × e4 -0.0007 -0.0030∗
(0.0040) (0.0016)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions on entry into and exit from entrepreneurship. Different from the main specifica-
tion, I construct growthfc from annual growth in the number of employees in the original
NACE rev. 2.0 industries rather than previously joining small industries. Industry em-
ployment growth is weighted to the field level using the average industry-field distribution
of graduates 1 to 5 years after graduation. growthfc × en denotes the interaction with a
dummy for graduates n years after graduation, so that all results are presented separately
for each of the first four years after graduation. growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after
graduation. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of growth: -0.08, 1.63, 1.71.
Entry is defined as being self-employed in year t and an employee or non-employed in t−1.
Mean of entry: 0.027. Exit is defined as being an employee or non-employed in year t
and self-employed in t − 1. Mean of exit: 0.007. The sample covers college graduates in
the first four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts
2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of study directly related to the primary or
public sector. Covariates: dummies for gender, foreign, children at graduation and type of
university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study, cohort, year surveyed and number of years
since graduation. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗
denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level. 57
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Table 1.B.14: Weighting matrix based on individuals surveyed in years 2003-2011,
using a self-constructed correspondence between NACE rev. 1.1 and NACE rev. 2
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
growthcf × e1 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0021∗ -0.0023∗
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0012) (0.0013)
growthcf × e2 0.0040 0.0046∗ -0.0017 -0.0013
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0012)
growthcf × e3 -0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0031∗∗ -0.0030∗
(0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0015) (0.0016)
growthcf × e4 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0026 -0.0018
(0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0024) (0.0023)
growthf,c+1 × e1 -0.0022 -0.0009
(0.0031) (0.0014)
growthf,c+2 × e2 0.0043 0.0011
(0.0046) (0.0009)
growthf,c+3 × e3 0.0058 -0.0031∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0016)
growthf,c+4 × e4 0.0004 -0.0023
(0.0036) (0.0015)
FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I provide linear probability model estimates for the effect of economic
conditions on entry into and exit from entrepreneurship. Different from the main specifica-
tion, I construct growthfc from annual growth of the number of employees in aggregated
industry groups, weighted to the field level using the average industry-field distribution
of graduates surveyed in 2003-2011. To obtain consistent industry groups over the years
2002 to 2011, I to construct a correspondence from the NACE rev. 1.1 industry classifi-
cation (survey waves 2002-09) to the NACE rev. 2 industry classification (survey waves
2009-11). I construct the correspondence from the 2009 wave of the Micro Census which
contains employer industries coded in both industry classifications. growthfc× en denotes
the interaction with a dummy for graduates n years after graduation, so that all results
are presented separately for each of the first four years after graduation. growthf,c+n in-
dicates growth n years after graduation. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range
of growth: -0.08, 1.63, 1.71. Entry is defined as being self-employed in year t and an
employee or non-employed in t − 1. Mean of entry: 0.027. Exit is defined as being an
employee or non-employed in year t and self-employed in t− 1. Mean of exit: 0.007. The
sample covers college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged 23-32 at grad-
uation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude fields of study
directly related to the primary or public sector. Covariates: dummies for gender, foreign,
children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of study, cohort,
year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors in brackets,
clustered at field of study level.
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Table 1.B.15: More parsimonious sets of fixed effects, entry
Dependent variable: Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Baseline)
growthfc × e1 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0034)
growthfc × e2 0.0050∗ 0.0037∗ 0.0041∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0056∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0018)
growthfc × e3 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0002 0.0026 -0.0018 0.0007
(0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0026)
growthfc × e4 -0.0018 0.0002 0.0002 0.0045 0.0008 0.0035
(0.0041) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0023)
FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE (t) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Field FE (f) yes yes yes no yes no
Cohort FE (c) yes no yes yes no no
Years since highest yes yes no yes no yes
degree FE (n)
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I modify the set of fixed effects for the model with entry as dependent
variable. Column 1 is the baseline specification (table 1.3, column 2).
growthfc×en denotes the interaction with a dummy for graduates n years after graduation,
so that all results are presented separately for each of the first four years after graduation.
growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after graduation. 1
st quartile, 3rd quartile and in-
terquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79. Standard deviation: 1.3. Entry is defined
as being self-employed in year t and an employee or non-employed in t− 1. Mean of entry:
0.027. The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged
23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude
fields of study directly related to the primary or public sector. Covariates: dummies for
gender, foreign, children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of
study, cohort, year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors
in brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and
∗ at 10% level.
59
CHAPTER 1
Table 1.B.16: More parsimonious sets of fixed effects, exit
Dependent variable: Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Baseline)
growthfc × e1 -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0021 0.0007 -0.0008 0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0009)
growthfc × e2 -0.0016 -0.0007 -0.0019∗∗ 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0002
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0008)
growthfc × e3 -0.0028∗∗ -0.0025∗∗∗ -0.0035∗∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0020∗∗ -0.0016
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0010)
growthfc × e4 -0.0023 -0.0025∗ -0.0036∗∗ 0.0005 -0.0024∗ -0.0014
(0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012)
FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE (t) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Field FE (f) yes yes yes no yes no
Cohort FE (c) yes no yes yes no no
Years since highest yes yes no yes no yes
degree FE (n)
Observations 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407 20407
Notes: In this table I modify the set of fixed effects for the model with exit as dependent
variable. Column 1 is the baseline specification (table 1.4, column 2).
growthfc×en denotes the interaction with a dummy for graduates n years after graduation,
so that all results are presented separately for each of the first four years after graduation.
growthf,c+n indicates growth n years after graduation. 1
st quartile, 3rd quartile and in-
terquartile range of growth: -0.02, 1.77, 1.79. Standard deviation: 1.3. Exit is defined as
being an employee or non-employed in year t and self-employed in t − 1. Mean of exit:
0.007. The sample covers college graduates in the first four years after graduation, aged
23-32 at graduation, excluding PhDs. Cohorts 2003-2010, observed up to 2011. I exclude
fields of study directly related to the primary or public sector. Covariates: dummies for
gender, foreign, children at graduation and type of university. FE: Fixed effects for field of
study, cohort, year surveyed and number of years since graduation. Robust standard errors
in brackets, clustered at field of study level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and
∗ at 10% level.
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Chapter 2
Entrepreneurial Entry and
Deregulation
This chapter is part of joint work with Susanne Prantl.
2.1 Introduction
There is a long-standing interest in the entry of entrepreneurs and new firms as entry
is widely recognized as a major driver of job creation and economic growth.1 One
important factor that can inhibit and shape entry is regulatory restrictions. Their
role attracts substantial attention from policy makers, as well as the public, but is
not yet fully understood.
In this paper, we study the role of entry regulation and its consequences for en-
trepreneurial entry and exit, making use of a reform to a specific and strict entry
restriction. The reform consists of a major change to the German Trade and Crafts
Code (Gesetz zur Ordnung des Handwerks) in 2004. Up to the reform, the Code
imposed a substantial mandatory standard, the master craftsman certificate (Meis-
tertitel), on entrepreneurs who wanted to start a legally independent firm in one of
1 See, for example, Glaeser, Kerr and Kerr (2015) on the spatial link between entrepreneur-
ship and employment and Aghion et al. (2004, 2009) on the effect of foreign firm entry
on domestic innovation and productivity.
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a large number of regulated product markets. Similar standards are known in other
European countries as well, but the regulation in Germany was particularly strict.
A master craftsman certificate is a professional degree that an individual can earn
after several stages of training, collecting work experience, and taking examinations.
Earning the certificate involves not only monetary costs, such as fees for prepara-
tion courses, but also a substantial investment of time. As of 2004, the German
master craftsman certificate lost its role as a mandatory standard for prospective
entrepreneurs (up to some minor exceptions). Given the substantial costs involved
in acquiring the certificate, the deregulation led to a significant reduction in entry
restrictions. Due to two core features, the reform qualifies as a suitable quasi-natural
experiment for identifying effects of an important and substantial entry regulation.
First, the set of product markets affected by the regulation relates to a diverse set
of manufacturing industries, as well as service industries, and its composition goes
back long in time, at least to times before World War II. Second, the timing of the
reform was exogenously determined by the strengthening of regulatory activities
at the supra-national level of the European Community and a related court case
filed at the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in
2002. Still before the Federal Constitutional Court reached its decision, the Fed-
eral Government of Germany (Bundesregierung) and the German Bundestag moved
ahead by opting for the major change to the German Trade and Crafts Code as
implemented in 2004.
For our empirical analysis, we combine data from several sources, using, in par-
ticular, a comprehensive and large German population survey where participation
is mandatory (Micro Census). Our main sample with about 600,000 observations
covers the years 1996 to 2009, and 51 industries in manufacturing and services. In
our empirical analysis we implement a difference-in-differences approach, estimating
effects of the deregulation reform by comparing changes in outcome variables over
time in industries with different deregulation intensities.
Our main empirical findings are fourfold. First, we find a statistically and eco-
nomically significant positive effect of the deregulation reform on entry into self-
employment. Second, most new ventures start without employees. This is in line
with expectations since the entry regulation effectively constituted a fixed cost to
prospective entrepreneurs, which is most restrictive for entrepreneurs which intended
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to start on a small scale. Third, in consequence of the reform the entrants are less
likely to have no schooling or low schooling. Finally, we see no changes in overall
exit from self-employment in the first six years after the reform. The absence of
any decrease in the level of general education among entrants and the unchanged
exit from entrepreneurship suggest that the entrants which entered in consequence
of the reform may be of similar quality.
We contribute to the literature on the effects of entry regulation. An earlier set
of studies based on cross country comparison documents a negative relationship be-
tween country-level measures of the time it takes to register a new business and
firm entry.2 A second, more closely related strength of literature directly assesses
the consequences of policies that reduce specific firm entry restrictions using cross
region or industry variation. Among the recent contributions to that literature are
Branstetter et al. (2014) who study the effects of a reduction of administrative pro-
cedures in Portugal, as well as Bruhn (2011) and Kaplan, Piedra and Seira (2011)
who consider a similar administrative reform in Mexico. All three studies document
positive effects on firm entry, but only Branstetter et al. (2014) studies the char-
acteristics and performance of entrants. Finally, there are two studies by Prantl
and Spitz-Oener (2009) and Prantl (2012) which analyze the economic effects of the
entry restriction following from the German Trade and Crafts Code on entry into
self-employment. Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2018) use variation in entry restriction
generated by the German Trade and Crafts Code in an analysis of the effect of immi-
gration on natives’ wages. Differently from this chapter they use quasi-experimental
variation from the German reunification.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the considered entry
regulation and its reform in section 2.2. We explain the empirical strategy in section
2.3 and the data in section 2.4. The empirical results are discussed in section 2.5.
Section 2.6 summarizes our findings and provides conclusions.
2 For example, Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007) show that in countries where it takes less
time to register a new business, expansionary industry demand and technology shifts
lead to higher entry and employment growth.
3 Furthermore, Damelang, Haupt and Abraham (2018) study wage changes in occupations
related to the GTCC around the time of the 2004 reform. Rostam-Afschar (2014) and
Zwiener (2017) study the effect of the GTCC reform on self-employment and related
labor market outcomes. I will relate to their findings in section 2.5.
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2.2 The regulation of firm entry and its
reform
2.2.1 The considered entry regulation
The studied firm entry regulation is based on the German Trade and Crafts Code
(GTCC; Gesetz zur Ordnung des Handwerks, HwO, December 24, 2003), which - up
to its reform in 2004 - imposed a substantial restriction on firm entry into certain
product markets, but not in others. The roots of the law go back to the histori-
cal guild system of the Middle Ages, when skilled craftsmen who wanted to start
a firm needed to join the respective guild (Ogilvie, 2014). In its current form, the
entry regulation was formally introduced in 1935. From then on, individuals who
wanted to start a business in a regulated product market needed to obtain a master
craftsman certificate.4 After World War II the entry regulation was confirmed in
both parts of the then divided West and East Germany. It became part of a federal
law in 1953, including a precise list of affected product markets (Gesetz zur Ord-
nung des Handwerks, September 17, 1953).5 In 1994, about 18% of all Germans
were employed in businesses which were active in product markets regulated under
the GTCC.6 The covered product markets are in fields as diverse as printing and
bookbinding, baker and butcher trades or hairdressing. Often, very related prod-
uct markets are not regulated, such as copying and paper production, manufacture
and sale of ice-cream or the beautician trade. The entry regulation and its product
market coverage remained essentially unchanged until before the here considered
reform.7 We will make use of the long-standing character of the regulation in our
identification strategy.
Until 2004, entrepreneurs wanting to start a firm in a product market regulated
4 The entry restriction was part of a forced integration of the crafts associations into the
totalitarian Nazi system (Wagner, 2006). See Appendix 2.A.1 for historical background
on the entry regulation.
5 Former West Germany’s regulation was adopted without changes by the reunified Ger-
many in 1990.
6 The share is based on 6.3 million employed in firms which are regis-
tered with a crafts association (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1996) and 35.7 mil-
lion employed in Germany (DESTATIS database “Genesis-Online”, https://www-
genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online , Table 12211-0001).
7 Appendix 2.A.1 provides details.
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under the German Trade and Crafts Code needed to be registered with the local
craftsman association.8,9 Generally, this requires a master craftsman certificate in
the respective regulated product market, which can be attained by taking the mas-
ter craftsman examination.10 Applicants are generally required a two to three year
apprenticeship and three years of work as a journeyman.11 The master exam tests
knowledge on running a business such as book-keeping and legal aspects, skills nec-
essary for training apprentices and occupation-specific skills. The examination is
carried out in closed sessions by a regional committee, in which three out of five ex-
aminers are from the same regulated product market.12 In the 1990s, between 10%
and 25% of the candidates failed the master craftsman exam.13 Candidates typically
prepare for the examination by taking specialized preparatory courses, which take
between one (full-time) and three years (part-time) and typically have to be paid
by the candidate. Taken together, the necessary time investment and the financial
costs involved in attaining the mandatory entry standard constitute a substantial
restriction to starting a firm in the regulated product markets. Similar regulation
exists in other countries, as for example in Austria or the Netherlands, but the rules
in Germany were particularly strict (Monopolkommission, 1998).
At its legal re-introduction in post-war Germany in 1953, proponents of the GTCC
regulation stressed the business-related knowledge and skills which form part of the
master craftsman examination, claiming positive effects on firm stability (Deutscher
Bundestag, 1953, 12546). However, several institutions such as the German Mo-
8 Note that the firm entry regulation here is different from occupational licensing. It
imposes restrictions on individuals who want to start a business, whereas occupational
licensing laws restrict the access to occupations for both employees and self-employed
unless they fulfill specific occupational standards (see Kleiner, 2000, among others).
9 More precisely, the regulation applies to businesses in regulated product markets which
are to be distinguished from industrial manufacturing. See Appendix 2.A.2 for details
on the scope of the regulation.
10 Note that there is the possibility of applying for an exemption to the master certificate
requirement, if the applicant proves to be equally qualified. Exemptions accounted for
about 8% of all registrations in the years 1998-2003. See Appendix 2.A.2 for further
information.
11 An apprenticeship involves professional education at a vocational school and on-the-job
training in a regulated product markets. It is completed by a journeyman examination,
which certifies the required skills for undertaking all occupation-specific tasks
12 The committee consists of an independent chair, three employed in the respective regu-
lated product market, of which two are incumbent firm owners, and one expert in law
and business administration.
13 Source: Data provided directly by the German Confederation of Skilled Crafts, ZDH.
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nopolies Commission have long criticized the entry regulation in the GTCC (Dereg-
ulierungskommission, 1991, Monopolkommission, 1998, Monopolkommission, 2002).
The regulation is argued to restrict firm entry, industry dynamics and job creation.
2.2.2 Reform of the entry regulation
In 2003 the German government coalition proposed a major reform of the Trade
and Crafts Code, coming into effect on 1 January 2004.14 The government explicitly
motivated the reform as a response to an inconsistency of the former regulation with
EU and national constitutional law (Bundestagsdrucksache 15/1206, June 24, 2003).
In 2000, the European Court of Justice declared the administrative procedures,
which EU citizens had to undertake when offering products or services in product
markets regulated under the GTCC, incompatible with the EU Freedom of Services
Principle (ECJ, C-58/98 “Corsten”, October 3, 2000).15
In order to comply with the ECJ ruling, the German government permitted EU
citizens to offer their products and services without any prerequisites. They were
allowed to start a firm in a regulated product market if they documented sufficient
professional experience, irrespective of professional certificates (§ 1 EU/EWR-HwV,
December 20, 2007). This situation was claimed to “discriminate” Germans vis-a`-
vis EU citizens, which served as a basis for an influential case filed at the German
Constitutional Court in 2002 (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1 BvR 1730/02, December
5, 2005). Still before the Court reached its decision, the governing coalition moved
ahead by proposing the abolition of the master craftsman certificate’s role as a
mandatory entry standard.16
We will rely on this exogenous triggering of the reform in our identification strat-
egy.
The degree of entry deregulation differs across two groups of regulated product
markets. In 35 out of the 94 product markets, entrepreneurs can now start a firm if
they possess a journeymen degree and six years of professional experience, of which
four years must have been in a leading position, rather than taking the master
14 Drittes Gesetz zur A¨nderung der Handwerksordnung und anderer handwerksrechtlicher
Vorschriften, December 24, 2003
15 See section 2.A.3 for further information.
16 See Appendix 2.A.3 for more detailed information.
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craftsman examination (“Altgesellen-Regel”). In this group of product markets,
prospective entrepreneurs need to attain a journeyman certificate and can then
decide whether to acquire the master craftsman examination or work another six
years so that they fulfill the required work experience.
In another 53 previously regulated product markets, the need to attain the master
craftsman certificate in order to register a firm was fully abandoned. For this sub-
group, the reform effectively led to a reduction in required professional experience
by about six years17 as well as the elimination of the journeyman examination and
the master craftsman examination as a requirement for prospective entrepreneurs.
As the intensity of deregulation between these two groups of product markets is
potentially endogenous, we will not distinguish them in our empirical analysis.18
Note that in six previously regulated product markets the master craftsman cer-
tificate remained in force as a mandatory standard for entrants.19 In these fields, the
entry regulation was not challenged by the court rulings, because entry into these
fields is restricted in most EU member states.20
In addition, there were minor changes to the entry regulation. See Appendix 2.A.4
for details and sources.
In short, the reform - leading to the loss of the master craftsman certificate’s role
as a mandatory entry standard - considerably decreased the entry costs in some
product markets, but not in others. We exploit this variation to investigate how
regulatory entry restrictions affect the propensity to start a firm. In the described
context, we expect an increase in the individual propensity to start a firm in the
affected product markets. We will empirically investigate this research question
using the empirical model presented in the following section.
17 The six years result from two to three years apprenticeship plus three years of required
professional experience before taking the master craftsman examination.
18 There was a strong debate about the assignment of product markets to either of these two
categories (“Altgesellen-Regel” vs. full deregulation). Initially, the government planned
to fully deregulate 65 occupations. In a last-minute agreement with the opposition, 12
trades remained regulated under the “Altgesellen-Regel”, leading to the full deregulation
of only 53 trades.
19 These are chimney sweeps, opticians, hearing aid acousticians, orthopedic technicians,
orthopedic shoemakers and dental technicians.
20 These product markets are excluded from the main sample. Including them in the
comparison group leaves the main results unchanged (Appendix table 2.C.5, lines 9-
10).
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2.3 Empirical model
2.3.1 Model specification
We make use of the GTCC reform to identify the effect of entry regulation on entry
into and exit out of entrepreneurship. We set up a difference-in-differences model
effectively comparing changes in entrepreneurial entry and exit over time in product
markets with a differing intensity of firm entry deregulation.
We estimate several versions of the following model:
yijt = α + β sharej × reformt + Xijt′γ + θt + µj + ijt (2.1)
where subscript i denotes individuals working in 3-digit industry j, and t denotes
calendar years.21
We implement our main analysis at the level of industries rather than occupations
for two reasons. First, we focus on outcomes related to industry dynamics. Second,
the firm entry regulation resulting from the GTCC restricts potential entrepreneurs
in the product markets covered by the GTCC.22
The main explanatory variable is a measure of firm entry deregulation sharej ×
reformt. Sharej takes values between zero and one, corresponding to the indus-
tries’ pre-reform share of employed in deregulated product markets.23
In order to increase the comparability of the included industries in terms of un-
observed time-varying confounders, we restrict our main sample to 51 out of 134
private-sector industries with a sharej > 0. This ensures that also the comparison
industries were at least partially affected by the GTCC entry restriction in 1994.
We carefully test for the sensitivity of the results to this sample restriction.24
The indicator variable reformt takes the value one in all years beginning in
2004 when the reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code took effect, and zero
21 We use the national classification of industries, edition 2003, issued by the German
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). It is closely related to the European clas-
sification NACE Rev. 1.1.
22 An analysis at the occupation level gives similar results, see row 23 of Appendix Table
2.C.5.
23 See section 2.4.1 for the calculation of the treatment intensity.
24 Results of estimations for entrepreneurial entry and exit on the sample of all 134 private-
sector industries are very similar to those estimated on the restricted sample (columns
(3) and (4) of Table 2.C.4).
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before. The interaction term is a treatment intensity which proxies for the deregu-
latory change in the ease of starting a business in an industry. The main dependent
variables yijt are entry into and exit out of self-employment. Individual background
variables Xijt include age, age squared and binary variables for gender, non-German
citizenship and both general and professional education. Further, Xijt includes as
well fixed effects for the current occupation, since human capital is partly occupa-
tion specific. State fixed effects and fourth order state trends proxy for region-time
specific heterogeneity. Industry fixed effects µj allow for selection on level differ-
ences between industries. Year fixed effects θt capture unobserved aggregate macro
shocks. The construction of the variables is explained in the data section.
We estimate ordinary least squares estimates of linear probability models, even
though the main dependent variables are binary. The main reason is potential in-
consistency of non-linear models with a large number of fixed effects due to the
incidental parameter problem. However, the main results are confirmed when esti-
mated with probit models with industry and year fixed effects, as we show in rows
(13) and (14) of Appendix Table 2.C.5. In all regressions, observations are weighted
to readjust to the structure of the population sampled from.
We cluster standard errors at the industry level to allow for arbitrary forms of
correlation within industries. In our preferred sample the number of industry clusters
is 51.25
2.3.2 Identification
We identify the deregulatory effect on the propensity to start a business using re-
form induced variation in firm entry regulation within product markets over time. β
corresponds to an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) under the assump-
tion that the deregulation was unrelated to changes in the potential non-treatment
outcomes over time (Blundell and Dias, 2009; Lechner, 2011). Stated differently, we
assume that in the absence of the reform, the industries would have evolved similarly
over time. For example, our strategy would be misleading if industries with a large
25 Using monte-carlo simulations of difference-in-differences models, Bertrand, Duflo and
Mullainathan (2004) showed that allowing for arbitrary error correlation through clus-
tering standard errors at the longitudinal dimension achieves rejection rates close to
those of a simulation with a known covariance matrix when the number of clusters
exceeds 50.
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1994 share of employed in deregulated product markets (sharej) experienced rapid
growth around the year of the reform.
We argue the deregulation to be exogenous to unobserved confounding factors
based on two aspects of the reform. First, as explained in section 2.2, the set of
eventually deregulated product markets was legally defined in 1953 and remained
essentially unchanged up to the reform in 2004. This rules out a selection of regulated
industries in response to unobserved trends affecting the outcome variable (Besley
and Case, 2000). Second, the timing of the reform was determined exogenously
by court decisions at the European and national level (section 2.2). Given this
longstanding cross-sectional variation in regulatory status and exogenous timing of
the reform, we argue that the policy shift is exogenous to any differential unobserved
trends around the time of reform. Even though this common trend assumption
cannot be tested directly since it involves unobserved outcomes, we establish the
credibility of the assumption by testing for differential trends in outcome variables
in any of the eight pre-reform years (Figure 2.1), by additionally including linear
industry trends estimated on the pre-reform sample (Table 2.7) and controlling for
lagged industry sales (rows 7 and 8 of Appendix Table 2.C.5).
Furthermore, one may claim that potential entrants may adjust their behavior in
response to an anticipation of the 2004 reform. Although the regulation was repeat-
edly criticized in the preceding decades, it was completely unclear when or whether
at all the entry regulation would be abandoned due to the backing by the German
constitutional court up to 2003. This is confirmed by the absence of any pre-reform
dip in entry rates in the years immediately preceding the reform (cf. Figure 2.1).
Further, our identification strategy relies on the absence of systematic unobserved
composition changes of the industries in order to ensure before-after comparabil-
ity. Our use of individual level data and inclusion of a rich set of individual control
variables enables us to control for compositional changes in relevant observable char-
acteristics such as general and professional education, age, gender, occupation and
nationality.
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2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
2.4.1 Data
The main data set is a comprehensive and large German population survey, called
the Micro Census.26 It is a repeated annual survey of a one percent random sample
of the German population, carried out by the Statistical Offices of the German Fed-
eral States (see Appendix 2.B.1 for details on the data set). The survey provides
us with several advantages. Firstly, the data is of particular high quality, which is
reflected in low non-response rates (response to most questions is legally required)
and high comparability of items across survey waves.27 Secondly, it contains detailed
work-related information on self-employed, employees, unemployed and individuals
outside the labor force, allowing us to control for a rich set of individual-level char-
acteristics.
We use repeated cross-sectional data from scientific use files of the Micro Census
for all waves from 1996 to 2009.28 Since our analysis is at the industry level, we
restrict our main sample to all currently employed (self-employed or wage earner), as
their industry affiliation can be determined directly.29 Further, we limit our sample
to those aged 20 to 5930 and exclude individuals working in the public sector, non-
profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector.31
The main dependent variables are defined as follows. We define entry as being self-
employed in period t and having worked as employee, been unemployed or outside
26 Scientific Use File des Mikrozensus, FDZ der Statistischen A¨mter des Bundes und der
La¨nder
27 The Micro Census contributes to official national and EU-level statistics such as the EU
Labor Force Survey.
28 The survey was conducted in April of each year up to 2004 and throughout the year in
all subsequent waves.
29 The results are very similar when we include unemployed and individuals currently
outside the labor force that worked at least once in their life. They are assigned to
industries according to the industry they last worked in. The results remain virtually
unchanged (columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 2.C.4).
30 Estimations on a sub-sample restricted to individuals aged 25 to 54 show very similar
results (rows 11 and 12 of Appendix Table 2.C.5)
31 We exclude the following industries (2-digit SIC rev. 3 / NACE rev. 1 in brackets):
agriculture (01-05), mining (10-14), water provision (41), public administration (75),
education (80), health (85), public utilities (90), non-profit organizations (91), private
households (95) and extra-territorial entities (99). This leads to a sample of industry
families with the following industries (“private” sector): 15-40, 45-74 and 92-93.
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the labour force in t− 1. The employment status in t− 1 (12 months ago) is asked
retrospectively in t.32 Note that in the entry regressions, the entrants’ industry
affiliation (and treatment status) is measured in t, i.e. the first period of self-
employment. Exit is defined as being self-employed in t and working as employee,
being unemployed or outside the labour force in t + 1. Analogous to entry, we use
the variable “employment status 12 months ago” of the survey of year t + 1 to
construct this variable. Exitors are assigned to industries based on their industry
affiliation in t, which corresponds to their last period of self-employment. It is
asked retrospectively as “industry 12 months ago”. The main sample for the exit
regressions consists of all employed in t.
Our main explanatory variable is the industry-level measure of firm entry dereg-
ulation, sharej . To calculate the treatment intensity, we first assign all product
markets to which the German Trade and Crafts Code applies to occupations, be-
cause the structure of product markets listed in the GTCC is very similar to the
German occupation classification.33 We then calculate the occupation-level 1995
share of employed in deregulated product markets, using data from a survey of all
firms regulated under the GTCC (Handwerksza¨hlung 1995, Statistisches Bunde-
samt, 1996). In a third step, we map the occupation-level share of employed in
deregulated product markets to the industry level. We describe in detail how we
construct the used measure for deregulation in Appendix 2.B.2.
When defining the regulated product markets, we use the list of regulated product
markets in the 1953 version of the GTCC, in order to exclude any potentially en-
dogenous subsequent changes to the set of regulated product markets. In particular,
in 1998 scaffolder activities were added to the activities regulated by the GTCC.34
As this expansion of the GTCC coverage may have been endogenous, we exclude
32 Note that the retrospective questions are asked to a 45% sub-sample until 2004 and are
non-mandatory to respond. Non-response for the employment status 12 months ago
amounts to about 4%.
33 For the (manual) assignment of deregulated product markets to occupations, we compare
in detail the descriptions of regulated product markets in the legal guidelines on master
craftsman examinations in each regulated product market (“Meisterpru¨fungsverordnun-
gen”) with the 3-digit and 4-digit occupation code description of the 1992 occupation
classification by the German Statistical Office (“Klassifikation der Berufe, 1992”).
34 Further, several listed product markets were joined in 1998, without modifying the
overall set of regulated activities. Appendix 2.A.1 contains further information on the
minor 1998 reform of the GTCC.
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this product market when calculating the treatment intensity.35
As explained in section 2.2.2, in six regulated activities the master craftsman
certificate kept its role as a mandatory entry standard, while minor deregulations
applied (see Appendix 2.A.4). We exclude the related product markets from the
main regression sample, as well as when calculating the industry-level treatment
intensity. The results are very similar when including the six activities as non-
deregulated activities in the sample (rows 9 and 10 of Appendix Table 2.C.5).
Some covariates require a short explanation. We control for professional education
by including a dummy variable for academic education, i.e. degrees from applied
universities and universities, and one dummy variable for any kind of vocational
degree, i.e. journeyman, master craftsman and technician.36 Individuals with both
a vocational and a university degree are coded as university degree holders. Gen-
eral education is controlled for by using indicator variables for low or no schooling
(“Hauptschule”, typically 9 years), a medium level of schooling (“Realschule”, typ-
ically 10 years) and a high-school diploma (“Gymnasium”, typically 12-13 years).
Further, we control for 70 fixed effects for “current occupation” at the 2-digit
level of the 1992 national classification of occupations by the German Statistical
Office. In the regressions on exit from self-employment all covariates are recoded to
the previous year since individuals are assigned to industries based on the previous
year, which corresponds to exitors’ last period of self-employment. As the occupation
is not asked retrospectively for the previous year and may change due to exit from
self-employment, we do not include occupation FE in our main exit regressions.37
Similarly, the highest vocational degree is only known for the current period and
may differ from the one in the previous period. We control for vocational degree
in our main exit specification because there is no reason to expect any systematic
relationship between vocational degree changes and exit from self-employment.38
Appendix Table 2.C.1 contains descriptive statistics of the main variables.
35 The results are not affected by this sample modification.
36 We join individuals with an apprenticeship degree and master craftsman certificate in
one group because attaining a master craftsman certificate in addition to a journeyman
degree is potentially endogenous in the considered reform.
37 The results are robust to including current occupation fixed effects for the sub-sample
of individuals who indicate not to have changed their occupation in within the past 12
months (see rows 17 and 18 of Appendix Table 2.C.5)
38 Our results are robust to excluding all who acquired their vocational degree in the
current or previous period (rows 19 and 20 of Table 2.C.5).
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2.4.2 Descriptive statistics
In Table 2.1 we show descriptive statistics at the industry level for our regression
sample, which includes only industries with a non-zero share of employed in deregu-
lated product markets (sharej). We assign these industries into two groups. Indus-
tries with a pre-reform share of employed in deregulated product markets (sharej)
below the median (column 1) and industries with an above median sharej (column
2). The outcome variables entry into and exit from self-employment as well as most
individual covariates show similar sample means (t-test in col. 3). Employed in
industries with an above median share of employed in deregulated product markets
tend to be younger and are more likely to be male than employed in industries be-
low the median. The under-representation of women is largely driven by deregulated
product markets in the construction sector. The age difference is mostly due to a
higher share of apprentices in the deregulated product markets.
To verify the absence of any systematic differences in pre-reform trends, in col-
umn 4 we compare growth rates of each variable across the two groups of industries.
Growth rates are calculated as 1996 to 2003 growth in industry averages for each
variable.39 The growth rates are not statistically or economically different between
the two groups of industries. Column 5 shows that industry growth rates are not
significantly correlated with the treatment intensity sharej . This absence of differ-
ential pre-reform trends supports our identification strategy.
In the following section we present regression results to systematically investigate
the effects of the deregulation on entrepreneurial entry and exit.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main results
Entry As discussed in section 2.2.2, we expect an increase in the propensity to
enter into self-employment resulting from the deregulation of the German Trade and
39 In order to reduce sampling error, we calculate the growth as average annual growth
rate from the bi-annual average of the years 1996 and 1997 to the bi-annual average of
the years 2002 and 2003.
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Crafts Code in 2004, given the substantial previous restriction to firm entry.40 We
expect this increase to be larger in industries with a higher share of employed in
deregulated product markets, sharej .
We start by estimating a parsimonious version of our model in which the main
explanatory variable is an interaction term between 1(sharej > median), a vari-
able which takes the value one in all industries with an above median 1994 share
of employed in deregulated product markets, and reformt, which equals one start-
ing with the year when the reform took effect (2004). Further, we add industry
and year fixed effects, so that the model effectively compares changes in entry rates
over time between two groups of industries: industries with a below median sharej
and industries with an above median sharej . In this specification, the estimated
coefficient β on the interaction term is 0.004 (significant at 5%) (column 1, Table
2.2). Given that the sample mean of entry is 0.019, this estimate suggests that in
the years after the reform the propensity to enter increased by about 21% in the
group of industries with an above median sharej compared to the pre-reform level,
relative to the group of industries with a below median sharej .
In the model in column 2 we replace the previous interaction term with sharej×
reformt, which interacts the industry share of employed in deregulated product
markets with the indicator variable for the years 2004-2009. The specification com-
pares changes in entry rates over time between industries with varying shares of
employed in deregulated product markets. Since sharej does not fully range from 0
to 1, we calculate interquartile effects. The interquartile range amounts to 0.416, so
the coefficient of 0.013 (significant at 1%) implies an absolute interquartile effect of
0.006. Given the sample mean of 0.019, this is equivalent to a sizable 31% relative
increase in the propensity to start a firm in an industry at the 3rd quartile compared
to an industry at the 1st quartile.
In column 3 we additionally control for a rich set of individual characteristics,
occupation fixed effects as well as fixed effects and quartic trends for the 16 German
states (equation 2.1).41 The coefficient remains virtually unchanged, which suggests
40 Sunk entry costs have to be compensated by higher profits ex post. See the theoretical
models by Hopenhayn (1992), Poschke (2010) and Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011) on
the link between sunk entry costs and firm entry.
41 The coefficients of individual covariates are not reported but turn out as expected.
Results are available upon request.
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that changes in industry composition related to the covariates seem to be of no
concern.
To investigate the timing of the reform impact, we estimate the main difference-
in-differences coefficient separately for each year. The coefficient is estimated from
yearly interactions between the industry-level share of employed in deregulated prod-
uct markets (sharej) and an indicator variable yeart for each year from 1996 to
2009, with sharej ∗ year2004 being the excluded category (model 2.2).
yijt = α +
2009∑
t=1996
βt sharej ∗ yeart + Xijt′γ + θt + µj + ijt (2.2)
This specification allows to flexibly test for differential pre-reform trends corre-
lated with the treatment intensity measure. The corresponding Figure 2.1 shows
that the yearly coefficients are not statistically significantly different from zero in
the years up to the reform, indicating that the increase in entry rates cannot be
explained by differential industry trends prior to the reform. This finding supports
the common trend assumption. The yearly coefficients are strongly significant in all
years following 2005, reaching full size immediately in 2005.42
The positive effect on entry into self-employment suggests that the entry cost
resulting from the mandatory entry standard was previously binding compared to
the benefits from self-employment. The result is in line with the literature on entry
restrictions following from administrative burden at startup (Bruhn, 2011; Kaplan,
Piedra and Seira, 2011; Branstetter et al., 2014). Furthermore, the results are in line
with Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009) and Prantl (2012) who document a decrease in
entry in consequence of the GTCC regulation, using quasi-experimental variation
from the German reunification.
Finally, the documented increase in entry into self-employment is in line with re-
lated findings on the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code by Rostam-
Afschar (2014) and Zwiener (2017). The studies differ substantially in their empirical
model specifications and focus. Most importantly, as a comparison group they use
product markets in which the restriction to firm entry remained in place. Specifi-
42 Note that until 2004, the Micro Census survey was conducted in the first week of April.
Given the that setting up a business requires some time, this may explain the divergence
in entry rates only in 2005, not already in 2004 when the reform took effect.
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cally, Rostam-Afschar (2014) uses 6 product markets in which the master craftsman
certificate continued to be the mandatory entry standard as a comparison group and
all other deregulated product markets as treated groups. The comparison group in
Zwiener (2017) are the 6 product markets in which the master craftsman certificate
continued to be the mandatory entry standard, and 29 product markets in which
entrepreneurs became allowed to start a firm if they possess a journeymen degree
and six years of professional experience. In contrast, we exclude the 6 product
markets in which the master craftsman requirement continued to be the mandatory
entry standard from our main estimation sample and classify the 29 product mar-
kets in which in which entrepreneurs became allowed to start a firm if they possess
a journeymen degree and six years of professional experience as deregulated. Fur-
thermore, the above mentioned authors assign the deregulated product markets to a
classification of occupations due to their focus on labor market outcomes. We assign
the deregulated product markets to an industry classification due to our focus on
industry dynamics.
Furthermore, we add to the literature an analysis of changes in the composition of
entrants in the next section of this chapter and an analysis of the entrants’ post-entry
performance as well as the effect on incumbents in chapter three.
Entrant composition In this subsection, we investigate changes in the compo-
sition of entrants with respect to their initial firm size, income, professional training
and general education (schooling). To this end, we restrict the sample to entrants
and exclude all self-employed which did not enter in the current year as well as all
employees.43
We expect a mechanical shift in the composition of the entrants’ level of profes-
sional training, since the reform explicitly facilitated entry for individuals with no
master craftsman certificate, such as journeymen or individuals with no professional
training. We also expect a decrease in initial firm size, as the fixed entry cost fol-
lowing from the entry restriction should have been be more binding for firms which
intended to start on a small scale. In contrast, there is no reason to expect a me-
chanical change in the entrants’ composition with respect to general education, as
43 Recall that the entry definition includes entrants started out of employment as well as
out of non-employment (section 2.4.1).
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journeymen or individuals with no professional education are composed of all levels
of general education (Appendix Table 2.C.2).44 Since general education tends to
predict firm size,45 changes in the general education of entrants may indicate an
effect of the reform on the entrants’ long-run quality.
First, we consider the entrants’ firm size and income in their first year of activity.
As expected, the additional entrants tend to be initially smaller. Entrants are sig-
nificantly more likely to start without employees (Table 2.3, column 1). While there
is no statistically significant change in the propensity to start with 1-3 employees
(column 2), the propensity to start with at least four employees (column 3) decreases
significantly. Note that this compositional shift among entrants notwithstanding,
the deregulation raised the overall probability to start a firm with 1-3 employees
(Appendix Table 2.C.3). Also, the average net income of the newly self-employed
decreases significantly (column 4). Interestingly, this effect disappears after control-
ling for initial firm size, suggesting that additional entrants with similar firm size do
not earn significantly less (column 5).
We then explore composition changes among entrants with respect to their pro-
fessional training. As the reform explicitly facilitated entry for individuals with no
master craftsman certificate, the additional entrants should be (mechanically) less
likely to possess a master craftsman certificate and more likely to have a journeyman
degree or no professional education. As expected, an analysis of the composition of
entrants in their first year with respect to professional training shows an increase
in the entrants’ probability of possessing a journeyman degree and a decrease in
the probability of having attained a master craftsman certificate or an equivalent
degree such as technician (columns 2-3, Table 2.4). Interestingly, the probability of
possessing no professional education remains unchanged, indicating that the reform
did not attract disproportionately many individuals with no professional education.
We then investigate whether the reform led to a shift in the general education
(schooling) of the entrepreneurs. First, we show in Panel A of Table 2.5 that gen-
eral education correlates positively with firm size. We distinguish three levels of
schooling: low or no schooling (9 or less years of schooling), middle school (10
years) and high school (12-13 years). Firms run by entrepreneurs with a middle
44 In Germany, both the journeyman degree and the (consecutive) master craftsman cer-
tificate can be attained without a preceding school degree.
45 See, among others, Hombert et al. (2014).
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school degree are on average 12% larger than firms run by entrepreneurs with less
schooling. Firms run by high school graduates are on average 19% larger than firms
run by individuals with low or no schooling. Hence, general education appears to be
correlated with entrepreneurial ability and ambition. A similar correlation between
education and firm size has been found by many authors, including Hombert et al.
(2014).
Changes in the entrants’ general education in consequence of the decrease in entry
cost may shed light on two opposing views on selection into entrepreneurship. On the
one hand, under the assumption that prospective entrepreneurs have private ex-ante
information about their own entrepreneurial ability (Lucas, 1978), entry costs should
screen out entrepreneurs with low entrepreneurial ability. In this case, a decrease in
entry costs should disproportionately attract individuals with low entrepreneurial
ability and education (“selection view”). On the other hand, if entrepreneurial
success is not privately known ex-ante (Jovanovic, 1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995;
Asplund and Nocke, 2006), there is no reason to expect a negative effect on the
composition of entrants in consequence of the reform (“experimentation view”).
Interestingly, our results in panel B of Table 2.5 show no indication of a decrease
in average general education. In contrast, the reform led to a significant increase in
the entrants’ probability of having a middle school degree and a significant decrease
in the probability of having no or low schooling. There is no statistically significant
change in the probability of having a high school degree. We interpret this result as
support for the experimentation view.
Exit An increase in entrepreneurial entry raises the number of self-employed only
if exit from entrepreneurship does not increase to a similar extent. We investigate
this issue by considering changes in individual entrepreneurial exit around the time
of reform. As in the entry regressions, we run the analysis on a sample of employed.46
Table 2.6 presents the related results, structured analogously to the main results
on entry. The dependent variable exit from entrepreneurship takes the value 1 for
individuals that are self-employed in the current year and wage earner, unemployed
46 The repeated cross-sectional data structure of the Micro Census and lack of reliable
retrospective information on the year of entry into self-employment prevent us from
analyzing entrant survival in this chapter. We investigate entrant survival using longi-
tudinal establishment data in chapter three.
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or outside the labour force in the subsequent year. We rescaled the treatment
variable sharej by 100 to improve the readability of the tables.
In column 1 we show estimates of a version of the model where we regress exit on
the interaction term 1(sharej > median) ∗ reformt, which takes the value one
for industries with an above median 1994 share of employed in deregulated product
markets in all years beginning in 2004. Conditional on full sets of industry and year
fixed effects, the specification compares changes in exit over time between industries
with an above and below median share of employed in deregulated product markets.
The coefficient is very small and statistically insignificant.
In column 2 we replace the binary treatment variable with the industry share
of employed in deregulated product markets, interacted with the reform indicator.
The estimate remains statistically insignificant, indicating that relative to the years
before the reform, industries with a higher share of employed in deregulated product
markets did not experience an economically or statistically significant change in exit.
The result is confirmed when adding individual-level control variables (column 3).
Together with the documented increase in entrepreneurial entry, the absence of
any effect on exit from entrepreneurship suggests a net increase in entrepreneurship
in consequence of the reform.
Changes in entrepreneurial exit may be driven by both entrepreneurs which en-
tered in consequence of the reform as well as entrepreneurs which entered before
the reform took effect (incumbents). Since there is no reason to expect a decrease
in exit among incumbents in consequence of the reform, counteracting changes in
exit among entrants and incumbents are unlikely. This suggests that the additional
entrants may be similarly stable. In chapter three we will provide specific evidence
separately for entrants and incumbents using establishment panel data.
The documented absence of any increase in exit from self-employment in con-
sequence of the GTCC reform is in line with similar findings by Rostam-Afschar
(2014) and Zwiener (2017).
Our result is relevant for economic policy since long-lived entrants are much more
likely to enhance welfare, growth and technological progress by lowering prices,
attracting demand and innovating, as well as causing advancing reactions in incum-
bents through competitive pressure. In contrast, entrants that exit already after a
few periods may even cause welfare losses in the form of sunk set-up costs related
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to entering (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986).
2.5.2 Robustness
In the following we present a number of checks to verify the robustness of our results.
One potential problem are pre-existing outcome dynamics that are systematically
related to the used treatment intensity sharej . If industries that were more af-
fected by deregulation experienced an increase in entry rates after the reform due to
differences in time trends that preceded the reform, the common trend assumption
would be violated and estimates inconsistent. To check for the potential impact of
differential industry trends prior to the reform, we include linear industry trends
estimated on pre-reform years 1996 to 2003 in our main entry and exit regressions.
The corresponding coefficients in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.7 remain similar to
the baseline coefficients (columns 1 and 3), indicating that the positive effect on
entrepreneurial entry and the near-zero effect on entrepreneurial exit are not driven
by differential pre-reform trends.
Additional concerns may relate to two policy changes which were implemented
around the time of the considered deregulation. First, a series of active labor market
policies was implemented between 2003 and 2005, including an expansion of start-up
subsidies to previously unemployed which affected the incentives for starting a firm
among unemployed (Caliendo and Ku¨nn, 2011). Our results would be invalidated
if the policies’ effect on entrepreneurial entry interacted with the considered dereg-
ulation. We test for the relevance of this concern by adding an interaction of the
2003 industry-level share of unemployed and reformt to the main model. Here, we
include all currently unemployed and those outside the labor force, who have been
employee or self-employed once in their life. They are assigned to industries based
on their last employer’s industry affiliation or industry of last self-employed.47 This
specification controls for differential changes over time in entrepreneurial entry rates
that are related to the pre-reform industry share of unemployed. Note that the spec-
ification also partially controls for potential differences between wage earners and
unemployed in the propensity to enter into self-employment over the business cycle
(Parker, 2009). Individuals which recently became unemployed may be dispropor-
47 Unemployed and those outside the labor force that never worked are not included.
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tionately more likely to enter self-employment during recessions compared to wage
earners, as they want to earn a subsistence income. On the other hand, individuals
which are drawn into self-employment by product market expansions should be less
likely to have been unemployed before entry into self-employment. It turns out that
the corresponding results are very similar to the baseline results (column 1 of Ta-
ble 2.8), indicating that active labor market policies and differences in the industry
share of unemployed cannot explain our results.
Further, the 2004 enlargement of the European Union by 10 countries and the 2007
enlargement by Bulgaria and Romania led to a considerable influx of migrants which
were permitted to start a firm. In column 2 of Table 2.8 we show the result of the
main model estimated on a sample in which we exclude immigrants who immigrated
to Germany within the last 8 years. As our last sample year is 2009, we ensure with
this alternative sample specification that immigrants migrated to Germany in 2000
or earlier, i.e. long before the 2004 enlargement of the European Union and before
the GTCC reform was announced. The corresponding coefficient is very similar
to the coefficient of the baseline specification, indicating that the deregulation’s
positive effect on entry cannot be explained by the differential immigration. Further
robustness checks are provided in Appendix 2.C.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the impact of regulatory entry restrictions on en-
trepreneurial entry and exit, focusing on a reform to a specific and substantial
entry restriction, the German Trade and Crafts Code. The reform essentially led
to the repeal of the master craftsman certificate’s role as a mandatory standard for
prospective entrepreneurs.
We find a significant positive effect of the deregulation reform on entry into self-
employment, but no effect on exit from self-employment. As expected, the reform
raised the propensity to enter among both individuals with a vocational degree and
no professional training. Interestingly, the entrants’ propensity to have low or no
schooling did not increase. Finally, entrants are found to be disproportionately small
- the newly created firms are mostly solo-entrepreneurs. This specific type of firm
creation raises interesting questions about resulting effects on industry dynamics
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and employment.
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2.7 Figures and tables
Figure 2.1: Effect of the deregulation on entry into self-employment (annual ef-
fects)
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Coefficients βt and 95% confidence interval of the model
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in which sharej×year2004 is the excluded category. The dependent variable entry is defined
as being self-employed in year t and an employee, unemployed or outside the labor force t−1.
Sample mean of entry: 1.9%. Sharej corresponds to the share of employed in deregulated
product markets in year 1994 in industry j. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile
range of sharej : 0.074, 0.491, 0.417. Covariates: age, age squared, indicator variables for
female, immigrant, three general education groups, three professional education groups,
2-digit current occupation FE, and fixed effects and quartic trends for the 16 German
states. Estimation performed using linear probability models. The sample consists of
617,549 employed aged 20 to 59, observed in the years 1996-2009 and reporting all relevant
information. We exclude individuals working in the public sector, non-profit organizations,
agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the level of industries.
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Table 2.1: Pre reform averages and growth rates of main variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Industries with Industries with
Sharej < Median Sharej ≥ Median Difference in Difference in Coefficient on
Average Average Average Average Sharej
(Levels) (Levels) (Levels) (Growth) (Growth)
Entry 0.017 0.019 0.002 0.011 0.039
(0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.024) (0.055)
Exit 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.007
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.036)
Foreign 0.081 0.099 0.018 -0.016 -0.039
(0.026) (0.041) (0.011) (0.011) (0.028)
Vocational 0.722 0.765 0.043 0.001 0.001
degree (0.088) (0.083) (0.031) (0.001) (0.003)
University 0.111 0.068 -0.043 -0.002 -0.015
(0.109) (0.043) (0.029) (0.010) (0.024)
Age 39.550 38.864 -0.685*** 0.001 0.003
(0.621) (0.863) (0.235) (0.001) (0.002)
Female 0.459 0.292 -0.167* 0.003 0.005
(0.211) (0.217) (0.092) (0.003) (0.007)
N (industries) 23 28 51 51 51
Sample: 51 industries with positive non-zero share of employed in deregulated product
markets in year 1994 in industry j (sharej). Columns 1 and 2 show industry averages over
the years 1996-2003 for employed in industries with above and below median sharej , re-
spectively. Column 3 provides a t-test on the difference of averages between the two groups
of industries. Column 4 provides a t-test of the difference in growth rates, calculated as av-
erage yearly growth of industry averages from 1996/97 to 2002/03. Column 5 presents the
coefficients of a separate regression for the growth in each variable on the share of employed
in deregulated product markets, sharej . The calculations are based on all employed aged
20 to 59 reporting all relevant information. We exclude individuals working in the public
sector, non-profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at
1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 2.2: Effect of the deregulation on entry into self-employment
Dependent variable: Entry
(1) (2) (3)
1(Sharej > Median)×Reformt 0.004∗∗∗
(0.002)
Sharej ×Reformt 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Covariates no no yes
Observations 617549 617549 617549
In this table we show the effect of the deregulation on entry into self-employment. The
dependent variable entry is defined as being self-employed in year t and an employee,
unemployed or outside the labor force t − 1. The variable 1(sharej > median) takes the
value 1 for industries with an above median share of employed in deregulated product
markets in the year 1994. Reformt is an indicator variable for the years 2004-2009. The
variable sharej corresponds to the share of employed in deregulated product markets in
year 1994 in industry j. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of sharej : 0.074,
0.491, 0.417. Sample mean of the dependent variable: 1.9%. Covariates: age, age squared,
indicator variables for female, immigrant, three general education groups, three professional
education groups, 2-digit current occupation FE, and fixed effects and quartic trends for
the 16 German states. All estimations are performed using linear probability models. The
sample consists of all employed aged 20 to 59, observed in the years 1996-2009 and reporting
all relevant information. We exclude individuals working in the public sector, non-profit
organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗
at 10% level.
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Table 2.3: Entrant composition: initial firm size and income
Dependent variable: No employee 1-3 employees ≥ 4 employees Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sharej ×Reformt 0.191∗∗∗ -0.062 -0.129∗∗ -0.185∗ -0.095
(0.043) (0.046) (0.053) (0.104) (0.098)
Firmsize 0.060∗∗∗
(0.006)
Firmsize2 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Mean depvar 0.567 0.245 0.187
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes
State FE and trends yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 11482 11482 11482 10346 10346
This table illustrates changes in the composition of entrants with respect to initial hir-
ing activity and net self-employment income. The sample consists of entrants in their
first year of activity (t0), observed in the years 1996-2009 and reporting all relevant infor-
mation. The dependent variable No employee in t0 indicates entrants with no employee
(solo-entrepreneur) in the first year of activity. 1-3 employees in t0 indicates having 1-3
employees in the first year ≥ 4 employees in t0 indicates that the entrant employs at least
four workers. The dependent variable ln(income) in t0 denotes the log of the net income
of self-employed (corrected for national inflation). The variable sharej corresponds to the
share of employed in deregulated product markets in year 1994 in industry j. 1st quartile,
3rd quartile and interquartile range of sharej : 0.074, 0.491, 0.417. Reformt is an indi-
cator variable for the years 2004-2009. Estimations in columns 1-2 are performed using
linear probability models, those in columns 3-4 with OLS. We exclude individuals working
in the public sector, non-profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying
sector. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes
significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 2.4: Entrant composition: professional training
Dependent variable: No professional Journeyman Master craftsman University
education degree or technician degree
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sharej ×Reformt -0.005 0.142∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.032
(0.028) (0.051) (0.036) (0.023)
Mean depvar 0.131 0.490 0.203 0.176
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Occupation FE yes yes yes yes
State FE and trends yes yes yes yes
Observations 12217 12217 12217 12217
In this table we illustrate changes in the composition of entrants with respect to their
professional training. The sample consists of entrants in their first year of activity,
observed in the years 1996-2009 and reporting all relevant information. The depen-
dent variable Noprof educ is defined as having 1 year or less of professional training,
zero else. The dependent variable Journeyman indicates a journeyman degree, which
is earned after the successful completion of an apprenticeship. The dependent variable
Technician /Master craftsman is defined as being a technician, master craftsman or pos-
sessing an equivalent advanced professional degree. University denotes individuals with a
degree from a (scientific) college or university (incl. universities of applied sciences). The
variable sharej corresponds to the share of employed in deregulated product markets in
year 1994 in industry j. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of sharej : 0.074,
0.491, 0.417. Reformt is an indicator variable for the years 2004-2009. All estimations are
performed using linear probability models. We exclude individuals working in the public
sector, non-profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at
1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 2.5: Entrant composition: general education (schooling)
Panel A: In a sample of self-employed, education is positively correlated with firm
size
Dependent variable: ln(firm size) ≥ 1 employee ≥ 2 employees ≥ 10 employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Middle school 0.123∗∗∗ 0.025 0.038∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006)
High school 0.192∗∗∗ 0.008 0.045∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.020) (0.019) (0.009)
Mean depvar 0.534 0.392 0.098
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Occupation FE yes yes yes yes
State FE and trends yes yes yes yes
Observations 74450 74450 74450 74450
Panel B: Effect of the deregulation on the entrant composition
Dependent variable: Low or no schooling Middle School High School
(1) (2) (3)
Sharej ×Reformt -0.075∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.007
(0.032) (0.032) (0.038)
Mean depvar 0.336 0.342 0.322
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Occupation FE yes yes yes
State FE and trends yes yes yes
Observations 12217 12217 12217
In Panel A we provide descriptive statistics on the correlation between general education
(schooling) and firm size. The sample comprises all self-employed aged between 20 and 59,
observed in the years 1996-2009. The dependent variable ln(firm size) denotes the log of
the number of employed as reported by the entrepreneur. ≥ 2 employees indicates that the
entrepreneur employs at least two workers, and ≥ 10 employees indicates the employment
of at least 10 workers. The variable Low or no schooling is defined as having a school degree
equivalent to 9 years of schooling or less (Hauptschule). Middle school is defined as having
a middle school degree (typically 10 years of schooling) (Realschulabschluss). High school
is defined as having a high school degree (typically 12-13 years of schooling) (Abitur).
In Panel B we provide evidence on the effect of the deregulation on the composition of
entrants with respect to their general education. The sample consists of entrants in their
first year of activity, observed in the years 1996-2009 and reporting all relevant information.
The variable sharej corresponds to the share of employed in deregulated product markets
in year 1994 in industry j. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of sharej : 0.074,
0.491, 0.417. Reformt is an indicator variable for the years 2004-2009. All estimations are
performed using linear probability models. We exclude individuals working in the public
sector, non-profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at
1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
89
CHAPTER 2
Table 2.6: Effect of the deregulation on firm exit
Dependent variable: Exit
(1) (2) (3)
1(Sharej > Median)×Reformt 0.001 × 10−2
(0.001 × 10−2 )
Sharej ×Reformt 0.128 × 10−2 0.075 × 10−2
(0.135 × 10−2 ) (0.130 × 10−2 )
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Covariates no no yes
Observations 551399 551399 551399
In this table we provide evidence on the effect of the deregulatory reform on the propensity
to exit from self-employment. The dependent variable exit is defined as being self-employed
in t and being and an employee, unemployed or outside the labor force in t + 1. Sample
mean of the dependent variable: 1.0%. The variable 1(sharej > median) takes the value
1 for all industries with above median share of employed in deregulated product markets
in the year 1994. Reformt is an indicator variable for the years 2004-2009. The variable
sharej corresponds to the share of employed in deregulated product markets in year 1994
in industry j. It is scaled by 100 to improve readability. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and
interquartile range of sharej : 0.074, 0.491, 0.417. Covariates: age, age squared, gender,
immigrant, for three general education groups, three professional education groups, and
fixed effects and quartic trends for the 16 German states. The estimations are performed
using linear probability models. The sample consists of all employed aged 20 to 59, observed
in the years 1996-2008 and reporting all relevant information. We exclude individuals
working in the public sector, non-profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and
quarrying sector. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the industry level.
∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 2.7: Robustness: controlling for linear pre-trends
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sharej × reformt 0.014∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.075 × 10−2 -0.047 × 10−2
(0.004) (0.003) (0.130 × 10−2) (0.167 × 10−2 )
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes
Linear Ind. Pre-Trends no yes no yes
Observations 617549 617549 551399 551399
Columns 1 and 3 reproduce the baseline specification for entry and exit, respectively. The
models in columns 2 and 4 additionally include linear industry pre-trends, estimated on the
pre-reform sample only. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of sharej : 0.074,
0.491, 0.417. In columns 3 and 4 (exit), sharej is scaled by 100 to improve readability.
Covariates: age, age squared, gender, immigrant, for three general education groups, three
professional education groups, and fixed effects and quartic trends for the 16 German states.
In the entry regressions, we add 2-digit occupation FE. The estimations are performed using
linear probability models. The sample consists of all employed aged 20 to 59 reporting
all relevant information. We exclude individuals working in the public sector, non-profit
organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗
at 10% level.
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Table 2.8: Robustness: alternative explanations
Dependent variable: Entry
(1) (2)
Sharej ×Reformt 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Share unemployed2003,j ×Reformt 0.023
(0.018)
Industry FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Covariates yes yes
Observations 617549 608538
Column 1: The model is extended by Share unemployed2003,j×
Reformt, where Share unemployed2003,j is defined as the 2003
share of unemployed (ILO definition) at the industry level. Col-
umn 2: We exclude immigrants which entered Germany within
the last 8 years.
The sample consists of all employed aged 20 to 59, observed
in the years 1996-2009 and reporting all relevant information.
We exclude individuals working in the public sector, non-profit
organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector.
Covariates: age, age squared, indicator variables for female, im-
migrant, three general education groups, three professional ed-
ucation groups, 2-digit current occupation FE, and fixed effects
and quartic trends for the 16 German states. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes
significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Appendix 2.A Institutional background
2.A.1 Historical background
The institutional framework of the considered firm entry regulation dates back to
the historical guild system of the Middle Ages. Guilds were social communities of
craftsmen, which generally possessed legal privileges endowing its members with ex-
clusive rights to practice particular economic activities, such as selling certain goods
in a particular city (Ogilvie, 2014, who also provides a recent overview of the topic).
Guilds covered most of the urban production and services sector of the Middle Ages.
Most guilds effectively limited firm entry, aimed at increasing rents for incumbents
(Ogilvie, 2004). Guilds gradually declined in the 18th century, when the growing
industrialization contributed to a strong increase in competition for the traditional
crafts workshops (Ogilvie, 2014). In 1810 Prussia officially introduced free firm entry
(freedom of trade), partly inspired by the growing liberalism of the time, partly as
part of a legal package introducing taxes on crafts businesses.48 A similar entry reg-
ulation was restored only in 1935, when the master certificate requirement became
the mandatory standard to be obtained by individuals who wanted to start a firm in
one of the product markets covered by the entry restriction.49The entry restriction
was part the forced integration of the crafts associations into the totalitarian Nazi
system.
After WWII, the Federal Republic of Germany reintroduced the entry regulation
essentially in the form of 1935 (Gesetz zur Ordnung des Handwerks, September
17, 1953). When proposing the GTCC in 1950, the government stated two main
motivations for restricting entry into the defined set of product markets. Firstly,
it claimed that it is “in the interest of the general public” to protect the “com-
petitiveness” (“Leistungsfa¨higkeit”) of the regulated product markets (Bundestags-
drucksache 1/1428, October 6, 1950). The government thereby referred to the “craft
sector’s” small businesses, which should be protected against harmful competition
from larger firms. Further, the administration underlined the “crafts sector’s sur-
plus professional education” (Bundestagsdrucksache 1/1428, October 6, 1950). In
48 Edikt u¨ber die Einfu¨hrung einer allgemeinen Gewerbesteuer (November 2, 1810), cited
in Wagner, 2006.The regulation later applied to the Second German Reich.
49 Dritte Verordnung u¨ber den vorla¨ufigen Aufbau des deutschen Handwerks (January 10,
1935)
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this context, one of the master certificate’s stated purposes is to guarantee a certain
degree of management skills by prospective entrants in order to raise the economic
stability of crafts businesses (BT Plenarprotokoll, March 3, 1953).
The law was challenged in 1961 at the German Constitutional Court on the
grounds of Art. 12(1) of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz), granting free
occupational choice. The court confirmed the law and the motivations stated by
the administration (Bundesverfassungsgericht, E13, 97, July 17, 1961). According
to the court, the entry restriction resulting from the master craftsman requirement
may be reconciled with the constitutionally guaranteed free choice of occupation
because the master craftsman requirement “is an adequate measure” to guarantee
the craft sector’s “competitiveness” by fostering “trust” in the “quality of the crafts
sector’s products” (Bundesverfassungsgericht, E13, 97, July 17, 1961).
After 1945, the 1935 regulation was also formally reestablished in the former GDR.
As part of the 1990 reunification, the West German regulation was applied without
changes to East Germany.50
From its re-introduction in 1953 to the considered reform in 2004 the GTCC was
subject to three minor changes. A 1965 reform extended eligibility to establish a
firm to those with vocational degrees which are equivalent to the master examina-
tion.Further, master craftsmen became permitted to be active in a defined set of
related product markets.51 There were two minor changes to the GTCC in 1994
and 1998 which concerned the incumbents but did not reduce the entry restrictions.
As a result of the 1994 reform, master craftsmen are permitted to perform tasks of
other regulated product markets if they complement the product market pertaining
to the own master craftsman certificate.Further, business owners in affected prod-
uct markets became permitted to hire managing master craftsmen trained for other
product markets, so that they can offer services in these other regulated markets as
well.52 In a minor reform in the year 1998, similar regulated product markets were
joined in order to facilitate the provision of services in related markets. In addition,
50 Gesetz u¨ber die Inkraftsetzung des Gesetzes zur Ordnung des Handwerks (Handwerk-
sordnung) der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
(July 12, 1990).
51 Bekanntmachung der Neufassung der Handwerksordnung (December 28, 1965)
52 Gesetz zur A¨nderung der Handwerksordnung, anderer handwerksrechtlicher Vorschriften
und des Berufsbildungsgesetzes (December 20, 1993)
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six small and antiquated regulated product markets were removed from the list of
regulated product markets, reducing the number of regulated product markets from
127 to 94.53 The by then unregulated scaffolders market was added to the list of
regulated product markets.54
2.A.2 Scope of the firm entry regulation
In this section, we explain in more detail under which circumstances a firm is sub-
ject to the considered entry regulation. A firm is regulated under the GTCC if
four kinds of requirements are fulfilled (Detterbeck, 2013, § 1 par. 1-55). First,
essential tasks need to be part of one of the regulated product markets listed in
Appendix A of the GTCC (§ 1 HwO). Essential tasks are activities which can not
be learned in less than three months and which are a relevant element of a regulated
product market (§ 1 (2) HwO). The tasks constituting a regulated product market
are not defined in the law, in order to leave room for changes in the definition of
a craft due to technological innovation.55 Second, regulated product markets are
distinguished from non-regulated industrial manufacturing by characteristics such
as no technically automated production, low division of labor and high complexity
of the performed tasks (Detterbeck, 2013, § 1 par. 25-31). Third, the business
must be independent or an independent and relevant part of another business (§ 3
HwO). Finally, the regulation applies only to businesses with a fixed location but
not to traveling craftsmen (§ 55 HwO). The decision whether a business qualifies as
a regulated craft is taken by the local craftsmen association, representing the local
incumbent business owners in the regulated product markets. If the GTCC applies
to the activities of a firm, it needs to be registered in a local skilled crafts register
(“Handwerksrolle”) (§ 6 (1) HwO).
53 Among these were glove makers knitters, tanners and lithographic printers. Together,
the six removed product markets accounted for less than 0.05% of the total employment
in the regulated product markets (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1996).
54 Zweites Gesetz zur A¨nderung der Handwerksordnung und anderer handwerksrechtlicher
Vorschriften (March 25, 1998) As described in section 2.4, we code the scaffolder trade
as non-deregulated.
55 The two main sources describing the regulated product markets are legal guidelines
regulating the master certificate examination in each craft and descriptions by the
National Craftsmen Association (ZDH).
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2.A.3 Legal aspects of the reform
As described in the main text, a court ruling by the European Court of Justice
related to the Freedom of Service Principle,56 and a related case pending at the
German Constitutional Court were central to triggering the 2004 reform of the
German Trade and Crafts Code. In this Appendix section, we explain the related
legal background in more detail.
Until 2002, firms from EU countries which served one of the product markets reg-
ulated under the GTCC in Germany had to register with the local crafts association,
which involved either applying for an exemption (§ 8 HwO ed. September 24, 1998,
see Appendix 2.A.2 on exemptions) or documenting relevant occupational experi-
ence (generally three to six years, depending on previous occupational training).57
In any case, the registration required a burdensome authorization process with the
local German administration. In 2000, the European Court of Justice ruled that
this administrative burden was incompatible with the Freedom of Services Princi-
ple, in particular with the Council Directive 1999/42 EEC, Art. 4, July 31, 1999.
The Directive requires a direct and efficient procedure of recognition of professional
qualifications (ECJ, C-58/98 “Corsten”, October 3, 2000). In 2002 the German
administration responded by abolishing the need to register with the crafts associ-
ation for entrepreneurs from the EU, as long as they do not establish themselves.58
The resulting improved access of EU firms to the product markets regulated un-
der the GTCC raised competitive pressure on German firms.59 In addition, it was
claimed to lead to a “discrimination” of German entrepreneurs, who still needed to
attain the costly master craftsman certificate, against EU firms.60 This difference
in treatment formed the basis for an influential case filed in 2002 at the German
Constitutional Court by a German entrepreneur, referring to the constitutionally
56 The Freedom of Service principle states that each EU citizen is free to provide services
on the territory of another EU Member State (Art. 49 EC).
57 § 9 HwO ed. September 24, 1998 in connection with § 1 EU/EWR-HwV ed. March 25,
1998
58 Fu¨nfte Verordnung zur A¨nderung der EWG/EWR-Handwerk-Verordnung, Art. 1, § 1,
October 9, 2002
59 EU citizens that want to establish a firm in a product market regulated by the GTCC
are still required to document related vocational experience (§ 1 EU/EWR-HwV, March
25, 1998).
60 See Fru¨h, 2001 and Monopolkommission, 2002 for a discussion.
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guaranteed freedom before the law (Art. 3 GG) (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1 BvR
1730/02, December 5, 2005).61 The suspected unconstitutionality was expected to
become more acute in face of the 2004 enlargement of the EU and the potential
wave of migrants establishing firms based on the EU/EWR-HwV exemptions.
Against the backdrop of these developments, in the draft of the 2004 GTCC re-
form the German government motivated the reform by the diminishing efficacy of
the master craftsman certificate in fostering the “crafts sectors competitiveness”
vis-a`-vis the growing number of foreign competitors whose access to the regulated
product markets was facilitated as a consequence of the ECJ ruling of 2000 (Bun-
destagsdrucksache 15/1206, June 24, 2003).
2.A.4 Minor parts of the reform
In chapter 2.2.2 of the main text, we mentioned four minor elements of the 2004
reform of the GTCC. In the following, we will give a brief explanation of each of the
changes.62
The first concerned university graduates and technicians. Before the 2004 reform,
in addition to documenting a journeyman degree and three years of professional
experience, they needed to apply with the local crafts association for recognition
of their degree as equivalent to a master craftsman examination (§ 7 (2) HwO,
September 24, 1998). The local associations then proceeded on a case by case basis.
As a result of the reform, university graduates and technicians have a legal right to
start a firm in a product market related to their degree, without being required a
journeymen degree or professional experience (§ 7 (2) HwO, December 24, 2003).
Second, until 2003 each owner of a civil-law association active in a regulated
product market was required to sign up to the crafts register (i.e. acquire a master
craftsman certificate or get an exemption). In the case of partnership, the part-
ner responsible for technical processes was required to get registered.63In contrast,
corporations were only required to have one registered craftsman as a manager for
61 The court initially planned to decide on the complaints in 2003 but deferred its decision
because of the German Government’s plans to reform the master craftsman requirement
in 2003 (Wagner, 2006)
62 A detailed discussion of the reform can be found in Mu¨ller (2004).
63 Civil-law associations and partnerships are the most common legal forms in the regulated
product markets (Mu¨ller, 2014).
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each establishment (§ 7 (4) HwO, September 24, 1998). Hence, the old regulation
favored limited liability corporations vis-a`-vis individually owned full liability civil-
law associations and partnerships. From 2004 on also these two legal forms may
be registered by an eligible employee, so that the legal owner may not be a master
craftsman or equivalent (§ 7 (1) HwO, December 24, 2003).
Third, before the reform journeymen had to document about two to three years of
work experience before being permitted to take the master craftsman examination
(§ 49 (1) HwO, September 24, 1998). This requirement was repealed, allowing
journeymen to predate their master examination (§ 49 (1) HwO, December 24,
2003).
Finally, the government used the reform to clarify legal exemptions for en-
trepreneurs which are active in fields which are “not essential” to a regulated task.
Tasks are denoted “not essential” if they can either be learned within three months or
if they are not an essential part of a regulated product market (Gesetz zur A¨nderung
der Handwerksordnung und zur Fo¨rderung von Kleinunternehmen, December 24,
2003). Previously, “non-essential tasks” were specified only by legal practice (e.g.
Bundesverwaltungsgericht - 1 C 27.89, February 25, 1992). According to the gov-
ernment the legal clarification was necessary, because - so it claimed64 - local crafts
associations were previously reluctant in permitting entrepreneurs without a master
craftsman certificate to engage in small-scale activities and activities only loosely
linked to a regulated product market (Bundestagsdrucksache 15/1089, June 3, 2003).
64 Bundestagsdrucksache 15/1089, June 3, 2003
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Appendix 2.B Data appendix
2.B.1 The Micro Census data set
The main data set used is the Micro Census, a household survey sampling 1% of
the German population.65 The Scientific Use File we use is a 70% sub-sample of the
households in the Micro Census. The sampling frame of the survey comprises all
persons living in Germany who have a right of residence. Households are sampled
at the level of small sampling districts, comprising on average 15 individuals. Each
sampling district remains in the sample for four years so that in each year a quarter
of the sampling districts are replaced. As mentioned in the main text, sampled in-
dividuals are obliged by law to provide information on most of the survey questions.
The data are collected mostly via personal interviews. Only if not possible other-
wise, respondents can answer a self-administered questionnaire. We use weighting
factors provided in the data set, which adjust the sample to the population based
on distributions of age groups, nationality groups and gender.
2.B.2 Construction of the measure of
deregulation
The treatment variables we use are based on a survey of all firms regulated under
the German Trade and Crafts Code, conducted in 1994 (“Handwerksza¨hlung 1995,
Statistisches Bundesamt, 1996). For the construction of the main treatment intensity
at the 3-digit industry level (sharej), we proceed in three steps.
First, we carefully assign all deregulated activities listed in the GTCC to the
3-digit level of the official German occupation classification (“Klassifikation der
Berufe, Ausgabe 1992, Statistisches Bundesamt”). We base the assignment
on a manual comparison of detailed descriptions of regulated activities in the le-
gal guidelines on master craftsman examinations in each regulated craft (“Meis-
terpru¨fungsverordnungen”) with the official descriptions of the 4-digit occupations.
We match deregulated product markets to occupations (instead of industries)
because the structure of product markets defined in the GTCC is very similar to the
65 See Schimpl-Neimanns and Herwig (2011) and references therein. English documentation
is available at http://www.gesis.org/missy/en/study/
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German occupation classification. This similarity is due to the fact that the GTCC
mostly affects product markets which are closely linked to occupations (Prantl and
Spitz-Oener, 2009). However, as argued in the main text, the firm entry regulation
resulting from the GTCC ultimately affects the ease of starting a business in the
product markets covered by the GTCC, so we perform the main empirical analysis
at the industry level.
In a second step, we calculate a 3-digit occupation-level treatment intensity by
dividing the 1994 number of employed in a deregulated product market (source:
Handwerksza¨hlung) by the 1995 projected number of employed in the corresponding
3-digit occupation in the Micro Census.66
In a third step we map the occupation-level treatment intensity to the industry
level by multiplying the occupation-level treatment intensity with each occupation’s
share in a 3-digit industry and subsequently add up the weighted shares at the
industry level.
Sharej =
∑
o
woj,1995 ×
#Employed in deregulated product marketso,1994
#All employed (Micro Census)o,1995
where woj,1995 indicates the share of employed of occupation o in industry j.
We illustrate the approach with the following example. One of the regulated
product markets is the activity “vehicle mechanics” (“Kraftfahrzeugtechniker”).
Here, the regulation mainly covers the product market of cars maintenance, since
the GTCC does not apply to industrial manufacturing (see Appendix 2.A.2). In
the first step, we assign the product market to the 3-digit occupation “vehicle/car
mechanics” in our data set. In step two, we construct the corresponding occupation-
level treatment intensity. We divide the number of employed in the regulated prod-
uct market “vehicle mechanics” (listed in the “Handwerksza¨hlung” 1995 ) by the
66 Note that in the nominator, we use employed in both legally independent firms and
subsidiaries in regulated product markets of which the parent firm is not active in a
regulated product market (“Nebenbetriebe”). Firms are allocated to crafts based on
their main economic activity. In the denominator, we can not use the projected 1994
number of employed because up to 1995 the Micro Census was conducted biannually
only. For 14 out of 303 3-digit occupations, the number of employed according to the
Handwerksza¨hlung exceeds the projected number of employed according to the Micro
Census, so that the treatment intensity would exceed the value 1. In these cases, we set
the treatment intensity to 1.
100
2.B. DATA APPENDIX
number of employed in the occupation “vehicle/car mechanics” (calculated from the
Micro Census). We then calculate the industry level treatment intensity sharej by
mapping the occupation level treatment intensity to the industry level. The cal-
culation shows that individuals with the occupation “vehicle/car mechanics” work
in several industries, including mainly “maintenance and repair of motor vehicles”
and to a much lesser extend “sale of motor vehicles” and “manufacture of motor
vehicles”. This is then reflected in the treatment intensity sharej , which takes the
value 0.64 for the industry “maintenance and repair of motor vehicles” (502), but
much smaller values for the industries “sale of motor vehicles” and “manufacture
of motor vehicles”. Consequently, the treatment intensity sharej correctly reflects
the extent to which the mentioned industries are affected by the GTCC.
Note that our results are similar when using an alternative industry-level treat-
ment intensity definition, which is based on a direct allocation of deregulated product
markets to 3-digit industries. This alternative treatment intensity is constructed by
dividing the number of employed in regulated product markets in 3-digit industries
(reported directly in “Handwerksza¨hlung” 1995) by the overall number of employed
in the 3-digit industry according to the 1995 Micro Census. The results are very
similar (rows 21 and 22 of table 2.C.5). Furthermore, the main results hold when
we use the treatment intensity at the occupation-level (calculated in step two). The
treatment intensity is then the occupation-level share of employed in deregulated
product markets.67
67 See row 23 of table 2.C.5.
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Appendix 2.C Additional tables
In this section we will present summary statistics and a series of robustness checks,
of which many were already mentioned in the text. Table 2.C.1 provides short
explanations and summary statistics of the main variables.
In the main text we showed that the deregulation led to a large increase in entry
into entrepreneurship, and at the same time a decrease in initial firm size. In ta-
ble 2.C.3 we investigate whether the reform led to an increase in the propensity of
entry into self-employment with employees. To this end we create three dependent
variables. Entry with 0 employees is one if an individual takes up self-employment
without hiring in the first year of self-employment, zero else. Entry with 1-3 em-
ployees is one for all newly self-employed who hire one to three employees in the
year of entry, and Entry with 4+ employees is the equivalent with at least four
employees. Interestingly, the reform increased not only the propensity to enter as a
solo-entrepreneur (coefficient of 0.012, sign. at 1%, col. 1), but also the propensity
to enter and hire one to three employees in the first year (coefficient 0.002, sign.
at 10%, col. 2). The propensity to start a firm with 4 or more employees did not
change due to the reform.
Table 2.C.4 shows the results which are obtained under two sample variations.
In column 1 we add unemployed and those outside the labor force to the sample.
We include unemployed and those outside the labor force which worked at least
once and assign them to industries based on their last employer or industry of last
self-employment. Individuals that never worked are not included in the extended
sample. This sample variation addresses potential endogeneity concerns in the main
specification, which may arise from the fact that the main regression sample con-
sists of employed only. Differential changes over time of the number of employed,
unemployed and inactive in the industries may be a function of the deregulation or
correlated factors. Unfortunately, we are only able to make this sample extension
for entry but not for exit regressions, because the required industry affiliation in
t− 1 is not available for those who were unemployed in t− 1 and employed in t.
The corresponding effect on entry into self-employment is slightly smaller com-
pared in the main sample but similar in size when compared to the sample means of
the dependent variable. The coefficient of 0.010 (sign. at 1%) corresponds to an in-
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Table 2.C.1: Definitions of variables and summary statistics
Variable Definition Mean/ Standard
share deviation
Entry 1: self-employed in t and employee, un-
employed or outside labor force in t-1
0.020 0.139
Exit 1: self-employed in t and employee, un-
employed or outside labor force in t+1
0.009 0.094
Sharej share of employed in deregulated prod-
uct markets in year 1994 in industry j
0.267 0.206
Age age of individual i in years at the sur-
vey date
39.982 10.483
Gender 1: female, 0: male 0.386 0.487
Immigrant 1: only non-German citizenship, 0:
otherwise
0.069 0.254
Low or no schooling 1: individual has a degree from a
“Hauptschule” (typically 9 years of
schooling) or no schooling, 0: else
0.440 0.496
Medium education 1: individual has a degree from a “Re-
alschule” (typically 10 years of school-
ing), 0: else
0.365 0.482
High education 1: individual has a degree from a high
school (“Gymnasium”, typically 12-13
years of schooling), 0: else
0.195 0.396
No professional education 1: individual has 1 year or less of pro-
fessional training, 0: else
0.163 0.369
Vocational degree 1: individual has a completed appren-
ticeship (journeyman degree), mas-
ter craftsman certificate, technician or
equivalent, 0: else
0.741 0.438
University 1: individual has a degree from an (ap-
plied) university, 0: else
0.096 0.294
The table provides non-weighted summary statistics, based on all employed aged 20 to 59
and observed in the years 1996-2009. We exclude individuals working in the public sector,
non-profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector. Sample for
exit: 551,399 observations. Sample for all other variables: 617,549 observations. Samples
described in the data section. Data: repeated cross-section data, Micro Census.
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Table 2.C.2: Categories of general education and professional training
General education
Professional training
No prof educ Journeyman Technician / University Total
Master craftsman
Low or no schooling 12% 24% 2% 0% 38%
Middle school 3% 25% 4% 0% 34%
High school 5% 6% 2% 14% 28%
Total 21% 56% 9% 15% 100%
The table shows the a tabulation of all individuals by general and professional education.
Sample: Individuals aged 20-59, observed in 1996-2009. 3,606,250 observations. Micro
census survey weights used.
Table 2.C.3: Effect on entry into self-employment by three initial firm size cate-
gories
Dependent variable: Entry with... 0 employees 1-3 employees 4+ employees
(1) (2) (3)
Sharej ×Reformt 0.012∗∗∗ 0.002∗ −0.000
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Mean depvar 0.010 0.005 0.003
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Occupation FE yes yes yes
State FE and trends yes yes yes
Observations 606812 606812 606812
Dependent variable: Binary variables for entry into self-employment without employees (col
1), 1-3 employees (col 2), and 4 or more employees (col 3). The variable sharej corresponds
to the share of employed in deregulated product markets in year 1994 in industry j. 1st
quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range of sharej : 0.074, 0.491, 0.417. Reformt is
an indicator variable for the years 2004-2009. The estimations are performed using linear
probability models. The sample consists of all employed aged 20 to 59, observed in the
years 1996-2009 and reporting all relevant information. We exclude individuals working
in the public sector, non-profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying
sector. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes
significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
terquartile effect of 0.004 which is equivalent to a relative increase in the propensity
to start a firm of 27% (mean entry: 0.015). The similar effect size implies similar
changes over time of the number of unemployed in the different industries.
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Another sample variation concerns the set of included industries. Recall that in
our main specification we use a sample of 51 3-digit industries which contained at
least some activity in deregulated product markets according to the 1994 survey
of firms regulated under the GTCC. Columns 2 and 3 of table 2.C.4 show the
corresponding coefficients on entry into self-employment and exit in a sample of
employed in all 134 private-sector industries. The model includes linear industry pre-
trends in order to account for differential trends in the highly diverse set of industries.
Again, the results are remarkably similar to those of the main specification.
Table 2.C.4: Robustness: alternative samples
Sample: Incl. unemployed All industries
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Entry Entry Exit
Sharej ×Reformt 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.194 × 10−2
(0.002) (0.003) (0.148 × 10−2)
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes
Linear Ind. Pre-Trends no yes yes
Observations 724583 1126613 1014393
Column 1: The main sample is extended to also include all currently unemployed and those
outside the labor force which were previously employed in the respective industry. It covers
the years 1996-2008 only, since the industry classification for unemployed changed in 2009.
Columns 2 and 3: The main entry and exit samples of employed are extended to contain
all industries, including the industries which contain no firms active in deregulated product
markets (treatment intensity zero). The models in columns 2 and 3 additionally include
linear industry pre-trends, estimated on the pre-reform sample only. Coefficients in exit
regressions scaled by 100 to improve readability. All samples contain individuals aged 20-59
reporting all relevant information. We exclude individuals working in the public sector, non-
profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector. The estimations are
performed using linear probability models. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
Table 2.C.5 shows an additional set of robustness checks. Rows correspond to
separate regressions of the indicated dependent variable entry or exit on the listed
treatment intensity and covariates explained in the table notes. We reproduce the
baseline results of equation 2.1 in rows (1) and (2). The first robustness check ad-
dresses potential mean reversion. If industries with a high or low pre-reform share of
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entrants adjusted back to some equilibrium level and the cross-sectional distribution
of pre-reform entry shares was correlated with our sharej × reformt interaction,
this adjustment may be picked up by our main coefficient. We investigate this issue
by including the year 2003 industry average of the dependent variable interacted
with a full set of year fixed effects. Note that the specification also controls for
potential differential trends that depend on baseline industry characteristics (e.g.
capital intensity) which are reflected in pre-reform differences in industry shares of
entrants or exits. The estimates in rows (3) and (4) are very similar to the baseline,
showing no evidence of mean-reverting dynamics affecting our results.
The second robustness check concerns potentially confounding effects of industry-
differences in the number of incumbent self-employed. The number of incumbents
may negatively affect expected profits and in consequence entry and exit dynamics.
Including the industry share of self-employed interacted with the reform dummy in
our main regressions leaves the main coefficients virtually unchanged (rows 5 and
6).
Another concern is that industry dynamics such as industry specific growth or
industries’ heterogeneous exposure to the business cycle may be correlated with the
reform and at the same time affect entry into and exit out of self-employment. To
alleviate this group of concerns, we control for lagged log industry sales at the 3-digit
level.68 Our main coefficients remain largely unchanged (rows 7 and 8).
Next, we verify the robustness of our results to an alternative way of dealing
with 6 product markets in which the entry regulation was not changed in 2003.69
As explained in section 2.2.2, entry into these product markets remained regulated
because entry into these product markets is restricted in most EU member states.
In our main specifications, we excluded the six product markets from the sample. In
rows 9 and 10 we show results where we include the product markets in the sample
and assign them a treatment intensity of zero. The results are not sensitive to this
sample modification.
Another sample variation concerns the included age groups. In our main regres-
sions we include employed aged 20 to 59. However, labor supply decisions and the
68 Data on industry sales are based on administrative revenue tax data for the years 1996
to 2008, available online at the German Statistical Office.
69 These product markets are optician, hearing aid acoustician, orthopedic technician,
orthopedic shoemaker and dental technician
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occupational choice of young and old employed may be distorted by education or
early retirement, respectively. As shown in rows 11 and 12, our main results hold if
we restrict to the sample to employed aged 25-54.
Our empirical models are estimated as linear probability models using OLS
regressions. We test the sensitivity of our results to the implicit functional
form assumption in rows 13 and 14, which contain estimation results from pro-
bit models. We estimated the model comparing industries with above and be-
low median share of employed in deregulated product markets. The treatment
effect is calculated as marginal effect of the coefficient of the interaction term
1(sharej > median) × reformt in a probit model with industry and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and clustered at the
industry level. The estimated effects are similar to those from equivalent linear
models in column 1 of tables 2.2 and 2.6.
Two robustness checks concern the fact that in the exit regressions covariates are
recoded to the previous period since individuals are assigned to industries based on
the previous year, which corresponds to exitors last year of self-employment. Since
the survey does not ask for the occupation in the previous year, we do not include
occupation FE in our main exit regressions. However, we can verify the robustness
of our results to including occupation FE in a sub-sample of individuals which
indicate to have stayed in their occupation in the past 12 months. By definition, this
restriction excludes unemployed and those outside the labor foce in t + 1 from this
sub-sample. Regression results on this sub-sample, without and with occupation FE
are displayed in rows 15 and 16. The coefficients are virtually unchanged. Another
variable which can not be recoded to the previous year is the highest vocational
degree. Again, the results of a sub-sample where we exclude all individuals who
acquired their highest vocational degree in the current or previous year (row 18) are
similar to the corresponding results from a sub-sample of those with data on the
year of the highest vocational degree (row 17). Note that the variable is part of the
survey only since 1999, reducing the number of observations substantially.
Furthermore, we present results using the more aggregated 2-digit industry clas-
sification. This specification allows us to account for potential spillovers between
3-digit industries in one 2-digit industry group. For example, entrants in highly
reform-affected 3-digit industry may attract product demand from a less affected
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3-digit industries in the same 2-digit group. The results in rows 19 and 20 remain
remarkably unchanged, suggesting that spillovers between product markets of one
2-digit industry group is not a relevant concern in our application.
A final set of results concerns the robustness of our main results to alternative
specifications of the main treatment intensity sharej × reformt. As explained in
Appendix 2.B.2, an alternative treatment intensity can be formed by constructing
the 1994 share of employed in firms in deregulated product markets at the 3-digit
industry-level over the 1995 number of all employed in the corresponding indus-
try. As explained in Appendix 2.B.2, we decided not to use this specification as
our baseline in this chapter because the allocation of product markets to 3-digit
industries is less precise compared to an allocation of product markets to 3-digit
occupations, which we do when constructing the main treatment intensity specifi-
cation. In line with this imprecision, the corresponding estimates in rows 21 and
22 are attenuated towards zero (Sharej,alternative). However, the coefficient on en-
try into self-employment remains economically and statistically significant. Finally,
our results hold when using a treatment intensity at the 3-digit occupation level
(shareo, calculated in step two of Appendix 2.B.2, row 23).
Note that our results remain unchanged in a set of regressions in which we se-
quentially exclude single industries from the sample, suggesting that our reported
effects are not driven by a single industry.
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Table 2.C.5: Additional robustness checks
Dependent var. Coefficient SE Observations
Sharej ×Reformt
(1) Baseline Entry 0.014∗∗∗ (0.004) 617,549
(2) Exit 0.075 × 10−2 (0.130 × 10−2) 551,399
(3) Mean reversion Entry 0.014∗∗∗ (0.003) 617,549
(4) Exit 0.033 × 10−2 (0.136 × 10−2) 551,399
(5) Share incumbents Entry 0.012∗∗∗ (0.003) 617,549
(6) Exit 0.092 × 10−2 (0.141 × 10−2) 551,399
(7) Controlling for Entry 0.012∗∗∗ (0.003) 584,691
(8) industry sales Exit -0.165 × 10−2 (0.254 × 10−2) 515,712
(9) Sample: include non- Entry 0.013∗∗∗ (0.004) 620,966
(10) deregulated product markets Exit 0.063 × 10−2 (0.130 × 10−2) 560399
(11) Sample: age 25-54 Entry 0.014∗∗∗ (0.004) 502,147
(12) Exit 0.072 × 10−2 (0.163) × 10−2 454,007
(13) Probit model Entry 0.002∗∗∗ (0.001) 617,549
(14) Exit 0.030 × 10−2 (0.061 × 10−2) 551,399
(15) Sample: no occupation change Exit -0.016 × 10−2 (0.118 × 10−2) 499,251
(16) Include occ FE Exit -0.022 × 10−2 (0.119 × 10−2) 499,251
(17) Sample: year of highest Exit 0.152 × 10−2 (0.201 × 10−2) 345,890
vocational degree non-missing
(18) Drop if vocational degree Exit 0.153 × 10−2 (0.187 × 10−2) 330,751
in current or previous year
Share2−digit ind ×Reformt
(19) 2-digit industry level Entry 0.018∗∗∗ (0.002) 617,549
(20) Exit 0.111 × 10−2 (0.194 × 10−2) 551,399
Sharej,alternative ×Reformt
(21) Alternative sharej Entry 0.005
∗∗∗ (0.001) 617,549
(22) Exit 0.002 × 10−2 (0.070 × 10−2) 551,399
Shareo ×Reformt
(23) Occupation level Entry 0.006∗∗∗ (0.002) 617,549
This table contains additional robustness checks described in Appendix 2.C. Rows show results of separate
regressions of the dependent variable in column 2 on the indicated treatment intensity and covariates.
Exit regressions control for 3-digit industry FE and year FE. Entry regressions additionally include 2-digit
occupation FE. The occupation-level regression in row 23 controls for 3-digit occupation FE. Additional
covariates included in all regressions are age, age squared, gender, immigrant, three professional training
groups, three general education groups, and fixed effects and quartic trends for the 16 German states.
Share2−digit ind corresponds to the share of employed in deregulated product markets in year 1994 in a 2-
digit industry. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range: 0.062, 0.399, 0.337. Sharej,alternative is an
alternative specification of sharej , explained in Appendix 2.B.2. 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile
range: 0.039, 0.631, 0.592. Shareo corresponds to the share of employed in deregulated product markets in
a 3-digit occupation (Appendix 2.B.2) with 1st quartile, 3rd quartile and interquartile range 0, 0.656 and
0.656.
Lines 13 and 14 are estimated as probit models, all others as linear probability models. If not stated
differently in the text, the entry (exit) sample consists of all employed aged 20 to 59, observed in the
years 1996-2009 (1996-2008) and reporting all relevant information. We exclude individuals working in the
public sector, non-profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying sector. In rows 19 and
20, standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of 51 3-digit industries. In row 23, SE are
clustered at the level of 238 3-digit occupations. In all other rows, SE are clustered at the level of 51 3-digit
industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 2.C.6: Effect of the deregulation on entry into self-employment and exit
from self-employment - extended table
Dependent variable: Entry Exit
(1) (2)
Sharej ×Reformt 0.014∗∗∗ 0.075 × 10−2
(0.004) (0.130 × 10−2)
Age 0.002∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.008∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Foreign 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
Medium general education 0.004∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
High general education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
Vocational degree -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
University education -0.005∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
Industry FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Occupation FE yes yes
State FE and trends yes yes
Observations 617549 551399
In this table we report covariates for column 3 of table 2.2 and column 3 of table 2.6.
Medium general education denotes individuals with a medium school degree, typically
gained after 10 years of schooling (“Realschulabschluss”). High general education denotes
a high-school diploma (“Abitur/Gymnasium”, typically 12-13 years). Vocational degrees
denotes the journeyman degree, the master craftsman certificate, technicians and related.
University education joins degrees from applied universities and universities. In column 2
(exit), sharej is scaled by 100 to improve readability. All estimations are performed using
linear probability models. The sample consists of all employed aged 20 to 59, observed in
the years 1996-2009 and reporting all relevant information. We exclude individuals work-
ing in the public sector, non-profit organizations, agriculture and the mining and quarrying
sector. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the industry level. ∗∗∗ denotes
significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Entry Deregulation, Industry
Dynamics and Employment∗
This chapter is part of joint work with Susanne Prantl.
3.1 Introduction
It is well established that new firms contribute substantially to job creation. This
phenomenon is driven by a subset of entrants which survives and grows, while the
majority of new firms fails relatively quickly (Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda,
2013). At the same time, firm entry is subject to a multitude of regulatory restric-
tions (Djankov et al., 2002). Reducing such restrictions with the aim of spurring
industry dynamics and employment is of interest to policy makers and academics
alike (Djankov, 2009). Yet, solid evidence on whether firm entry deregulation can
spur employment remains scarce.
We contribute by providing new empirical evidence on the effect of a substantial
reduction in firm entry restrictions on entry, industry dynamics and employment.
Since additional entrants can contribute to job creation only if they sustain com-
petition, we investigate effects not only on the number of entrants, but also their
∗ Financial support provided by the German Research Foundation (DFG) for one part
of the data preparation in this chapter is gratefully acknowledged (DFG PR 1238/1-1,
DFG SPP 1764).
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composition with respect to their post-entry longevity and probability to hire. We
also analyze effects on the probability of survival and size of incumbent firms, as
changes in incumbents’ outcomes may counteract job creation by entrants.
We investigate the effects of firm entry restrictions in the context of a recent
product market deregulation - the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts
Code (GTCC, Handwerksordnung). Up to its reform in 2004, the GTCC required
prospective entrepreneurs to fulfill a substantial mandatory standard, the master
craftsman certificate (Meistertitel), if they wanted to start a firm in one of the spe-
cific product markets covered by the regulation. Given the substantial professional
training and monetary costs to acquire the certificate, the deregulation led to a
significant reduction in entry restrictions.
The reform is well suited for a causal investigation of the effects of firm entry
costs, due to two institutional characteristics. First, the pre-reform industry cover-
age of the GTCC dates back to the historical guilds structure of the Middle Ages,
when many professions organized themselves with the aim of restricting firm entry
and competition (Ogilvie, 2014). Similar restrictions persisted in other European
countries, but the German regulation remained particularly strict. Second, the 2004
reform of the GTCC was spurred by a preceding EU court decision which declared
the regulation’s incompatibility with the EU Freedom of Services Principle.
In our empirical strategy we adopt a difference-in-differences approach which com-
pares changes in entrant and incumbent outcomes between previously unregulated
and regulated product markets around the time of the reform. Due to pre-reform
differences in the age and skill composition of the employees in the affected prod-
uct markets, they may evolve differently over time because of an interaction of the
business cycle with these product market characteristics. For example, individuals
with different levels of human capital differ in their propensity to enter into en-
trepreneurship over the business cycle (Svaleryd, 2015). We apply two alternative
modifications of the difference-in-differences model to address this concern. First,
we control for interactions of year fixed effects and the pre-reform share of employ-
ees that are high skilled, medium skilled, aged 15-24 and those aged 25-49. In an
alternative modification of the model, we select a matched comparison group of in-
dustries with similar pre-reform characteristics using statistical matching. We then
estimate the reform effect via difference-in-differences in the resulting matched prod-
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uct market sample. We carefully assess the identifying common trend assumption
by investigating pre-reform outcome patterns.
We use rich administrative establishment-level panel data which covers a 50%
sample of all German establishments with at least one employee. We are able to
use four years before and five years after the regulatory reform. The data are well
suited for this study since they allow us to disentangle the employment dynamics of
entrants and incumbents.
We find that the reduction in entry restrictions leads to an economically and
statistically significant increase of about 12% in the number of new establishments
with at least one employee. This result suggests that before its reform, the GTCC
imposed a binding constraint to establishment entry. This result is in line with
chapter two, where we documented an increase in entry into self-employment in
consequence of the reform using individual level data. We then study entrant size
and follow the new establishments over time to investigate potential changes in post-
entry survival and hiring. We find that even though the additional entrants are less
likely to start with two or more employees, they are similarly stable and similarly
likely to hire in the first years after entry.
Furthermore, we show that in consequence of the reform, incumbents with less
than five employees did decrease their number of employees and became significantly
more likely to fail, while larger incumbents remained similarly large and stable.
Taken together, the overall number of employees did not change significantly in
consequence of the reform.
Our results are most closely related to the empirical literature on entry restric-
tions in the form of administrative burden at start up. Several studies investigate
the effects of municipality-level simplifications of the firm registration process (e.g.
Bruhn, 2011; Kaplan, Piedra and Seira, 2011; Branstetter et al., 2014). The use of
within-country changes in entry restrictions excludes the influence of confounding
factors at the national level.1 While these studies document sizable positive effects
1 Related cross country studies include Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006), who show
that national entry restrictions decrease firm entry and slow incumbent growth more in
industries which should naturally have high entry rates. For a broader type of product
market liberalization, Griffith, Harrison and Macartney (2007) and Fiori et al. (2012)
show that the increased competition leads to increased output and employment, and
that this effect is more pronounced if labor market regulation is high. Boeri, Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2015) and Schiantarelli (2010) review the literature on product market
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on the number of entrants and direct job creation by entrants, we contribute a de-
tailed analysis of the impact of a reduction in entry restrictions on the crowding
out of incumbents. Furthermore, our study is related to previous work on the en-
try restriction following from the GTCC. Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009) and Prantl
(2012) investigate the effect of the GTCC on entry into entrepreneurship in the
context of the German reunification. They find a negative effect of the entry re-
striction on entry into entrepreneurship. Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2018) study the
effect of immigration on wages of competing native workers in sectors with differing
levels of labor market regulation and product market regulation following from the
GTCC. Two papers study the 2004 GTCC reform but examine different outcomes
and use differing empirical specifications. Rostam-Afschar (2014) finds an increase
in entry into self-employment in occupations affected by the GTCC regulation in
the context of the 2004 GTCC reform. Damelang, Haupt and Abraham (2018) doc-
uments a decrease in wages in occupations affected by the GTCC. Closest to this
paper, Zwiener (2017) investigates changes in dependent employment in occupations
affected by the GTCC reform. Similar to this paper, she finds no evidence for an
increase in dependent employment. In section 3.5.3 we will relate our findings and
document substantial differences in the empirical model specification.
Another group of papers has a similar focus on both firm entry and ensuing effects
on industry dynamics and employment but investigate different entry-related policies
and regulatory restrictions. Hombert et al. (2014) study an unemployment insurance
reform which allowed previously unemployed entrepreneurs to retain their rights to
unemployment benefits in case of business failure. Similar to our results, the reform
increased both the number of entrants and the number of jobs created by young
firms, but the increased job creation by start-ups was offset by lower employment
growth among incumbent firms. Further comparable evidence on entrepreneurship
and ensuing industry dynamics has been found in the context of financial market
reforms which improve the allocation of capital to prospective entrants (Bertrand,
Schoar and Thesmar, 2007; Kerr and Nanda, 2009) and in the context of restrictions
to the maximum size of new retail establishments (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002;
Sadun, 2015).
The following section 3.2 provides an overview of the entry restriction following
reforms and productivity.
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from the GTCC and its reform. Section 3.3 outlines our identification strategy and
empirical model. We present the data and descriptive statistics in section 3.4 and
our results in section 3.5. Section 3.6 provides conclusions.
3.2 Institutional setting
3.2.1 Entry regulation
For our analysis of the effect of firm entry restrictions we make use of a reform to
a substantial industry-specific entry restriction in Germany. The restriction follows
from the German Trade and Crafts Code (GTCC, Handwerksordnung), which
imposed a mandatory standard, the master craftsman certificate, on prospective
entrants in the product markets covered by the GTCC.2 This section briefly sum-
marizes the entry regulation and its reform in 2004. A more detailed discussion can
be found in section 2.2 of chapter 2.
To obtain the master craftsman certificate, prospective entrepreneurs need to un-
dertake several years of training, pass multiple examinations and collect several years
of work experience. Typically, individuals first enroll into a three-year industry-
specific apprenticeship training, which is completed with a journeyman examina-
tion. After having collected at least three additional years of industry-specific work
experience, journeymen may undertake the master craftsman exam.3 To prepare
the exam, most candidates take specific courses, which last one and a half to three
years and typically have to be paid by the candidate. Several institutions such as
the German Monopolies Commission have long argued that the time and monetary
expenses required to obtain the mandatory entry standard result in a substantial
entry restriction for prospective entrepreneurs, with adverse consequences for firm
entry and industry dynamics (Deregulierungskommission, 1991, Monopolkommis-
sion, 1998, Monopolkommission, 2002).
Crucially for our analysis, the GTCC affects a diverse set of specific product
markets, but no broad industry sectors, so that often regulated and unregulated
2 See Appendix section 2.A.2 for details on the exact criteria under which a prospective
entrepreneur is affected by the entry regulation.
3 The exam covers general topics such as business administration as well as occupation-
specific contents.
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product markets are closely related. For example, metalwork (boring, milling, etc.)
in manufacturing, carpentry in construction or hair dressing in the service sector
are covered by the GTCC, while the industrial production of engines, renting of
construction equipment or beauticians are not covered. This sectoral coverage of
the GTCC goes back to the Middle Ages, when many occupations were organized
as guilds. Already then, in many European cities craftsmen who wanted to start a
business were required to join the respective guild (Ogilvie, 2004). The current form
of the entry restriction dates back to 1935 and was confirmed in the first post-war
version of the GTCC in 1953. From then on, the regulation and set of regulated
product markets remained almost unchanged until the considered reform in 2004.4
3.2.2 Reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code
In January 2004, the GTCC was reformed such that the master craftsman certificate
lost its role as a mandatory standard for prospective entrepreneurs. The reform was
enacted in response to substantial criticism of the entry regulation by European
and national courts. In 2000, the European Court of Justice declared the admin-
istrative procedures, which EU citizens had to undertake when offering products
or services in product markets regulated under the GTCC, as incompatible with
the EU Freedom of Services Principle (ECJ, C-58/98 “Corsten”, October 3, 2000).
In consequence of the ECJ ruling, individuals from EU countries without a degree
equivalent to the master craftsman certificate were permitted to offer their products
without prior registration. The fact that the mandatory entry standard effectively
differed for German and foreign entrepreneurs formed the basis for an influential
case filed at the German Constitutional Court in 2002 (Bundesverfassungsgericht,
1 BvR 1730/02, December 5, 2005). Still before the Court reached its decision, in
2003 the German Government moved ahead by proposing the abolition of the master
craftsman certificate’s role as a mandatory entry standard.5 In the general public,
the abolition of the master craftsman certificate was seen as surprising.6
As part of the reform, in 53 out of the 94 previously regulated product mar-
4 See Appendix 2.A.1 for historical background on the entry regulation.
5 See section 2.A.3 for further information.
6 See, e.g., Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10.10.2002, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
10.02.2003a and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28.06.2003b.
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kets, prospective entrepreneurs were no longer required to obtain any mandatory
entry standard. As in product markets which were never regulated by the GTCC,
entrepreneurs now merely need to register their business with the local adminis-
tration. In another 35 product markets, prospective entrepreneurs can now obtain
the mandatory standard by completing six years of relevant professional experience.
Because the sorting of product markets in these two deregulated groups is poten-
tially endogenous, we will not distinguish these two groups of product markets in
our empirical analysis.
In six regulated product markets, the master craftsman certificate kept its role
as a mandatory entry standard. These are chimney sweeps and five crafts in the
health sector.7 In these fields, the entry regulation was not challenged by the court
rulings, because firm entry is restricted in most EU member states.
Further, the reform entailed a number of technical changes to the GTCC which
facilitated firm entry for specific groups of potential entrepreneurs. We explain
these minor simplifications to firm entry in Appendix 2.A.4. These simplifications
concerned all product markets covered by the GTCC, including the six product
markets in which the master craftsman requirement remained in force. Since we
are mainly interested in the effect of the entry restriction following from the master
craftsman certificate, we will focus our empirical analysis on the product markets
where the master craftsman certificate lost its role as a mandatory standard for
entrants and exclude the six product markets that were only affected by the minor
simplifications from the sample.
In short, the reform - leading to the loss of the master craftsman certificate’s role
as a mandatory entry standard - considerably decreased the entry costs in some
product markets, but not in others. This isolated change in entry costs is arguably
unrelated to other developments in the two groups of product markets around the
time of the reform, as the cross-sectional structure of product markets covered by
the entry regulation was fixed since at least 1953 and the reform event was triggered
by legal issues that were unrelated to economic outcomes. In the following section,
we propose an empirical identification strategy which makes use of this institutional
setting.
7 These crafts are optician, hearing aid acoustician, orthopedic technician, orthopedic
shoemaker and dental technician.
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3.3 Empirical strategy
3.3.1 Identification approach
Our objective is to uncover the average effect of the firm entry regulation on industry
dynamics and employment in the deregulated product markets (average treatment
effect on the treated, ATT). Since the counterfactual outcome is not observed, we
make use of industry-time variation generated by the reform of the German Trade
and Crafts Code (GTCC). The reform substantially lowered the mandatory standard
for firm creation in the covered product markets. It had, however, no direct effect
on product markets which were not covered by the GTCC.
Difference-in-differences specification Building on this institutional set-
ting, we set up a difference-in-differences (DiD) model, which compares changes in
establishment turnover and employment in deregulated and never regulated product
markets in the years 1999 to 2008. Specifically, we examine whether establishment
turnover and employment in deregulated relative to never regulated product mar-
kets (first difference) are higher after the reform relative to the period before the
policy shift (second difference). The main identifying assumption is that, condi-
tional on covariates, the outcomes of interest would have evolved similarly in the
deregulated (treated) and never regulated (comparison) product markets in absence
of the reform (common trend assumption).
A simple estimate of the ATT is calculated by an unconditional difference-in-
differences model, which does not account for potential differences in the product
markets’ characteristics. Differences between product markets in characteristics
which may affect outcome variables are accounted for by the DiD model as long
as their influence on the outcomes of interest can be assumed to be constant over
time. However, differences in product market characteristics bias the estimator
if they cause differences in outcomes dynamics, such as growth of the number of
entering establishments. As we will show in the following, the deregulated and never
regulated product markets differ in terms of their employee skill and age structure.
Relevant differences in product market characteristics First, differ-
ences in the skill structure may cause differential firm entry dynamics, if entry
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into self-employment over the aggregate business cycle varies across skill groups.
Svaleryd (2015) provided recent related evidence for Swedish local labor markets.
She finds that low-skilled are more likely to enter self-employment during downturns,
while high-skilled are more likely to enter self-employment during booms. This find-
ing is related to recent evidence on entrepreneurial motivations, which have been
classified into subsistence entrepreneurship and transformational entrepreneurship
(Schoar, 2010; Hurst and Pugsley, 2011; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017). While sub-
sistence entrepreneurs aim at subsistence income for themselves, transformational
entrepreneurs engage in ambitious projects. With respect to the effect of business
cycle conditions on entry into entrepreneurship, subsistence entrepreneurs are ex-
pected to see self-employment as an outside option to escape unemployment during
downturns (“recession-push” hypothesis, choice based on necessity). In contrast,
transformational entrepreneurs should be more likely to start a firm when the econ-
omy is growing (“prosperity-pull” hypothesis, choice based on business opportuni-
ties, Parker, 2009).
In addition, product market level differences in the firms’ employee skill compo-
sition may also correlate with a potentially different evolution of product markets
due to technological change. High-skilled may be more likely to exploit business
opportunities which emerge due to technological innovations, affecting product mar-
ket level establishment entry and growth dynamics (See, e.g., Giarratana, 2004).
Furthermore, the level of general education of entrepreneurs has been found to be
strongly associated with firm growth and longevity (Bates, 1990; Gennaioli et al.,
2013; Levine and Rubinstein, 2017).
Second, the propensity to start a firm changes over the individual life cycle, as
individuals need to build up relevant experience and wealth, but also weigh the re-
maining years of potential income from self-employment against fixed costs of entry
(Evans and Leighton, 1989; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Bates, 1995). In conse-
quence, entry into self-employment may respond differently to cyclical fluctuations.
For instance, product markets with a higher share of employees that are more likely
to start a firm due to their age may experience a stronger increase in firm entry
during booms.8
8 This argument rests on the idea that employees build up human capital that is
partly industry-specific (Parent, 2000; Poletaev and Robinson, 2008; Gathmann and
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To reduce the bias potentially introduced by observable differences between dereg-
ulated and never regulated product markets, we employ two identification strategies
which condition on observable covariates.
Conditional difference-in-differences First, we address the issue of differ-
ences in product market characteristics by inclusion of a suitable parametrization of
the relevant product market characteristics directly in the linear regression model
(specification “Conditional DiD”). To ensure that the product market characteristics
we control for are exogenous to the treatment status, we measure the characteris-
tics in the pre-reform period. We use the years 1999 to 2002 to avoid potential
anticipation effects in the last pre-reform year 2003.
We will control for interactions of year fixed effects and relevant pre-reform prod-
uct market characteristics. Based on the previous discussion, the characteristics we
control for are the product markets’ employee education distribution in three skill
groups (share of low, medium and high-skilled) and the employee age distribution
in three age groups (age groups 15-24, 25-49, ≥50).9
However, conditioning on relevant covariates in a simple regression model relies on
extrapolation if the covariates’ overlap across the treatment and comparison group
is limited. The estimate may be biased if the functional form assumptions regarding
the covariates are incorrect (see e.g. Imbens, 2004). Therefore, we also combine
statistical matching with a regression estimator.
Matched sampling to select a comparison group Our preferred specifica-
tion is to choose a comparison group of product markets with similar pre-reform char-
acteristics from the pool of never regulated product markets via statistical matching
in a first step and then apply a regression estimator to the balanced sample (speci-
fication “Matching DiD”).10 We will use the annual effects in the pre-reform period
Scho¨nberg, 2010) and that is valuable for starting a firm in the same industry (Cooper,
Gimeno-Gascon and Woo, 1994; Bosma et al., 2004).
9 We exclude one skill group and one age group to avoid multicollinearity. The medium
skill group comprises both individuals with a journeyman degree and a master craftsman
certificate (see Table 3.1).
10 Note that we are not able to chose a comparison group via statistical matching in
the second chapter, because a more aggregated industry classification prevents us from
assigning the deregulation status to individual industries (treatment intensity rather
than binary treatment).
120
3.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
to assess the credibility of the common trend assumption.
We aim at balancing the product markets in the treatment and comparison group
in terms of the product market level employee skill and age structure. Specifically,
we match at the product market level on the pre-reform product market share of
employees in the three skill groups and three age groups which we also use as covari-
ates in the “Conditional DiD” specification. Note that we explicitly do not match on
outcome variables. Combining a difference-in-differences estimator with statistical
matching on pre-treatment outcomes leads to an inconsistent estimator when DiD
is consistent, because it essentially reintroduces the pre-treatment outcome which
is differenced out in the DiD specification (Lechner, 2011; Chabe´-Ferret, 2014 and
Chabe´-Ferret, 2015).
We chose the matched sample via propensity score matching at the product market
level, estimating each product markets’ probability of being deregulated given the
matching variables (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). We match on the variables in
each of the years 1999 to 2002 rather than the average pre-reform values to account
for potential trends in the employee structure. We exclude the last pre-reform year
2003 and the post-reform years to ensure that the matching variables are exogenous
from the treatment.
For each affected product market, we match two nearest neighbors based on the
estimated propensity score from the pool of unregulated product markets in the
private sector.11 We match with replacement and drop duplicate comparison indus-
tries.
In Table 3.C.2 we show that our main results are similar for a sample created by
propensity score matching in which we impose common support over the estimated
propensity score.12
3.3.2 Econometric model
We estimate the effect of the firm entry restriction using variants of the following
difference-in-differences model:
11 See Appendix section 3.A.3 for a list of industries included in the private sector sample.
12 Specifically, we exclude treated industries whose propensity score is higher than the
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the comparison industries.
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yjt = α + β deregj × reformt + Xjt′γ + µj + φt + jt, (3.1)
where the subscript j denotes product markets and t denotes calendar years. We
measure product markets as 5-digit industries. Choosing the level of industry aggre-
gation involves a trade-off. On the one hand, a disaggregated industry classification
allows to control in detail for industry characteristics that are either permanent and
unobserved (fixed effects) or observed and time-varying. On the other hand, the
causal identification requires implicitly, that comparison industries are not affected
by the firm entry deregulation. We will discuss this issue in the following section.
In this industry-year-level specification, the outcome variables yjt are mainly the
log of the number of new establishments and the log of the overall number of em-
ployed in an industry-year cell. The main explanatory variable deregj×reformt is
our measure of the entry deregulation, where deregj takes the value one if an indus-
try was deregulated in 2004 and zero if it was never regulated under the GTCC. The
second term of the interaction, reformt, is one for the five calendar years following
the reform in January 2004 and zero for the pre-reform years 2000 to 2003. The
model controls for time-invariant differences across industries through industry fixed
effects µj and aggregate shocks through year fixed effects φt. Industry fixed effects
control for fixed differences in outcomes across industries, such as those caused by
an industry’s product mix. Year fixed effects account for aggregate shocks due to
the national business cycle or country-level policy shifts. In the Conditional DiD
model, covariates Xjt include interactions of the pre-reform share of employees in
the age categories 15-24 and 25-49, the share of medium skilled and high skilled
employees with year fixed effects.
We also report results from the following more flexible version of the previous
model:
yjt = α +
2008∑
t=1999
βt deregj × yeart + Xjt′γ + µj + φt + jt, (3.2)
where the term in the summation interacts the industry-level deregulation dummy
deregj with a full set of year dummies and deregj∗year2003 is the excluded category.
The pre-reform effects allow for a flexible investigation of differential trends in the
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outcome variables of interest prior to the reform. Differing trends prior to the reform
would question the common trend assumption. The post-reform effects describe the
dynamic pattern of the treatment effect, such as its persistence in the examined first
five years following the reform.
We then turn to an analysis at the establishment level to investigate the longevity
of the newly started establishments and the response of the establishments which
were already on the market prior to the reform (incumbents). The main establish-
ment level specification is as follows:
yijt = α +
2008∑
t=1999
βt deregj × yeart + µj + φt + ijt, (3.3)
where i denotes individual establishments. In this specification, our main estab-
lishment outcomes are the size and longevity of entrants and incumbents. Finally,
we investigate within-establishment effects on employment in surviving incumbents,
by replacing industry fixed effects with establishment fixed effects.
We cluster standard errors at the industry level to allow for arbitrary forms of
correlation within industries, such as serial correlation. The number of industry
clusters in the matched industry sample is 181.13
3.3.3 Discussion of identifying assumptions
The interpretation of the β coefficients from both the Conditional DiD specification
and the Matching DiD specification as causal effect of the firm entry deregulation
requires that in absence of the reform, the means of the outcome variables of interest
would have evolved similarly in the deregulated and included comparison industries,
conditional on covariates (common trend assumption). More formally, we assume
that the conditional difference between the outcomes in the treatment and compari-
son group in the pre-treatment period proxies correctly for the conditional difference
in potential outcomes in the post-reform period.
13 Using monte-carlo simulations of difference-in-differences models, Bertrand, Duflo and
Mullainathan (2004) showed that allowing for arbitrary error correlation through clus-
tering standard errors at the longitudinal dimension achieves rejection rates close to
those of a simulation with a known covariance matrix when the number of clusters
exceeds 50.
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Given that the common trend assumption cannot be tested directly since it in-
volves a comparison to the unobserved counterfactual outcome, we investigate the
pre-reform evolution of all main outcomes. Similar pre-reform outcome changes in
deregulated and comparison industries support the common trend assumption.
Conditioning on observable covariates, either by adding them to the regression
model or by conditioning on the propensity of being treated, makes the common
trend assumption more likely to hold if there are differences in characteristics which
may potentially affect the dynamics of the outcome variables, as in our setting. How-
ever, we have to assume that conditional on the observed covariates, the potential
outcomes are independent of the treatment (conditional independence assump-
tion, CIA). This assumption rules out any remaining differences in unobservable
characteristics which may affect the outcome dynamics, after conditioning on the
included observable characteristics. We will evaluate this assumption by condition-
ing on other observable factors that could conceivably be correlated with outcome
dynamics, such as industry sales growth.
We also have to require that both the included covariates in the Conditional DiD
model and the variables which we use for the statistical matching are exogenous from
the treatment (Froelich, 2008). We argue that the product market level employee age
and skill structure in the years 1999 to 2002 was determined before the treatment.
Similarly, we assume that the outcome variables are not affected by the reform in
the pre-reform period. This requires the absence of any anticipation of the reform
until 2002. We argue in section 3.2.2 that such anticipation is unlikely since the
reform was planned only in 2003 and was then seen as surprising.
The common trend and CIA assumptions are closely related to the stable com-
position assumption, which requires the comparability of the product markets over
time in characteristics which are related to outcome dynamics. For example, a dis-
proportionate increase in the share of high-skilled in treated vs. comparison product
markets would bias the estimated reform effect if the skill-level affected the outcomes
of interest. Note that this concern differs from our motivation for the use of the prod-
uct markets’ cross-sectional pre-reform skill and age distribution as covariates in
the Conditional DiD model and as matching variables in the Matching DiD model.
There, we were concerned with cross-sectional differences between treated and com-
parison product markets which may cause differential outcome dynamics, e.g. if
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they interact with the business cycle. In contrast, the stable composition assump-
tion rules out differential changes over time of characteristics which may affect the
outcomes of interest.
Also, the stable composition assumption is not directly testable in principle. We
will investigate its plausibility by controlling for the time-varying product market
level employee composition with respect to age, education, gender and nationality
in robustness specifications. If these characteristics exhibited differential changes
over time and were closely related to the outcomes of interest, we would expect the
estimator of the deregulation effect to change considerably. It turns out that their
inclusion has almost no impact on the results (Table 3.3 column 1).
As discussed above, the Conditional DiD estimator requires that the parametriza-
tion of the covariates allows to correctly impute covariate values in the case of limited
overlap of the covariate distributions of the treatment and comparison group. In
contrast, the Matching DiD estimator assumes common support of the covariate
distributions. We will test the common support assumption directly by inspecting
the covariate distributions.
Furthermore, we assume that the treated product markets were not selected based
on shifts in potential outcomes (Besley and Case, 2000). An endogenous reform
implementation (e.g. in response to declining employment) is unlikely given the
institutional setting. In section 3.2.2 we argued that the GTCC reform was enacted
in response to a preceding EU court decision which challenged the regulation’s com-
patibility with EU law. The necessity to reform the GTCC regulation was therefore
arguably unrelated to economic trends in the regulated product markets. Further,
at the time of the reform the set of regulated product markets was fixed since at
least 1953, as explained in section 3.2.1.
Finally, the potential outcomes of either the treatment group or comparison group
must not vary with the treatments assigned to respective other group, and, for each
group, there are no different forms or versions of each treatment level, which lead to
different potential outcomes (stable unit treatment value assumption, SUTVA,
Rubin, 1977; Imbens and Rubin, 2015). This assumption would be violated in the
case of spillover effects between the treatment and comparison group. For example,
if the deregulation spurred establishment entry in deregulated product markets and
the new establishments competed with establishments in the comparison group,
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firm entry in the comparison group could be negatively affected by the deregula-
tion. This may exaggerate our estimates of the deregulation effect on entry into
entrepreneurship.
Violations of the SUTVA assumption are empirically intractable unless we have a
specific hypothesis about the source of the violation. Relating to the example con-
cerning potential spill-overs due to competition between establishments in related
product markets, we examine the sensitivity of our results to dropping product mar-
kets from the comparison group which are closely related to product markets in the
treatment group. As we assign product markets to 5-digit industries and industries
are typically grouped in higher order industry groups based on similarities in the
production process, “neighboring” industries within industry groups are particu-
larly susceptible to spill-overs. If such spill-overs occurred, we would expect to find
smaller treatment effects if we exclude all 3-digit industry groups which contain a
deregulated 5-digit industry from the pool of potential comparison industries and
match a new set of comparison industries from this restricted pool. The results
remain essentially unchanged (columns 3-4, Table 3.C.3).
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
3.4.1 Data sources
Our main data source is administrative establishment data for Germany from the
Establishment History Panel (Betriebshistorikpanel 1975-2014, BHP).14 The data
is a weakly anonymous 50% sample of all establishments with at least one employee
in Germany (see Schmucker et al., 2016 for a detailed description). It is based on
the mandatory registration of employees liable to social security. This individual
level information is aggregated to the establishment level on 30 of June of each year,
resulting in a yearly panel data set. The organizational unit ‘establishment’ refers to
a facility in a given geographic location, such as a plant or retail outlet (Schmucker
et al., 2016).
The BHP is well suited for this study since it provides detailed and reliable infor-
14 Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Center (FDZ) of the
German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research
(IAB) and remote data access.
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mation on establishment turnover and establishment level employment dynamics.
Its complete industry coverage and a detailed 5-digit industry classification allow
for a precise determination of the product markets which are affected by the studied
entry regulation. As the 5-digit industry information is available only from 1999 on
and is subject to a major classification change in 2009, we use the waves 1999 to
2008. This sample covers four years before and five years after the reform.
As self-employed are not liable to social security, the data do not cover solo-
entrepreneurs. Focusing our analysis on establishments with at least one employee
is adequate for this study, since they are more likely to matter for our focus on job
creation and industry dynamics.
3.4.2 Definition of main variables
Establishment entry For the definition of our measure of original independent
establishment entry, we start from the conceptual definition of entry as an event in
which production factors are newly combined, but no other firms are involved in
the establishment creation (Eurostat, 2007). Specifically, two types of events are
excluded by this definition. The first group contains events where an already exist-
ing physical production unit undergoes an organizational change, such as ownership
changes, legal form changes, or corporate mergers. Second, a new physical estab-
lishment may be created by a multi-establishment firm or result from a corporate
spin-off or a corporate split-up / break-up.
Since the data which we use do not contain annually updated information on the
ownership and legal form of establishments, we cannot identify ownership and legal
form changes directly.15 Instead, we use information on flows of workers between
establishment identifiers (EID) to exclude establishments which are likely to rep-
resent merely an organizational change. New physical establishments are generally
assigned a new EID by the German social security agency.16 We do not consider
the reappearance of an EID after a period of absence in the data as a new EID,
15 See e.g. Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) for
early classifications of firm entrants when ownership information is available.
16 Establishments may be assigned to a common EID if they are active in the same 5-
digit industry and located in the same municipality (NUTS-5) (Schmucker et al., 2016).
Physical relocations and industry changes of establishments do generally not lead to the
assignment of a new EID.
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since the establishment may have continued its activity without employees during
the interruption.17
We denote a new EID as a new establishment if its workforce consists largely
of workers that have newly come together to the production process. To this end,
we rely on worker flows between establishments to improve the definition of estab-
lishment entry and exit (Benedetto et al., 2007). The required worker flow data
at the establishment level was made available for the BHP data by Hethey-Maier
and Schmieder (2013). The worker flow data contain information on the proportion
of employees who had worked together in another establishment in the previous
year (maximum clustered inflow, MCI). Based on a combination of the BHP data
with the IAB Betriebspanel, a survey on a subset of the establishments in the BHP,
Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013) show that new EIDs with a large initial em-
ployee cluster (MCI) are less likely to indicate an original establishment entry.
Building on Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013), we denote new EIDs as en-
trants if there are at least four non-marginal employees in their main employment,
of which no more than 30% had previously worked together in another establish-
ment. Marginal employees and employees in secondary employment are not included
in the worker flow data.18 About 4% of all new EIDs have four or more non-marginal
employees in their main employment, of which no more than 30% had previously
worked together in another establishment (Table 3.A.1, column 5).19 We do not
classify new EIDs as entrants if more than 30% of the non-marginal employees pre-
viously worked together in another establishment. This applies to about 8% of all
new EIDs.20 Among the new establishments that have a large cluster of work-
ers who were previously employed at another establishment and are, therefore, not
counted as entrants, are non-independent entrants from multi-establishment firms
where workers from other establishments of the parent firm constitute the initial
workforce of the entrant (e.g. opening of an additional plant or store). Further-
17 Compared to defining all or parts of reappearing EIDs as potential entrants, the defini-
tion which we use provides a lower bound of actual establishment entry.
18 In the years 1999-2002, employees were defined as non-marginal employees if they earned
at least 325 Euros or worked more than 15h/week. In 2003 the monthly earnings cutoff
was raised to 400 Euros and the work-hours constraint was abandoned.
19 In Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013) this group corresponds to the establishment
entry category “New Establishment (med & big)”.
20 In Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013), this group corresponds to the categories “New
Estab (fuzzy)”, “Spin-off”, “ID change” and “Unclear”.
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more, new EIDs with large clustered worker inflows include organizational changes
of already existing production units, such as ownership changes, legal form changes,
or corporate mergers, but also corporate spin-offs and split-ups.
We follow Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013) in classifying new EIDs with three
or less non-marginal employees as entrants irrespective of the share of workers which
previously worked for another establishment, because this share is difficult to inter-
pret for very small new establishments. For example, the fact that both employees
of a new EID with two employees have previously worked at the same establishment
may also represent individual worker mobility between establishments. In this case,
a classification as spurious entrants would be wrong. On the other hand, a high
cutoff below which to ignore worker flow clusters would raise the share of spurious
entrants, because more restructuring events remain undetected (‘false positives’).
New EIDs with three or less non-marginal employees make up about 25% of all new
EIDs.21 In Appendix section 3.A.1, we show that our main results are robust to
lowering the size cutoff above which we take clustered worker inflows to new EIDs
into account. The results are very similar (Appendix Table 3.A.3, column 3).
Different from Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013), we also include new EIDs
with only marginal employees or employees in secondary employment in our anal-
ysis. About 63% of all new EIDs (with at least one marginal employee) have only
marginal employees or employees in secondary employment in the first three years
after hiring the first marginal or secondary job employee. We denote new EIDs with
only marginal or secondary job employees during the first 3 years as entrants if they
have up to three workers (61% of all new EIDs). About 2% of all new EIDs employ
more than three marginal and no non-marginal employees in the first three years and
are therefore classified as continuing establishments (Appendix Table 3.A.3, column
4). The main results remain valid when we include new EIDs only in the year they
hire the first non-marginal employee (Appendix Table 3.A.3, column 2).
Establishment exit Establishment exit is defined analogously to entry. We
consider an EID as potential exit in the last year it lists an employee. EIDs with at
least four non-marginal employees in the last year are classified as exit if no more
21 In Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013), this group corresponds to the category “New
Establishment (small)”
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than 30% of the employees work together in another establishment in the following
year (Table 3.A.2 column 4). Further, we denote all EIDs with at most three non-
marginal employees as exit. Disappearing EIDs with up to three marginal and no
non-marginal employees are also classified as exit. Consequently, we consider EIDs
with more than four non-marginal employees as continuing establishments if more
than 30% work together in another establishment in the following year, as well
as EIDs with no non-marginal employee in the last 3 years and more than three
marginal or secondary job employees.
Industry classification We use the 5-digit level of the national industry clas-
sification by the Federal German Statistical Office, denoted “WZ” (Wirtschaft-
szweige).22 Establishments are allocated to industries based on their primary ac-
tivity. Waves 1999 to 2003 are coded in WZ, 1993 edition, which corresponds to the
NACE rev. 1 classification to the fourth digit and is nested in ISIC rev. 3. Waves
2003 to 2008 are coded in WZ, 2003 edition, which is based on NACE rev. 1.1 and
ISIC rev. 3.1.23 We join selected 5-digit industries to merge them to data on yearly
industry-level sales.
We subsequently create time-consistent industry definitions by joining 5-digit in-
dustries which are subject to classification changes. Following Pierce and Schott
(2012), we denote the resulting time-consistent industry groups as industry “fami-
lies”. We limit the inclusion of minor classification changes into industry families to
prevent single industry families from growing large, which would inhibit the precise
linkage of industry families to product markets regulated under the GTCC. To this
end, we apply a threshold method which was proposed by Pierce and Schott (2012)
for SIC and NAICS codes. Details are provided in Appendix section 3.A.2. If not
otherwise noted, the term “industry” refers to these industry families. We then focus
on private sector industries by excluding industry families with a WZ 1993 industry
in the public or non-profit sector (details on the excluded industries in Appendix
section 3.A.3). This leads to a set of 679 industry families in the private sector.
22 Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige, Ausgaben 1993 und 2003, Statistisches Bundesamt.
23 The 2003 WZ classification contains only minor changes compared to the 1993 WZ
classification. 92% of the 1.041 5-digit 2003 WZ industries have a 1:1 equivalence in the
1993 WZ classification.
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Product market regulation We carefully assign the regulated activities listed
in the German Trade and Crafts Code to the 5-digit 1993 industry classification.
For the assignment of regulated activities to industries, we manually compare de-
tailed descriptions of regulated activities in the legal guidelines on master craftsman
examinations in each regulated craft (“Meisterpru¨fungsverordnungen”) with the
5-digit industry code description of the industry classification.
We use the 1953 edition of the GTCC to exclude any potentially endogenous
subsequent changes to the set of regulated activities. Specifically, in 1998 scaffolder
activities became subject to the GTCC regulation. We exclude the corresponding
industry from our main estimation sample.24
Furthermore, as explained in section 3.2.1, the 2004 reform of the GTCC lifted
the entry restriction in all but six regulated activities. In these six regulated ac-
tivities, the master craftsman certificate kept its status as mandatory standard for
prospective entrants because their practice is restricted in some form in most EU
countries. In our main specification we exclude the 7 corresponding 5-digit industries
from the sample (about 1% of private sector employment). Therefore, we effectively
compare product markets in which the master craftsman certificate lost its role as
a mandatory standard, relative to product markets which were never regulated by
the GTCC. The results are very similar when including the product markets which
continued to be affected by the firm entry restriction in the pool of comparison
industries (columns 1-2, Appendix Table 3.C.3).
We identify 81 5-digit industries which are subject to the firm entry deregulation,
which we compare to 590 never regulated private sector industries. The affected
industries account for about 20% of the private sector employment in our data.
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 compares pre-reform industry characteristics for three groups of industries.
These three groups are the 81 industries which were affected by the deregulation
(column 1), the 590 comparison industries which were never regulated (“all control”,
column 2), as well as the subset of 100 matched comparison industries (column 3).
The first six rows show the average pre-reform industry share of employees by the
24 The scaffolder industry accounts for about 22,300 employees in 2005 (0.08% of all private
sector employees).
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three age and three skill groups which we used as matching variables. Column 4
shows significant differences in the age and skill structure between industries affected
by the deregulatory reform and non-affected industries. The affected industries have
a larger share of employees aged 15-24 (18% vs. 13%, difference sign. at 1%) than
the never regulated industries, but a lower share of employees aged 25-49 (61% vs.
65%, difference sign. at 1%). Furthermore, employees in the affected industries
are less likely to have a college education (3% vs. 12%, difference sign. at 1%).
These differences are reasonable due to the fact that establishments in the affected
industries are more likely to train apprentices and less likely to hire college educated
workers. Most apprentices start their training directly after completed schooling.
Interactions of these cross-sectional differences with the business cycle may lead
to systematically different dynamics of establishment entry and related outcomes
between deregulated and never regulated industries. To illustrate this concern, we
provide descriptive evidence for systematic differences in industry level entry rates
over the business cycle between industries with different initial shares of (1) high
skilled employees and (2) employees aged 15-24 in Appendix 3.B.25
Against this background, we create a matched industry sample with a similar
pre-reform age and skill composition. Column 5 shows that the statistical matching
successfully eliminates observable differences in the matched characteristics.
A comparison of pre-reform growth in the number of entrants and the number of
employees across the three groups of industries reveals slightly diverging pre-trends
between the affected industries and the non-affected industries (rows 7-8, column
4).26 This divergence confirms our motivation for using a Conditional difference-
25 In particular, we regress the yearly log industry number of entrants on an interac-
tion term of national employment growth and the initial industry share of high-skilled
employees and employees aged 15-24. We show a strong association for four national
business cycle measures (HP-filtered employment growth, annual employment growth,
HP-filtered sales growth and annual sales growth). Furthermore, we can show a signif-
icant association of the initial industry share of high-skilled with establishment entry
over the business cycle for a second data set which covers the years 1976 to 2014. As
the main data set used, it is based on the IAB Establishment History Panel. As above,
we exclude the public sector. Due to the sample coverage from 1974 to 2014, the sample
is limited to West Germany (excl. Berlin) and industries are aggregated to the 3-digit
level (229 3-digit industries).
26 For the dependent variables, we examine pre-reform growth rather than levels because
we account for time-invariant differences between industries by controlling for industry
fixed effects in the DiD specification.
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in-differences model and a Matching difference-in-difference model. The matched
sample shows very similar pre-reform trends for the main outcome variables (column
5). This supports the identifying common trend assumption.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Number of new establishments
Main findings We first investigate the reform effects on establishment entry. We
expect a positive effect of the entry deregulation on establishment entry, given the
substantial monetary and time costs required to comply with the previous manda-
tory entry standard.27
To estimate the effect of the entry deregulation on the number of entrants, we
use two types of difference-in-differences model specifications. In the first model
we compare changes over time in the number of new establishments among indus-
tries which were affected by the entry deregulation with the corresponding changes
over time among all non-affected industries in the private sector.28 To reduce the
bias potentially introduced by observable differences between deregulated and never
regulated product markets, we control for interactions of year fixed effects and the
industries’ employee skill distribution (share of medium-skilled and high-skilled) as
well as interactions of year FE with the employee age distribution (age groups 15-24
and 25-49). This specification is equivalent to equation 3.1 where Xjt denotes the
interactions between year FE and the pre-reform industry characteristics and j de-
notes all private sector industries (“Conditional DiD” or “CDiD”). The dependent
variable is the log of the number of new establishments with at least one marginal
employee in an industry-year cell.29
Column 1 of Table 3.2 shows the result for the CDiD model. The coefficient esti-
27 See, among others, Hopenhayn (1992), Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides (2001),
Poschke (2010) and Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011)
28 The model compares changes over time between treated and non-treated industries
because time invariant (level) differences between industries of the dependent variable
are absorbed by the included industry fixed effects and differences over time which are
constant across all included industries are absorbed by the year fixed effects.
29 Recall that we exclude new establishments of which a large proportion of the employees
have worked together in another establishment in the previous year. See Appendix
Table 3.A.3, row 3 (“main definition”).
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mate of 0.118 (significant at the 1% level) on the reform indicator dereg x reform
implies an increase of the number of new establishments with at least one employee
by 11.8% from the pre-reform period to the post-reform period in the affected indus-
tries, compared to the non-affected industries. The coefficient shows a percentage
increase because the dependent variable is specified in log terms. In column 2 we
show the results of a more flexible model specification, in which we interact the
variable indicating whether an industry was affected by the entry deregulation with
the full set of year fixed effects, 2003 being the omitted category. There are no
statistically significant differential trends in establishment entry in the four years
prior to the reform, raising no worries regarding the common trend assumption. Es-
tablishment entry increases strongly in 2005, the year after which the deregulation
took effect, and remains large until 2008, the last year of our sample. The coefficient
estimate is statistically significantly different from zero in the years 2005 to 2007.
We confirm this finding with an alternative model specification, where we
chose a comparison group with similar pre-reform characteristics from the pool of
non-affected industries via statistical matching (specification “Matching DiD” or
“MDiD”). We match on the pre-reform industry characteristics which we included
as covariates in the previous Conditional DiD specification and then estimate the
reform effect via DiD in the resulting matched industry sample without additional
covariates. The coefficient estimate of the MDiD specification (column 3) shows a
12.2% increase in the number of new establishments in consequence of the reform,
which is very similar to the one of the previous CDiD specification.
The corresponding annual coefficient estimates in column 4 show no indication
of diverging pre-trends (see Figure 3.1 for a graphical illustration). The coefficient
estimates are close to zero in the years before the reform, turn positive in 2005 and
remain statistically significantly different from zero in each year until 2008, the last
year of our sample.
Population-level implication Given that before the reform on average 41030
establishments entered in each affected industry and 81 industries were affected by
the deregulation, the increase based on the average effect estimate of 12% corre-
30 See Appendix Table 3.C.1 panel A. The descriptive statistics in the table refer to the
50% random sample which we use in this analysis, so they have to be multiplied by two
to reflect the population level.
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sponds to 3,985 additional establishments with at least one employee per year.
Comparison to chapter two The documented effect of the GTCC reform
on the number of new employer establishments can be seen as complimentary to
chapter two, where we identify a positive reform effect on entry into (individual-
level) self-employment.
While establishment entry corresponds to the event where production factors are
newly combined, individual entry into self-employment denotes the transition from
paid employment, unemployment or outside the labor force into self-employment.
An establishment entry may not correspond to entry into self-employment if a self-
employed starts an additional establishment or shuts down one establishment and
directly starts another production process in a different establishment. Analogously,
entry into self-employment may not correspond to establishment entry if a previ-
ous wage earner or unemployed becomes a managing owner of an already existing
establishment.
Given the conceptual difference between establishment entry and individual level
entry into self-employment, the positive reform effect on both empirical measures
supports our overall finding of increased entrepreneurial activity in consequence of
the reform.
Moreover, the here documented increase in entry of establishments with at least
one employee supports our finding regarding a small but statistically significant
increase of entry with one to three employees in chapter two (Table 2.C.3). Relative
to solo-entrepreneurship, the entry of establishments with at least one employee is a
more mature measure of new business activity, because the hiring of a first employee
suggests that the entrepreneur is more likely to pursue a business opportunity and
grow rather than earning only a subsistence income for herself.31
Robustness We assure the robustness of the previous result to several alternative
specifications of the Matching DiD model. First, we explore the influence of potential
systematic industry-specific changes over time in the employee industry composition,
by additionally controlling for the current industry share of employees by gender,
31 See Schoar (2010) for a discussion of opportunity and subsistence entrepreneurship.
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age, skill and nationality.32 Industry-specific changes over time in the industries’
composition would invalidate the stable composition assumption if the changes are
systematically related to both the reform and the dependent variable.33 We show the
result in column 1 of Table 3.3. The estimate of the reform effect is very similar in
size and more precisely estimated. Most coefficients on the industry characteristics
are economically small and statistically insignificant.34
Second, we additionally control for interactions of average pre-reform industry
sales growth with a post reform dummy and a linear trend variable, to flexibly
capture the influence of potentially systematic differences in pre-reform industry
growth.35 The coefficient estimate increases to 14.3% (column 2), but the differ-
ence to the baseline estimate is not statistically significant. The coefficient on the
interaction of sales growth and the post reform dummy is positive and statistically
significant. This points to lower pre-reform sales growth in industries affected by the
reform compared to non-affected industries and to a positive association between
pre-reform sales growth and growth of the number of entrants at the industry level.
Third, we show that our results remain similar when we control for linear industry
trends which are identified from the pre-reform sample years (column 3). This result
shows that the measured effect is not a mere continuation of diverging pre-reform
trends in establishment entry.
Fourth, we rule out that our results are driven by systematic differences in the
product markets’ covariation with the business cycle. To this end, we compute
industry betas with respect to sales growth. For each industry, we calculate the
beta as coefficient from a time-series regression of the industry’s annual sales growth
32 Specifically, we control for the current industry share of employees along seven char-
acteristics: female, aged 15-24, aged 25-49, medium skilled, high skilled, foreign EU
citizen and foreign non-EU citizen.
33 Note that this concern differs from our motivation for the use of the product markets’ pre-
reform (time-invariant) skill and age distribution as covariates in the Conditional DiD
model and as matching variables in the Matching DiD model. There, we were concerned
with cross-sectional differences between treated and comparison product markets which
may cause differential outcome dynamics, e.g. if they interact with the business cycle.
34 For example, the coefficient on the share of women in an industry-year cell of -0.696
would indicate that industry-year cells with a 1 percentage point higher share of women
have on average 0.696 percent fewer entrants.
35 The sales growth is calculated as average annual growth over the period 1996-2001 at
the industry level. Data on industry sales are based on administrative revenue tax data
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010 and previous editions).
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on aggregate annual sales growth in the pre-reform time series 1994 to 2003. The
retrieved coefficient estimate proxies for the degree of covariance of each industry
with the business cycle in the pre-reform period. We then include interactions of
the industry beta with a post reform dummy and a linear trend variable (column 4)
in the main model. The results are similar to the baseline estimates.
Fifth, we verify that our results are not driven by systematic differences in the in-
dustries orientation towards international trade. Following Mian and Sufi (2014), we
create a geographical Herfindahl index for each industry, which is based on the share
of an industry’s employment that falls in each municipality. Specifically, we define
the geographical Herfindahl index as the sum of the squared shares of an industry’s
employment in each municipality (“Kreis”), using the Establishment History Panel
of the years 1999-2002. This index of tradability relies on the idea that industries
which are oriented towards international trade tend to be geographically concen-
trated, while industries relying on local demand will be more uniformly distributed.
We then add interactions of this share with a post reform dummy and a linear trend
variable to capture potential differences in the evolution of industries with different
geographic industry concentration. The results are similar to the baseline estimates
(column 5).
Finally, we present results for an alternative model specification at level of
industry-region-year cells (38 NUTS-2 regions). While the identifying variation re-
mains at the industry-year level, this specification allows to control for the potential
influence of systematic local trends via interacted region-year fixed effects. The
dependent variables are the log number of entrants in an industry-region-year cell.
Both the conditioning and matching remains at the industry level, as in the main
industry-level specification. Also this model shows a significant increase in the num-
ber of new establishments (columns 1 and 3 of Appendix Table 3.C.4). Including
interacted region × year fixed effects does not change the results (columns 2 and 4).
3.5.2 Size, longevity and hiring of the new
establishments
After having established the positive effect of the GTCC reform on the number of
entrants in the previous section, we now turn to an investigation of the ex-post
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quality of the new establishments. The here investigated ex-post quality measures
are complementary to the ex-ante measure education (skill level), which we analyzed
in chapter two.
We create an establishment level sample of entrants in their first year and use
three main empirical measures of ex-post quality: the probability of having ≥2
employees at entry, the probability of 2-year survival and the probability of hiring
within the first 2 years. To demonstrate the robustness of our results, we also present
estimates for 1-year and 3-year survival and 3-year hiring and hiring 2 employees
within 2 years.
Since the analysis of survival of an entry cohort depends on outcomes up to three
years later, we restrict the estimation sample to the entry cohorts 2000 to 2006 to
rule out any confounding influence of the 2008 financial crisis. We estimate the
effect on each dependent variable with the Conditional DiD model (full sample) and
the Matching DiD model (matched sample).
Propensity to have 2 employees at entry We start with an analysis of
the initial size of the new establishments. As the deregulation decreased the initial
fixed entry cost, we expect that it facilitated entry disproportionately for those
entrepreneurs who intend to start at a small scale.
We define the dependent variable ≥2 employees at entry, which takes the value
one if a new establishment has at least two employees (marginal or non-marginal) in
the year of entry (t) and zero if the establishment has only one employee. We expect
a decrease in the propensity of having two or more employees in the year of entry.
This is also what we find. With the Matching DiD model we estimate a decrease of
the probability of having two or more employees at in the first year by 1.5 percentage
points after the reform, compared to the matched comparison industries (Table 3.4,
column 2). Given the sample mean of 0.43 (i.e. 43% of all new establishments have
two or more employees), the coefficient estimate indicates a relative decrease of
about 3.5%. The Conditional DiD model yields a similar qualitative result (column
1).36 This result is in line with a similar analysis in chapter two, where we found a
decrease in the entrants’ probability of having at least one employee in the year of
entry in consequence of the GTCC reform (Table 2.3).
36 See Appendix Table 3.C.6 for the corresponding industry level results.
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Propensity to survive for at least 2 years For our analysis of entrant
longevity, we create the dependent variable survive ≥2 years, which turns one if
the entrant survives and has at least one (marginal or non-marginal) employee in
t+1 and t+2 (first and second year after entry).37 The variable is zero if the new
establishment drops out of the data set within two years. This may be due to exit
or indicate that the establishment continues without employees. For example, for
entrants in 2004 the variable indicates the continued operation of an establishment
until at least June 2006.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 shows the result for the entrants’ propensity to
survive for at least two years. With both the CDiD and the MDiD model, the effect
is not statistically significantly different from zero. The results are very similar for
entrants’ 1-year and 3-year survival (see Appendix Table 3.C.5). Also estimates at
the industry-year level show an increase of both the number of entrants which fail
within 2 years and the number of entrants which survive for 2 years (Appendix Table
3.C.7). We conclude that the GTCC reform had no statistically significant effect on
entrant longevity.
The documented unchanged longevity of the new establishments is in line with
chapter two, where we found no significant change in exit from self-employment in
consequence of the reform.
Propensity to hire within the first 2 years Next, we investigate potential
changes in the new establishments’ propensity to hire. We create a dependent
variable which indicates the propensity to survive for two years and hire at least
one additional (marginal or non-marginal) employee within two years (hire within
2 years). The variable is zero if the new establishment has equally many or less
employees after two years (t+2), compared to the year of entry, or drops out of the
data set.
Using the Conditional DiD model, we estimate a decrease in the propensity to hire
by 0.9 percentage points (sign. at 1%). Relative to the mean of 22%, the estimate
corresponds to a relative decrease of 4% (column 5). The estimate is smaller and not
statistically significantly different from zero with the Matching DiD model (column
37 Recall that conditioning on an employee count of at least one is necessary because the
data is restricted to employer establishments.
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6).38 At the industry level, the CDiD model delivers an increase in the number of
new establishments which hire within 2 years by 8% (sign. at 10%, Appendix Table
3.C.8, column 1). The according coefficient of the MDiD model on the number
of new establishments which hire is positive but imprecisely estimated (column 2).
The number of new establishments which survive but do not hire within 2 years
increases by 15% (sign. at 1%, column 3) according to the CDiD model and by 10%
according to the MDiD model (sign. at 1%).
Taken together, the results suggest that there is an economically small average
decrease in the new establishments propensity to hire.
The related empirical evidence has been mixed. Branstetter et al. (2014) finds
that a decrease in administrative entry costs leads to an increase in the number of
entrants but a decrease in the two-year survival probability.39 In contrast, Hombert
et al. (2014) consider a reform which reduced the downside risk from entrepreneurial
entry out of unemployment through an extension of unemployment benefit claims
in case of business failure, but did not affect entry costs. Similar to our results, they
find an average decrease in the initial size of the entrants but find no significant
change in the average propensity to survive or hire.
The unchanged composition of entrants with respect to longevity on the one hand,
and the fact that we find only an economically small decrease in the propensity
to hire on the other hand may also contribute to the understanding of individual
selection into entrepreneurship. Our results do not support the theoretical view
that individuals select into entrepreneurship based on private ex-ante information
about their entrepreneurial ability (“selection view”) (Lucas, 1978). In this case,
entry costs would screen out entrepreneurs with low expectations about success
and a decrease in entry costs should negatively affect the entrant composition. In
contrast, our results speak in favor of the view that individuals can learn about
their entrepreneurial ability only by starting a firm because they have no private
information about their entrepreneurial ability (“experimentation view”) (Jovanovic,
1982; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Asplund and Nocke, 2006). Under this assumption,
38 Also the propensity to hire at least one employee within 3 years is not statistically and
economically significantly affected (see Appendix Table 3.C.5, columns 5-6).
39 In a different institutional context, Jensen, Leth-Petersen and Nanda (2015) show that
a reform that relaxed financing constraints for potential entrepreneurs attracted mostly
entrepreneurs which failed within 3 years.
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there is no reason to expect a change in the composition of entrants with respect to
post-entry outcomes in response to a change in entry costs.
In the following, we investigate whether the increase in the number of entrants
translated into an increase in the overall number of employees.
3.5.3 Number of employees in new establishments
and overall employment
Number of employees in new establishments First, we investigate
whether the reform of the GTCC increased the number of employees in entering
establishments. As a dependent variable we use the log of the industry-level number
of all employees after two years in entering establishments with at least one employee
of a given year. The measure thus counts the number of jobs that will be created by
entrants in two years and excludes new establishments which will exit within two
years. Employment is measured in full-time equivalents.40
With both the Conditional DiD model and the Matching DiD model, the esti-
mated effect of the GTCC reform on the number of jobs created by entrants is not
statistically significantly different from zero, but positive (Table 3.5, columns 2 and
4). The result is robust to adding time-varying covariates for the current industry
employee composition, controlling for average pre-reform sales growth, as well as
including linear industry pre-trends (Appendix table 3.C.9).
Number of employees in all establishments In Table 3.6 we show the
effect of the reform on the number of full-time equivalent employees in all estab-
lishments with at least one employee in the years 1999 to 2008.41
40 We calculate FTE employment as follows: Full-time employees are assigned a weight of
1, (non-marginal) part-time employees (“Teilzeit”) a weight of 0.5 and marginal (part-
time) employees (“Geringfu¨gige Bescha¨ftigtung”) a weight of 0.25. The values corre-
spond to the self-reported median number of work hours in the respective employment
status in Germany (own calculation based on the Micro Census 2008).
41 Theoretical predictions on the link between entry restrictions and employment depend
strongly on the underlying assumptions on product market conditions (such as the
extent and quality of entry, product market differentiation and competition) and labor
market conditions (such as the labor supply elasticity or rent sharing) (Fonseca, Lopez-
Garcia and Pissarides, 2001; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Koeniger and Prat, 2007;
Ebell and Haefke, 2009; Felbermayr and Prat, 2011).
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With the Conditional DiD model we estimate a negative coefficient of the GTCC
reform on the number of employees (sign. at 5%, column 1). However, the estimate
is driven by a steady decrease in the number of employees in the affected indus-
tries relative to the non-affected industries, which started already before the reform
(column 2). Hence, the decrease cannot be attributed to the reform.
The Matching DiD model performs better in isolating the reform effect. The
number of employees developed similarly in the affected industries and matched
non-affected industries in the pre-reform years (column 4). The estimated coefficient
of the MDiD model on the interaction term Deregj×reformt is not statistically
significantly different from zero (column 3).
The MDiD result is robust to adding time-varying covariates for the current in-
dustry employee composition (Appendix table 3.C.10, column 1), controlling for
average pre-reform sales growth (column 2) and including linear industry pre-trends
(column 3).
We therefore conclude that we find no change in dependent employment in con-
sequence of the GTCC reform. Our finding is in line with Zwiener (2017) who finds
no change in dependent employment in consequence of the GTCC reform. Differ-
ently from this paper, Zwiener (2017) uses individual level data (SIAB), chooses a
different specification of the treatment and comparison group and performs her anal-
ysis at the occupation level.42 In the context of administrative burden to start-ups
in Mexico, Bruhn (2011) finds a positive effect of a reduction in entry restrictions
on the number of wage earners in industry sectors affected by the change in en-
try restrictions, at the cost of reduced wage employment in non-affected sectors.
Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) show that a restriction to the maximum size of new
retail establishments slowed down employment growth.
Note that our result does not include employment changes accounted for by solo-
entrepreneurs. The increase in the entry by solo-entrepreneurs measured in the
second chapter suggests that the here measured effect on the number of employees
in establishments with at least one employee may underestimate the effect on overall
42 As comparison group, Zwiener (2017) chooses the 6 product markets in which the
master craftsman certificate continued to be the mandatory entry standard and 29
product markets in which entrepreneurs became allowed to start a firm if they possess a
journeymen degree and six years of professional experience. We exclude the first group
from the sample and specify the second group as deregulated.
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employment.
3.5.4 Incumbent survival and establishment size
We now examine incumbent employment and exit, to explore whether the reform
increased reallocation between entrants and incumbents. Exit by inefficient incum-
bents is expected to increase if the additional entrants raise industry productivity
and compete directly with the incumbents (market selection) (Hopenhayn, 1992;
Poschke, 2010). However, if the incumbents had market power before the deregu-
lation reform, they may have found it optimal to restrict output and employment
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). Then, firm entry may increase incumbent employ-
ment if the new firms increase industry competition. Finally, the strategic reaction
of incumbents to firm entry may depend on their competitiveness. Aghion et al.
(2009) show that foreign firm entry has adverse effects on incumbent productivity
growth and patenting in industries far below the technology frontier, but positive
effects in industries close to the frontier.
To this end, we create an establishment level sample which contains only establish-
ments aged five years or older. The definition ensures that establishments observed
in the last sample year 2008 have been created before the reform in June 2003.43
Note that the conditioning/matching is not adapted when going from the industry
level to the establishment level in order to consistently use one covariate set and one
industry-level comparison group throughout the chapter.
We first investigate establishment exit as the extensive margin of adjustment.
Using the CDiD model, we find no overall increase in incumbent exit in consequence
of the reform (Table 3.7, column 1). Using the MDiD model, the increase in exit
amounts to 0.4 percentage points (col. 3, sign. at 10%), which is equivalent to a
relative increase of 8% compared to the pre-reform sample mean of 0.05 (Appendix
Table 3.C.1).
43 This age restriction is implemented by imposing that establishments needed to have at
least one full-time employee five years ago. It therefore excludes incumbents which had
only marginal employees five years ago, since marginal employment is included in the
data only from 1999. Note that the sample is unbalanced. The number of observations
is smaller in the employment regressions since the inclusion of establishment fixed ef-
fects omits all variation from establishments that are observed only for one period, i.e.
establishments which exit at age six.
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To further explore which subgroup of incumbents drives this result, we estimate
heterogeneous effects by initial establishment size. Specifically, we create an indi-
cator variable smalli,t−5, which is one if an incumbent had one to four full-time
employees five years ago.44 The corresponding result for both the CDiD and MDiD
show a statistically significant increase in overall exit among incumbents which were
small before the reform. According to the MDiD model, small incumbents became
0.4 percentage points more likely to fail in consequence of the reform (column 4,
row 2, sign. at 10%), while there is no significant change for non-small incumbents
(largei,t−5). The results are very similar with the CDiD model (column 2) and
when controlling an interaction of pre-reform industry sales growth with a post-
reform dummy and a linear trend (column 6).
We then investigate effects on employment changes within surviving incumbents,
which is the intensive margin of adjustment (Table 3.8). We use the same incum-
bent sample, but now include establishment fixed effects rather than industry fixed
effects to control for differences in unobserved permanent establishment character-
istics such as entrepreneurial ability. In this model, the reform effect is identified
from employment changes within surviving establishments in affected product mar-
kets around the reform year, relative to within establishment employment changes
in non-affected product markets.
With the MDiD model, the estimated coefficient on employment of the average
incumbent is not significantly different from zero (column 3). However, the analysis
of heterogeneous effects by pre-reform size as above reveals that incumbents in the
affected industries which had 4 or less employees before the reform did shrink more
or grow less around the time of the reform than small incumbents in the non-affected
industries (sign. at 10%, column 4, row 2). Also, this result is similar for the CDiD
model (column 2), when controlling for linear industry trends (column 5).
Note that the results are very similar when restricting the sample to incumbents
which are in the sample in each year from 1999 to 2008 (balanced sample, Appendix
Table 3.C.11). This implies that the within-establishment employment changes are
not driven by later exiting establishments.45
44 Note that we cannot include marginal employees in this definition, since they are ob-
served only from 1999 on.
45 Since the sample is restricted to establishments which have been active for 5 years, the
establishments of the restricted sample survive for at least 15 years.
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The results on incumbent exit and employment growth are consistent with a
reform-induced increase in industry dynamics. Small incumbents are partially
crowded out in consequence of the reform. This finding is in line with Hombert
et al. (2014), who document a decrease in employment among small incumbents as
a result of reform which facilitated entry into entrepreneurship in France.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we estimate the effect of a deregulation that led to a substantial
reduction in firm entry restrictions in a large and diverse set of product markets,
while other markets remained entirely unaffected. Up to its reform, the regulation
imposed a mandatory standard, the master craftsman certificate, on prospective en-
trepreneurs. Given its arguably exogenous implementation, the deregulation qual-
ifies as a suitable quasi-natural experiment for identifying effects of a reduction in
entry restrictions.
We find that the deregulation led to a substantial increase in the number of new
establishments with at least one employee. The new establishments are initially
smaller, which was expected given that the fixed entry cost resulting from the entry
restriction was more binding for prospective entrepreneurs who intended to start on
a small scale. Interestingly, the new establishments are similarly likely to survive.
This suggests that the deregulation did not negatively affect the composition of the
new entrepreneurs.
In a second set of findings, we show that at least in the first five years after the
reform, the increased activity by new establishments did not result in a statistically
significant increase in dependent employment. This may be partly due to crowding-
out of small incumbents, which experienced an increased probability of exit and
lower employment in consequence of the deregulation.
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3.7 Figures and tables
Figure 3.1: Effect of the deregulation on the number of entrants (annual effects)
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Notes: In this figure we show coefficients βt and 95% confidence intervals of the model
yjt = α+
2008∑
t=2000
βt deregj × yeart + µj + φt + jt
in which deregj×year2003 is the excluded category. The dependent variable is the log of the
number of new employer establishments per industry-year (details in section 3.4.2). The
measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject to
the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Estimation
performed using OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform in-
dustry employment. Sample: matched sample of 181 5-digit industries (details in section
3.3.1), years 2000-2008. Number of observations: 1629. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation within industries. Coefficients
reported in table 3.2 column 4.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of treatment and comparison group industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat All Matched (1)-(2) (1)-(3)
Control Control t-test t-test
Mean Mean Mean Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Pre-reform matched product market characteristics
Employee age:
Share age 15-24 0.182 0.127 0.161 0.054∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.020 (0.020)
Share age 35-49 0.613 0.654 0.621 -0.040∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.008 (0.013)
Share age 50+ 0.205 0.219 0.217 -0.014 (0.010) -0.012 (0.013)
Employee education:
Share low skilled 0.198 0.158 0.176 0.040 (0.026) 0.022 (0.030)
Share medium skilled 0.768 0.727 0.781 0.041 (0.025) -0.013 (0.026)
Share high skilled 0.034 0.115 0.043 -0.081∗∗∗ (0.010) -0.009 (0.009)
Pre-reform product market characteristics not matched
Growth No entrants -0.140 -0.183 -0.151 0.043 (0.026) 0.011 (0.033)
Gr. No entrants with 1 employee -0.125 -0.154 -0.106 0.028 (0.032) -0.019 (0.045)
Gr. No entrants with 2+ empl. -0.159 -0.197 -0.198 0.038 (0.027) 0.039 (0.040)
Gr. No entrants which survive 2y -0.116 -0.140 -0.083 0.024 (0.027) -0.034 (0.031)
Gr. No entrants don’t survive 2y -0.172 -0.251 -0.239 0.079 (0.043) 0.068 (0.052)
Gr. No entrants hire within 2y -0.031 -0.104 -0.024 0.072* (0.033) -0.007 (0.033)
Gr. No entrants don’t hire in 2y -0.199 -0.174 -0.143 -0.025 (0.036) -0.057 (0.040)
Gr. No employeest+2 in entrants -0.162 -0.244 -0.201 0.083 (0.060) 0.039 (0.048)
Gr. No employees -0.073 -0.041 -0.075 -0.032∗ (0.014) 0.002 (0.035)
N (industries) 81 590 100 671 181
Notes: In this table we show industry level characteristics for industries affected by the
deregulatory reform (column 1), all non-affected industries (column 2) and matched com-
parison industries (column 3). Column 4 compares deregulated to all never regulated
industries and column 5 compares deregulated to matched comparison industries. The pre-
reform matched product market characteristics (share aged 15-24 etc.) are calculated as
industry average in the years 2000-2003. For the non-matched outcome variables (growth
of the number of entrants etc.) we report the industry-level growth from 2000/2001 to
2002/2003. Low skilled denotes employees with no apprenticeship training (no vocational
qualification). Medium skilled denotes employees with an apprenticeship training or mas-
ter craftsman certificate. High skilled are those with a degree from a university or college
of higher education. Industry-observations are weighted by employment. Robust standard
errors in brackets. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 3.2: Effect of the deregulation on the number of entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification Conditional DiD Matching DiD
Dependent variable ln(No entrants)
Deregj×reformt 0.118∗∗∗ 0.122∗
(0.041) (0.066)
Deregj× 2000 -0.033 -0.021
(0.036) (0.061)
Deregj× 2001 0.014 -0.006
(0.043) (0.042)
Deregj× 2002 -0.003 -0.006
(0.031) (0.044)
Deregj× 2004 0.042 0.068∗∗
(0.050) (0.030)
Deregj× 2005 0.141∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗
(0.034) (0.051)
Deregj× 2006 0.124∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.036)
Deregj× 2007 0.123∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.054) (0.054)
Deregj× 2008 0.132 0.176∗∗
(0.105) (0.087)
Pre-reform industry char. yes yes no no
× Year FE
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 6039 6039 1629 1629
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the deregulation on establishment entry.
In columns 1-2 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-digit pri-
vate sector industries (years 2000-2008). We include interactions of year fixed effects with
pre-reform industry characteristics. These are the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-
skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24 and share of employees aged
25-49. In columns 3-4 (specification “Matching DiD”) the sample includes the industries
affected by the deregulation and matched comparison industries (181 industries). To create
the matched regression sample, we match on the following four pre-reform industry charac-
teristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24 and
share of employees aged 25-49.
In columns 1-4, the dependent variable is the log of the number of entering employer
establishments per industry-year (details in section 3.4.2). The measure of deregulation
deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject to the 2004 reform of the
German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt takes the value 1 for
the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimations performed using OLS, with industry-year
observations weighted by average pre-reform industry employment. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation within industries.
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Table 3.3: Effect of the deregulation on the number of entrants - Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Matching DiD
Dependent variable ln(No entrants)
Robustness Employee Sales growth Lin. pre-reform Industry Geographical
composition industry trends beta concentration
Deregj×reformt 0.119∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.055) (0.042) (0.040) (0.053) (0.054)
Share femalejt -0.696 1.131 -0.177 0.024 -0.724
(2.082) (1.623) (1.388) (1.652) (2.083)
Share age 15-24jt 3.502 4.181
∗ 2.479 4.225∗∗ 3.252
(2.389) (2.193) (1.940) (2.076) (2.388)
Share age 25-49jt 2.072 2.911
∗ 1.488 2.312∗ 2.319
(1.420) (1.543) (1.117) (1.330) (1.466)
Share medium skilledjt 1.607 2.639
∗ 1.752 2.049 1.340
(1.636) (1.422) (1.331) (1.447) (1.661)
Share high skilledjt -1.131 0.614 -0.157 -0.754 -1.578
(4.460) (3.727) (3.013) (4.340) (4.455)
Share foreign non-EUjt 2.936 4.488
∗∗ 2.996 3.154 2.938
(2.131) (1.962) (1.941) (2.063) (2.129)
Share foreign EUjt 5.779 3.980 5.223
∗ 6.289∗ 5.654
(3.864) (3.390) (3.099) (3.781) (3.821)
1996-2001 sales growthj 0.821
∗∗
× reformt (0.403)
1996-2001 sales growthj 0.112
× trendt (0.118)
Industry betaj -0.020
∗∗∗
× reformt (0.006)
Industry betaj 0.002
× trendt (0.001)
Geogr. HHIj 0.245
× reformt (0.516)
Geogr. HHIj 0.157
× trendt (0.136)
Linear pre-reform no no yes no no
industry trends
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 1629 1629 1629 1629 1629
Notes: In this table we show results for alternative specifications. In col. 1, we control for the
current industry share of employees along seven characteristics. In col. 2, 1996-2001 sales growthj
is average industry sales growth in 1996-2001. In col. 3, we control for linear industry trends which
are identified from the pre-reform sample. The industry betas in col. 4 are calculated as coefficient
from a regression of the industry’s annual sales growth on aggregate sales growth in 1994-2003. In
col. 5, we control for a geographical Herfindahl concentration index, defined as the sum of squared
shares of industry employment in each municipality, using pre-reform data. All other components
as in col. 4 of the previous table.
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Table 3.4: Initial entrant size, entrant longevity and hiring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification CDiD MDiD CDiD MDiD CDiD MDiD
Dependent variable ≥ 2 employees in t0 Survive ≥2 years Hire within 2y
Deregj×reformt -0.025∗∗∗ -0.015∗ 0.002 -0.003 -0.009∗ -0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
Mean depvar 0.376 0.426 0.577 0.559 0.220 0.245
Pre-reform industry char. yes no yes no yes no
× Year FE
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 638473 221752 638473 221752 638473 221752
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the deregulation on initial entrant
size, entrant longevity and hiring of entrants in their first year. The dependent variable ≥2
employees in t0 takes the value one if the entering establishment has at least two (marginal
or non-marginal) employees in the first year and zero if the new establishment has only one
employee. Survive ≥2 years is one if the entrant survives at least two years. This implies
that the establishment has at least one (marginal or non-marginal) employee in the first
and second year after entry. The variable is zero if the new establishment drops out of
the data set within two years. This may be due to exit or indicate that the establishment
continues without employees. Hire within 2 years takes the value one if the entrant survives
and hires at least one additional (marginal or non-marginal) employee within two years.
The variable is zero if the new establishment has equally many or less employees after two
years, compared to the year of entry, or if the establishment drops out of the data set.
In columns 1, 3 and 5 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-
digit private sector industries (years 2000-2008). We include interactions of year fixed
effects with the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share
of employees aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 2, 4 and 6 (specifi-
cation “Matching DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and
matched comparison industries (181 industries, years 2000-2008). We match on the follow-
ing four pre-reform industry characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled,
share of employees aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject
to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt
takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimation performed using a
linear probability model, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform
industry employment. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for
unrestricted correlation within industries.
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Table 3.5: Effect of the deregulation on the number of employees in entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification Conditional DiD Matching DiD
Dependent variable ln(No employeest+2 in entrants)
Deregj×reformt 0.116∗ 0.063
(0.063) (0.080)
Deregj× 2000 -0.204∗∗ -0.038
(0.083) (0.108)
Deregj× 2001 0.026 -0.042
(0.090) (0.105)
Deregj× 2002 -0.011 -0.027
(0.088) (0.115)
Deregj× 2004 -0.036 0.047
(0.093) (0.084)
Deregj× 2005 0.145 0.023
(0.090) (0.102)
Deregj× 2006 0.081 0.107
(0.091) (0.082)
Deregj× 2007 0.057 -0.070
(0.084) (0.081)
Deregj× 2008 0.098 0.073
(0.141) (0.140)
Pre-reform industry characteristics × Year FE yes yes no no
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 6039 6039 1629 1629
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the deregulation on the number of
employees in entering establishments. In columns 1-2 (specification “Conditional DiD”),
the sample includes all 671 5-digit private sector industries (years 2000-2008) We include
interactions of year fixed effects with the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled,
share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49.
In columns 3-4 (specification “Matching DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected
by the deregulation and matched comparison industries (181 industries). We match on
the following four pre-reform industry characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of
high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49.
The dependent variable is the annual industry-level log of the entrants’ number of employees
two years after entry. Employment is measured in full-time equivalents. The measure of
deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject to the 2004
reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt takes
the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimations performed using OLS, with
industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry employment. Standard
errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation within
industries.
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Table 3.6: Effect of the deregulation on the number of employees
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification Conditional DiD Matching DiD
Dependent variable ln(No employees)
Deregj×reformt -0.086∗∗ -0.003
(0.040) (0.078)
Deregj× 1999 0.060∗∗ -0.020
(0.030) (0.078)
Deregj× 2000 0.042∗ -0.015
(0.022) (0.055)
Deregj× 2001 0.022 -0.006
(0.014) (0.032)
Deregj× 2002 0.015 0.001
(0.009) (0.011)
Deregj× 2004 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.010) (0.018)
Deregj× 2005 -0.050∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.018) (0.036)
Deregj× 2006 -0.064∗∗ -0.014
(0.032) (0.046)
Deregj× 2007 -0.074∗ -0.010
(0.042) (0.057)
Deregj× 2008 -0.075 -0.008
(0.046) (0.065)
Pre-reform industry characteristics × Year FE yes yes no no
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 6710 6710 1810 1810
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the deregulation on the number of
employees. In columns 1-2 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671
5-digit private sector industries (years 1999-2008). We include interactions of year fixed
effects with the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share
of employees aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 3-4 (specifica-
tion “Matching DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and
matched comparison industries (181 industries). We match on the following four pre-reform
industry characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees
aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49.
In both specifications, the dependent variable is the annual industry-level log of the num-
ber of employees in establishments with at least one employee. Employment is measured
in full-time equivalents. The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81
industries which were subject to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code
(details in section 3.2). Reformt takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before.
Estimations performed using OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by average
pre-reform industry employment. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered
to allow for unrestricted correlation within industries.
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Table 3.7: Effect on incumbent establishment exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification Conditional DiD Matching DiD
Dependent variable Establishment exit
Deregj×reformt 0.002 0.004∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Deregj × reformt × smalli,t−5 0.002 0.005** 0.001 0.006**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Deregj × reformt × largei,t−5 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Deregj × smalli,t−5 -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Reformt × smalli,t−5 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.002*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Smalli,t−5 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1996-2001 sales growthj 0.043***
× reformt (0.009)
1996-2001 sales growthj -0.006**
× trendt (0.003)
Pre-reform industry char. yes yes no no no no
× Year FE
Linear industry trends no no no no yes no
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N (establishment-year) 4792675 4792675 2214679 2214679 2214679 2214679
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the deregulation on exit of incumbent
establishments. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value one if
an incumbent exits in the current year and zero for all continuing incumbents. Sample
mean of exit: 0.05. Incumbents are defined as establishments with at least one employee
5 years ago. smalli,t−5 is defined as having had up to 4 employees 5 years ago. largei,t−5
is defined as having had 5 or more employees 5 years ago. Since last sample year is 2008,
both variables refer to the pre-reform period.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject
to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt
takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimation performed using a
linear probability model, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform
industry employment. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for
unrestricted correlation within industries.
In columns 1-2 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-digit pri-
vate sector industries (years 1999-2008). We include interactions of year fixed effects with
the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees
aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 3-4 (specification “Matching
DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and matched com-
parison industries (181 industries). We match on the following four pre-reform industry
characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24
and share of employees aged 25-49. 153
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Table 3.8: Effect on incumbent establishment employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification Conditional DiD Matching DiD
Dependent variable log(establishment size)
Deregj×reformt -0.044** -0.018
(0.019) (0.036)
Deregj × reformt × smalli,t−5 -0.054*** -0.050* -0.029** -0.038
(0.017) (0.029) (0.013) (0.030)
Deregj × reformt × largei,t−5 -0.026 0.023 0.010 0.030
(0.023) (0.046) (0.011) (0.041)
Deregj × smalli,t−5 0.011 0.028 0.013 0.020
(0.009) (0.022) (0.010) (0.017)
Reformt × smalli,t−5 0.036*** 0.081** 0.055*** 0.076**
(0.011) (0.036) (0.016) (0.031)
Smalli,t−5 -0.074*** -0.091*** -0.073*** -0.083***
(0.007) (0.021) (0.009) (0.016)
1996-2001 sales growthj -0.132***
× reformt (0.041)
1996-2001 sales growthj 0.109*
× trendt (0.058)
Pre-reform industry char. yes yes no no no no
× Year FE
Linear industry trends no no no no yes no
Establishment FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N (establishment-year) 4660729 4660729 2160669 2160669 2160669 2160669
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the deregulation on the size of incumbent
establishments. The dependent variable log(establishment size) is defined as the log of
the number of employees (full time equivalents) at the level of establishments. Incumbents
are defined as establishments with at least one employee 5 years ago. smalli,t−5 is defined
as having had up to 4 employees 5 years ago. largei,t−5 is defined as having had 5 or more
employees 5 years ago. Since last sample year is 2008, both variables refer to the pre-reform
period.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were sub-
ject to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2).
Reformt takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimation performed
using OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry em-
ployment. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted
correlation within industries.
In columns 1-2 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-digit pri-
vate sector industries (years 1999-2008). We include interactions of year fixed effects with
the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees
aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 3-4 (specification “Matching
DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and matched com-
parison industries (181 industries). We match on the following four pre-reform industry
characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24
and share of employees aged 25-49.154
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Appendix 3.A Data appendix
3.A.1 Alternative definitions of new
establishments
In this appendix section we describe three additional entry definitions. Recall that,
in the main definition, we follow Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013) who classify
all new establishments with one to three non-marginal employees as entrants. New
EIDs with four or more non-marginal employees are classified as entrants if no more
than 30% had previously worked together in another establishment. New EIDs with
only marginal or secondary job employees during the first 3 years are denoted as
entrants if they have three or less workers.
First, we create an alternative entry definition which excludes new EIDs with
only marginal employees, for which there is no worker flow information (alternative
definition 1). Then, an establishment is counted as new establishment in the first
year if it employs at least one non-marginal employee. As above, new establishments
are entrants, if no more than 30% of the employees have previously worked together
in another establishment or if there are no more than three employees. Using the
log of the industry-level number of entrants based on this definition yields results
which are very similar to the main definition (table 3.A.3, column 2).
With our alternative definition 2 we explicitly take worker flows of new EIDs with
one to three employees into account. Different from the main definition, now we
do not count new EIDs with up to three non-marginal employees as entrants if two
or more non-marginal employees were employed in the same establishment in the
previous year. This case covers 3.3% of all new EIDs (table 3.A.1, column 4). This
implies that under this alterative definition 2, new establishments with up to three
non-marginal employees are only classified as entrants if all employees previously
worked in different establishments (column 3). As in the main definition, new EIDs
with four or more non-marginal employees are classified as entrants if less than 30%
of the employees have previously worked for an identical establishment.
Our third alternative firm entry definition concerns new establishments which
have only marginal employees in the first year and hire their first non-marginal
employee in the following years (first worker flow information). The choice of the
time period until when to take a first hiring of non-marginal employees into account
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involves a trade-off. On the one hand, late hirings may be less related to the entry
event but rather represent the expansion of already existing establishments. On the
other hand, a new establishment with only marginal employees may be started to
prepare the actual entry, which may then be classified as a spurious entry if the later
inflow of non-marginal workers is highly clustered. In our alternative definition 3,
we take worker flow information of the first year when non-marginal employees are
hired into account, irrespective of the time period between the hiring of the first
marginal and non-marginal employee. The results are robust to this modification
(table 3.A.3, column 4).
Finally, we show that the effect is of similar size when we specify the dependent
variable as industry-level share of new establishments over the lagged number of
employees, rather than the log of the number of entrants. This alternative definition
is closest to the firm entry definition in chapter two, where we define firm entry as
entry into self-employment (individual level). The average number of entrants per
1000 employees is 7.3 (Table 3.A.3, column 5). The measured effect of the reform
on the share of entrants over 1000 employees is 0.95, which is an increase of 13%
relative to the sample mean. The size of the effect is comparable to the main result
in column 4 (12% increase).
3.A.2 Time-consistent industry definitions
In this section we explain the algorithm that we use for concording the industry
classification change from the German national classification Klassifikation der
Wirtschaftszweige (WZ), 1993 edition, to the subsequent classification WZ, 2003
edition. We start out from the algorithm for concording revisions of product and
industry classifications over time which was proposed by Pierce and Schott (2012)
for SIC and NAICS codes. We adapt the procedure to the German national in-
dustry classification. If a 1993 code splits into several 2003 codes or vice versa,
the threshold method joins the 1993 “parent” code and the 2003 “children” codes
into one “industry family”, unless a child code accounts for only a minor share of
the parent employment. Ignoring minor industry links prevents the families from
growing large. Minor industry links are determined as follows. First, tabulate em-
ployment according to the 1993 and 2003 industry classifications, using the 2003
wave in which establishments are coded in both industry classifications. This cre-
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Table 3.A.1: Definition of establishment entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st criterion: newly appearing administrative establishment identifier (EID)
2nd criterion: number
non-marginal employ-
ees
0 non-marginal employees 1-3 non-marg empl. ≥ 4 non-marg empl.
3rd criterion: Maxi-
mum clustered inflow
(MCI)
≤ 3
marginal
employ-
ees
≥ 4
marginal
employ-
ees
MCI = 1 MCI >
50%
MCI <
30%
MCI ≥
30%
Examples (MCI /
Size)
1/1, 1/2,
1/3
2/2, 2/3,
3/3
1/4, 1/5,
1/6, 1/7,
2/7,...
2/4, 3/4,
4/4,
2/5,...
Main definition entry no entry entry entry entry no entry
Alternative def. 1:
≥ 1 non-marginal em-
ployee (column 2, ta-
ble 3.A.3)
no
entry
no entry entry entry entry no entry
Alternative def. 2:
Exclude clustered in-
flows for small en-
trants (column 3, ta-
ble 3.A.3)
entry no entry entry no
entry
entry no entry
Share new EIDs 61.23 2.07 21.27 3.27 3.78 8.38
Notes: This table compares our main establishment entry definition to two alternative
entry definitions. A clustered inflow denotes a group of non-marginal employees who had
previously worked together in another establishment. MCI denotes the largest clustered
outflow of a new establishment (Schmieder, 2013). Marginal employees (marg empl.) do
not contribute to social security but have to be reported by the employer. Their maximum
monthly earnings were 325 Euros up to 2002 and 400 Euros from 2003 on. Non-marginal
employees (non-marg empl.) have earnings above the respective thresholds. The shares of
new EIDs in the final row refer to all 1,104,599 new EIDs in years 2000-2008 in 671 private
sector industries.
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Table 3.A.2: Definition of establishment exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st criterion: disappearing administrative establishment identifier (EID)
2nd criterion: number
non-marginal employ-
ees
0 non-marginal employees 1-3 non-marg empl. ≥ 4 non-marg empl.
3rd criterion: Max-
imum clustered out-
flow (MCO)
≤ 3
marginal
employ-
ees
≥ 4
marginal
employ-
ees
MCO <
30%
MCO ≥
30%
Examples (MCO /
Size)
1/4, 1/5,
1/6, 1/7,
2/7,...
2/4, 3/4,
4/4,
2/5,...
Definition exit no exit exit exit no exit
Share disappearing
EIDs
28.79 1.19 54.61 5.94 9.47
Notes: This table illustrates our establishment exit definition. A clustered outflow denotes
all non-marginal employees who will work in the same establishment in the year after
exit. MCO denotes the largest of all clustered outflows of a disappearing establishment.
Marginal employees (marg empl.) do not contribute to social security but have to be
reported by the employer. Their maximum monthly earnings were 325 Euros up to 2002
and 400 Euros from 2003 on. Non-marginal employees (non-marg empl.) have earnings
above the respective thresholds. The shares of all disappearing EIDs in the final row refer
to 1,039,615 disappearing EIDs in years 1999-2008 in 671 private sector industries.
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Table 3.A.3: Results for alternative definitions of establishment entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Alternative
definition 1
Alternative
definition 2
Alternative
definition 3
Alternative
definition 4
Specification ≥1 non-
marginal
employee
Exclude
clustered
inflows for
small entrants
Include
worker flow
info for late
non-marginal
inflow
Dependent var.: ln(No entrants)
Noentrantst×1000
Noemployeest−1
Deregj×reformt 0.122∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.952∗∗
(0.066) (0.062) (0.065) (0.061) (0.395)
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Mean dep. var. 7.267
N (industry-year) 1629 1629 1629 1629 1629
Notes: This table shows results for alternative definitions of establishment entry. In columns
2-4, we use the log number of entrants as dependent variable. In column 2, we classify
EIDs as entrants only after hiring their first non-marginal employee and exclude all new
establishment IDs with only marginal employees in the first year (“Alternative definition
1”, table 3.A.1). In column 3, we provide results for an alternative entry definition which
also excludes new EIDs with up to three non-marginal employees if the initial employee
structure is highly clustered (“Alternative definition 2”, table 3.A.1). In column 4, we
include worker flow information of new establishments which hire their first non-marginal
employees more than three years after hiring of the first (marginal) employee. In column
5, we use the industry level share of entrants (multiplied by 1000) over the lagged number
of employees as dependent variable.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were sub-
ject to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2).
Reformt takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimation performed
using OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry em-
ployment. Sample: matched sample of 181 5-digit industries (details in section 3.3.1),
years 2000-2008. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the level of 181 industry
groups. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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ates a matrix which indicates the employment shares of all 2003 industries in 1993
industries and vice versa. The employment shares proxy for the empirical proximity
between two industry codes. Second, sort all corresponding 2003 (base) industries
in descending order according to their employment share in a 1993 (target) indus-
try. Third, keep correspondences until the cumulative employment share of all base
correspondences to the target industry exceeds the defined threshold of 50%. Note
that minor correspondences are only dropped if the minor industry is part of another
industry family (many-to-many-match). The larger the threshold, the larger (and
more diverse) industry families may become. A threshold of one results in joining
all correspondences into families. A threshold of zero would be equivalent to keeping
only the modal base correspondence.
3.A.3 Private sector
In our definition of the “private sector”, we exclude industry families with the follow-
ing industries (2-digit SIC rev. 3 / NACE rev. 1 in brackets): agriculture (01-05),
mining (10-14), water provision (41), central bank (4-digit NACE rev. 1 65.11),
public administration (75), education (80), health (85), public utilities (90), non-
profit organizations (91), broadcasting (92.20.1), libraries (4-digit code 92.51) and
museums (4-digit code 92.52). These exclusions lead to an estimation sample of in-
dustry families in the “private sector”, covering the following industries: (“private”
sector): 15-40, 45-74 (except 65.11), 92-93 (except 92.20.1, 92.51, 92.52).
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Appendix 3.B Industry differences in
entry over the business
cycle
We use the Matching DiD model and Conditional DiD model due to the presence of
systematic cross-sectional differences between industries which may cause differing
industry trends in establishment entry over the business cycle. As explained in sec-
tion 3.3.1, we expect high-skilled to be more likely to enter during expansions than
low-skilled as they are more likely to engage in ambitious projects, which may be
positively influenced by expansionary business cycle conditions. Furthermore, young
individuals may differ in their propensity to start a firm as they had less time to
acquire necessary human and financial capital. If these production factors are dis-
proportionately relevant for ambitious self-employment projects, young individuals
should be less likely to enter during booms than older individuals.
To illustrate this concern, we provide descriptive evidence for systematic differ-
ences in industry level entry rates over the business cycle between industries with
different initial shares of (1) high skilled employees and (2) employees aged 15-24 in
this appendix section.
We use two alternative data sets. First, we use the data and industry-year sample
of the main analysis, i.e. variation from 671 5-digit private sector industries in the
years 2000 to 2008. We report descriptive statistics of the initial industry shares
of high-skilled (degree from a university or college of higher education) and young
employees (age 15-24) as well as the business cycle measures in Table 3.B.1.
We regress the yearly log industry number of entrants on an interaction term of
the national detrended number of employees and the 1999 industry share of high-
skilled employees (degree from a university or college of higher education) or the
1999 industry share of employees aged 15-24. We also add industry and year fixed
effects. To calculate the detrended employment, we apply a Hodrick-Prescott-filter
(Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).46
We present the regression results in Table 3.B.2 Panel A. We find that industries
with a 1 percentage point higher 1999 share of high-skilled have 16 percent more
46 Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we set the smoothing parameter of the annual data
to 6.25.
161
CHAPTER 3
entrants when the aggregate number of employees deviates from its non-linear trend
by 1 percent (Panel A, column 1). The coefficient on the interaction term is statis-
tically significant at the 1% level. Adding linear industry specific trends does not
alter the coefficient (column 2). We obtain similar results when using detrended
aggregate sales as a business cycle measure (columns 3-4).
Alternatively, we use the annual log growth of the aggregate number of employees
(column 5) or sales growth (column 6) as a business cycle measure and the industry
level annual log growth of the number of entrants as dependent variable. Also these
specifications yield a statistically significant positive coefficient. To illustrate the size
of the coefficient, we express the coefficient of column 5 for reasonable changes of
the two components of the interaction term. When moving from the lowest national
employment growth to the highest national employment growth (trough to peak,
5.5 percentage points difference), an industry at the third quartile experiences on
average a 5.1 percentage point larger annual entry growth than an industry at the
first quartile of the industry distribution of high-skilled (0.036 to 0.117 = 0.081).
Relative to the average annual entry growth rate of -3.1%, this corresponds to an
economically relevant relative difference of 65%.
The initial industry share of employees aged 15-24 is negatively associated with
entry during business cycle expansions (Table 3.B.2 Panel B).
The positive association between the industries’ initial share of high-skilled and
entry during business cycle expansions holds also for a second data set, which covers
the years 1976 to 2014. As the main data set used above, it is based on the IAB
Establishment History Panel. We exclude Eastern Germany (incl. Berlin) and the
public sector. Due to multiple industry classification changes in this longer time
period, industries are aggregated to the 3-digit level (229 3-digit industries).47 We
show results for the business cycle measures detrended employment and annual
employment growth in Table 3.B.3.
47 In the 1975-2014 sample we use the 3-digit industry correspondence created by Eberle
et al. (2011).
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Table 3.B.1: Summary statistics on industry differences in entry over the business
cycle
Panel A: Years 1999-2008 (5-digit industry sample) (N=6710)
mean SD min max
No non-marginal entrantsjt 100.459 284.761 0 5841
∆ln(No non-marginal entrants)jt -0.032 0.486 -2.303 4.143
Share high skilled 1999j 0.094 0.091 0.000 0.534
Share aged 15-24 1999j 0.115 0.064 0.000 0.589
ln(Employees detrended)t 0.000 0.013 -0.018 0.023
ln(Sales detrended)t 0.000 0.018 -0.026 0.027
∆ln(Employees)t -0.002 0.020 -0.032 0.023
∆ln(Sales)t 0.036 0.026 -0.005 0.076
Panel B: Years 1976-2014 (3-digit industry sample) (N=8,931)
mean SD min max
No non-marginal entrantsjt 195.197 749.979 0 9848
∆ln(No non-marginal entrants)jt -0.018 0.471 -3.056 2.303
Share high skilled 1975j 0.031 0.050 0.000 0.568
Share aged 15-24 1975j 0.179 0.082 0.040 0.544
ln(Employees detrended)t 0.000 0.016 -0.024 0.033
∆ln(Employees)t 0.001 0.021 -0.046 0.038
Notes: In this table we show summary statistics for two samples. The sample in Panel A
consists of 671 5-digit private sector industries in the years 1999-2008 (regression results in
table 3.B.2). This is the sample which we also use in the main analysis of establishment
entry. The alternative sample in Panel B consists of 229 3-digit private sector industries
over the years 1976-2014 (regression results in table 3.B.3).
No non-marginal entrants is the number of entrants with at least one non-marginal em-
ployee in an industry-year cell. ∆ln(No non-marginal entrants)jt is the log growth of the
number of entrants with at least one non-marginal employee. Share high skilled 1999j is
the industry level share of employees with a degree from a university or college of higher
education, measured in 1999. Share aged 15-24 1999j is the industry level share of employ-
ees aged 15-24, measured in 1999. ln(Employees detrended)t is the Hodrick and Prescott
(HP) filtered natural logarithm of the annual aggregate number of employees. ln(Sales
detrended)t is the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filtered natural logarithm of annual aggre-
gate sales. ∆ln(Employees)t is the difference in logarithms of the annual aggregate number
of employees. ∆ln(Sales)t is the difference in logarithms of annual aggregate sales.
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Table 3.B.2: Descriptive evidence on industry differences in entry over the business
cycle 1999-2008
Panel A: Initial differences in the industry level share of high-skilled employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(No non-marginal entrants) ∆ln(No entrants)
(non-marginal)
Share high skilled 1999j 16.327
∗∗∗ 16.368∗∗∗
× ln(Employees detrended)t (4.174) (4.405)
Share high skilled 1999j 11.753
∗∗∗ 11.819∗∗∗
× ln(Sales detrended)t (3.834) (4.061)
Share high skilled 1999j 10.062
∗∗∗
×∆ln(Employees)t (2.476)
Share high skilled 1999j 7.861
∗∗∗
×∆ln(Sales)t (2.624)
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Linear industry trend no yes no yes no no
N (industry-year) 6710 6710 6710 6710 6039 6039
Panel B: Initial differences in the industry level share of employees aged 15-24
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(No non-marginal entrants) ∆ln(No entrants)
(non-marginal)
Share aged 15-24 1999j -11.525
∗∗ -12.235∗∗
× ln(Employees detrended)t (5.164) (5.216)
Share aged 15-24 1999j -6.604
∗ -7.018∗
× ln(Sales detrended)t (3.779) (3.866)
Share aged 15-24 1999j -7.617
∗∗
×∆ln(Employees)t (3.168)
Share aged 15-24 1999j -5.167
∗
×∆ln(Sales)t (2.732)
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Linear industry trend no yes no yes no no
N (industry-year) 6710 6710 6710 6710 6039 6039
Notes: In Panel A we show results on the correlation between the initial industry level share of
high skilled employees and establishment entry over the business cycle. In Panel B we show the
corresponding correlation for the initial industry level share of employees aged 15-24. ln(Employees
detrended)t is the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filtered natural logarithm of the annual aggregate
number of employees. ln(Sales detrended)t is the HP filtered natural logarithm of annual aggregate
sales. ∆ln(Employees)t is the difference in logarithms of the annual aggregate number of employees.
∆ln(Sales)t is the difference in logarithms of annual aggregate sales. We include year and industry
fixed effects. The sample includes all 671 5-digit private sector industries in the years 1999-2008 (col
1-4) or 2000-2008 (col 5-6). The estimations are performed using OLS. Observations weighted by
current industry employment (FTE). SE clustered at the industry level.
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Table 3.B.3: Descriptive evidence on industry differences in entry over the business
cycle 1976-2014
Panel A: Initial differences in the industry level share of high-skilled employees
(1) (2) (3)
ln(No non-marginal entrants) ∆ln(No entrants)
(non-marginal)
Share high skilled 1975j 16.738
∗∗∗ 15.500∗∗∗
× ln(Employees detrended)t (5.054) (5.449)
Share high skilled 1975j 8.590
∗∗
×∆ln(Employees)t (3.683)
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Linear industry trend no yes no
N (industry-year) 8931 8931 8702
Panel B: Initial differences in the industry level share of employees aged 15-24
(1) (2) (3)
ln(No non-marginal entrants) ∆ln(No entrants)
(non-marginal)
Share aged 15-24 1975j -1.759 -1.570
× ln(Employees detrended)t (4.272) (4.431)
Share aged 15-24 1975j -2.075
×∆ln(Employees)t (2.613)
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Linear industry trend no yes no
N (industry-year) 8931 8931 8702
Notes: In this table we show additional results on the correlation between the initial indus-
try level share of high skilled employees (Panel A) and employees aged 15-24 (Panel B) and
establishment entry over the business cycle for an alternative sample of 229 3-digit private
sector industries over the years 1976-2014 (col 1-2) and 1977-2014 (col 3).
In columns 1-2 the dependent variable is the log number of entrants with at least one
non-marginal employee. In column 3 the dependent variable is the is the difference in
logarithms of the number of entrants with at least one non-marginal employee. Share high
skilled 1975j is the industry level share of employees with a degree from a university or
college of higher education, measured in 1975. Share aged 15-24 1975j is the industry
level share of employees aged 15-24, measured in 1975. ln(Employees detrended)t is the
Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filtered natural logarithm of the annual aggregate number of
employees. ln(Sales detrended)t is the HP filtered natural logarithm of annual aggregate
sales. ∆ln(Employees)t is the difference in logarithms of the annual aggregate number of
employees. ∆ln(Sales)t is the difference in logarithms of annual aggregate sales.
The estimations are performed using OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by
current industry employment (full time equivalents). Standard errors in parentheses are
robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation within industries. 165
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Table 3.C.1: Descriptive statistics of outcome variables
Panel A: Number of entrants and employed, industry-level, pre-reform average
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Ind Treated All control Matched control
Mean SD Mean Mean Mean
No entrants 135.32 (390.53) 204.95 125.76 147.77
No entrants 1 empl t0 84.32 (251.60) 117.43 79.77 85.02
No entrants 2+ empl t0 51.00 (157.76) 87.52 45.99 62.74
No entrants fail within 2y 60.43 (185.10) 88.44 56.58 72.41
No entrants survive 2y 74.89 (212.85) 116.51 69.17 75.36
No entrants hire within 2y 29.55 (76.37) 53.81 26.22 32.40
No entrants not hire within 2y 45.33 (147.52) 62.70 42.95 42.96
Noentrants
Noemployees × 1000 10.19 (17.40) 9.72 10.25 11.22
No employees 14497.68 (27351.37) 23984.51 13195.26 14333.98
N (industries) 671 671 81 590 100
Panel B: entrant characteristics, establishment-level, pre-reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Ind Treated All control Matched control
Mean SD Mean Mean Mean
P(2 employees in t0) 0.35 (0.48) 0.43 0.34 0.42
P(survive ≥1 year) 0.71 (0.46) 0.72 0.70 0.68
P(survive ≥2 years) 0.55 (0.50) 0.57 0.54 0.51
P(survive ≥3 years) 0.45 (0.50) 0.47 0.44 0.41
P(Hire within ≥2 years) 0.21 (0.40) 0.26 0.19 0.22
P(Hire within ≥3 years) 0.19 (0.40) 0.25 0.18 0.20
N (establishment-year) 294329 49804 244525 44330
Panel C: incumbent characteristics, establishment-level, pre-reform
(1) (2) (3)
All industries Treated All control Matched control
Mean SD Mean Mean Mean
No employees 16.53 (110.94) 10.90 19.11 14.87
∆5y ln(N
o employees) -0.03 (0.67) -0.08 -0.01 -0.07
P(exit) 0.05 (0.21) 0.04 0.05 0.05
N (establishment-year) 1854108 582913 1271195 296061
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the main outcome variables in 1999-2002.
Statistics are computed at the industry level in Panel A and at the establishment level in
Panels B and C. All Ind refers to the private sector sample defined in appendix section
3.A.3. Treated refers to industries which were subject to the deregulation of the GTCC. All
control refers to all industries which were never covered by the GTCC. Matched control is
the sample of matched comparison industries. The statistics refer to the 50% BHP sample.
Incumbents are establishments which had at least one employee five years ago.
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Table 3.C.2: Robustness: common support
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treat Matched Control t-test t-test
Common
Support
(1)-(2) Common Support
Mean Mean Mean Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Pre-reform product market characteristics not matched
Growth No entrants -0.140 -0.151 -0.151 0.011 (0.033) 0.008 (0.034)
Growth No employees -0.073 -0.075 -0.075 0.002 (0.035) -0.000 (0.035)
Pre-reform matched product market characteristics
Employee age:
Share age 15-24 0.182 0.161 0.161 0.020 (0.020) 0.014 (0.020)
Share age 25-49 0.613 0.621 0.621 -0.008 (0.013) -0.004 (0.012)
Share age 50+ 0.205 0.217 0.217 -0.012 (0.013) -0.010 (0.013)
Employee education:
Share low skilled 0.198 0.176 0.176 0.022 (0.030) 0.022 (0.031)
Share medium skilled 0.768 0.781 0.781 -0.013 (0.026) -0.014 (0.027)
Share high skilled 0.034 0.043 0.043 -0.009 (0.009) -0.008 (0.009)
N (industries) 81 100 99 181 181 178 178
Panel B: Regression
(1) (2)
Specification: Baseline Common Support
Dependent var.: ln(No entrants)
Deregj×reformt 0.119∗∗ 0.114∗∗
(0.055) (0.056)
Industry-year covariates yes yes
Industry FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
N (industry-year) 1629 1602
Notes: In columns 3 and 5 we report the effect on the industry number of entrants for
an alternative sample created by propensity score matching in which we impose common
support over the estimated propensity score. Specifically, we exclude treated industries
whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity
score of the comparison industries. This applies to two treated industries. One comparison
industry is dropped because it was the nearest neighbor to the two dropped treated indus-
tries. Under this restriction we identify the average effect over the common support region
instead of the ATT.
In column 2 of Panel B we report the effect on the number of entering establishments
for the common support sample. Industry-year covariates is the current industry share
of employees along seven characteristics: female, aged 15-24, aged 25-49, medium skilled,
high skilled, foreign EU citizen and foreign non-EU citizen. Estimation performed using
OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry employment.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation
within industries.
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Table 3.C.3: Number of entrants - Robustness: modifying the industry sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification CDiD MDiD CDiD MDiD
Sample Incl. A1 Product Markets Excl same 3dig
Dependent variable: ln(No entrants)
Deregj×reformt 0.139∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗
(0.039) (0.060) (0.043) (0.054)
Share femalejt -0.168 2.428 -0.214 -2.286
(0.945) (1.888) (1.006) (1.837)
Share age 15-24jt 4.319
∗∗∗ 10.542∗∗∗ 4.485∗∗ 8.836∗∗∗
(1.644) (3.487) (1.881) (3.280)
Share age 25-49jt 2.631
∗ 7.263∗∗∗ 2.909∗ 7.034∗∗∗
(1.369) (2.688) (1.507) (2.547)
Share medium skilledjt -1.837 3.055
∗ -1.913 -0.856
(1.260) (1.765) (1.280) (2.090)
Share high skilledjt 0.521 4.861 0.654 -3.748
(1.445) (3.764) (1.494) (3.044)
Share foreign non-EUjt -0.361 1.785 -0.768 -0.998
(1.336) (2.414) (1.238) (2.335)
Share foreign EUjt -2.965 3.771 -2.721 0.927
(2.197) (2.793) (2.089) (2.662)
Pre-reform industry char. yes no yes no
× Year FE
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 6111 1674 5148 1548
Notes: This table shows results for two alternative industry samples. We modify the pool
of comparison group industries. In the Matching DiD specification (col. 2 and 4) matched
comparison groups are selected from this modified industry sample. In columns 1-2, we
include seven industries for which firm entry is restricted under the GTCC but which were
not subject to the 2004 deregulation. In columns 3-4, we exclude industries which are in
the same 3-digit industry group as an affected industry in order to rule out potential spill
overs between ”neighboring” 5-digit industries in 3-digit industry groups.
In columns 1 and 3 (specification “Conditional DiD”) we include interactions of year fixed
effects with the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share
of employees aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 2 and 4 (specifica-
tion “Matching DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and
matched comparison industries. We match on the following four pre-reform industry char-
acteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24
and share of employees aged 25-49.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for industries which were subject to
the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). reformt takes
the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimation performed using OLS, with
industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry employment. Standard
errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation within
industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level. 169
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Table 3.C.4: Number of entrants - Robustness: local product market level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification Conditional DiD Matching DiD
Dependent variable ln(No entrants)
Deregj×reformt 0.065∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.102∗ 0.102∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.059) (0.057)
Share femalejt -0.032 -0.040 -0.099 -0.112
(0.091) (0.091) (0.212) (0.212)
Share age 15-24jt 0.302
∗ 0.264 1.179∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.177) (0.400) (0.386)
Share age 25-49jt 0.956
∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.156) (0.298) (0.288)
Share medium skilledjt -0.204 -0.223 -0.145 -0.161
(0.143) (0.144) (0.215) (0.219)
Share high skilledjt 0.063 0.045 -0.582
∗ -0.600∗
(0.173) (0.174) (0.311) (0.315)
Share foreign non-EUjt 0.425 0.435 1.120 1.155
(0.415) (0.414) (0.748) (0.747)
Share foreign EUjt 0.008 -0.012 0.515 0.485
(0.220) (0.221) (0.412) (0.421)
Pre-reform industry characteristics × Year FE yes yes no no
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes no yes no
Year FE yes no yes no
Region × year FE no yes no yes
N (industry-region-year) 189040 189040 54301 54301
Notes: This table shows results for an alternative specification at the local product market
level. The unit of observation is an industry-county-year cell (38 NUTS-2 regions). The
dependent variable is the log number of entrants in an industry-county-year cell. In columns
1-2 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-digit private sector
industries (years 2000-2008) We include interactions of year fixed effects with the industries’
pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24 and
share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 3-4 (specification “Matching DiD”) the sample
includes the industries affected by the deregulation and matched comparison industries (181
industries). We match industries on the following four pre-reform industry characteristics:
share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24 and share of
employees aged 25-49.
Covariates are measured at the industry-region-year level. Deregj takes the value one for
81 industries which were subject to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code
(details in section 3.2). Reformt takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before.
The estimations are performed using OLS. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered
at the level of industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 3.C.5: Initial entrant size, entrant longevity and hiring - Additional depen-
dent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification CDiD MDiD CDiD MDiD CDiD MDiD
Dependent variable Survive ≥1 year Survive ≥3 years Hire within 3y
Deregj×reformt -0.000 -0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007)
Mean depvar 0.726 0.708 0.481 0.465 0.209 0.230
Pre-reform industry char. yes no yes no yes no
× Year FE
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N (estab.-year) 638473 221752 638473 221752 638473 221752
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the deregulation on alternative measures
of entrant longevity and hiring. Survive ≥1 year is one if the entrant survives at least one
year. In the data set that we use, this implies that the establishment has at least one
(marginal or non-marginal) employee in the first year after entry. The variable is zero if
the new establishment drops out of the data set in the first year after entry. This may be
due to exit or indicate that the establishment continues without employees. Survive ≥3
years is equivalently defined and is one if the entrant survives at least three year. Hire
within 3 years takes the value one if the entrant survives and hires at least one additional
(marginal or non-marginal) employee within three years. The variable is zero if the new
establishment has equally many or less employees after three years, compared to the year
of entry, or if the establishment drops out of the data set.
In columns 1, 3 and 5 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-digit
private sector industries (years 2000-2008) We include interactions of year fixed effects with
the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees
aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 2, 4 and 6 (specification “Match-
ing DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and matched
comparison industries (181 industries, years 2000-2008). We match on the following four
pre-reform industry characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of
employees aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject
to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt
takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimation performed using a
linear probability model, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform
industry employment. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for
unrestricted correlation within industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗
at 10% level.
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Table 3.C.6: Initial entrant size: industry level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification CDiD MDiD CDiD MDiD
Dependent variable ln(No entrants 1 employee in t0) ln(N
o entrants ≥2 employees in t0)
Deregj×reformt 0.170∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.060 0.083
(0.040) (0.060) (0.045) (0.076)
Pre-reform industry yes no yes no
char. × year FE
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 6039 1629 6039 1629
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the GTCC reform on the (industry-
year) number of entrants with only 1 employee in the year of entry (col 1-2) and the number
of entrants with 2 or more employees in the year of entry (col 3-4).
In columns 1 and 3 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-digit
private sector industries (years 2000-2008) We include interactions of year fixed effects with
the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees
aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 2 and 4 (specification “Match-
ing DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and matched
comparison industries (181 industries). We match on the following four pre-reform indus-
try characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged
15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject
to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt
takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimations performed using
OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry employment.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation
within industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 3.C.7: Entrant longevity: industry level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification CDiD MDiD CDiD MDiD
Dependent variable ln(No entrants fail within 2 years) ln(No entrants survive ≥ 2 years)
Deregj×reformt 0.098∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.096∗
(0.048) (0.075) (0.041) (0.056)
Pre-reform industry yes no yes no
char. × year FE
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 6039 1629 6039 1629
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the GTCC reform on the (industry-
year) number of entrants which fail within the first 2 years (col 1-2) and the number of
entrants which survive for at least 2 years (col 3-4).
In columns 1 and 3 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-digit
private sector industries (years 2000-2008) We include interactions of year fixed effects with
the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees
aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 2 and 4 (specification “Match-
ing DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and matched
comparison industries (181 industries). We match on the following four pre-reform indus-
try characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged
15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject
to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt
takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimations performed using
OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry employment.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation
within industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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Table 3.C.8: Entrant hiring: industry level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification CDiD MDiD CDiD MDiD
Dependent variable ln(No entrants hire within 2 years) ln(No entrants do not hire in 2 years)
Deregj×reformt 0.077∗ 0.074 0.148∗∗∗ 0.105∗
(0.045) (0.060) (0.040) (0.056)
Pre-reform industry yes no yes no
char. × year FE
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 6039 1629 6039 1629
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the GTCC reform on the (industry-
year) number of entrants which hire within the first 2 years (col 1-2) and the number of
entrants which do not hire for at least 2 years (col 3-4).
In columns 1 and 3 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-digit
private sector industries (years 2000-2008) We include interactions of year fixed effects with
the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees
aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 2 and 4 (specification “Match-
ing DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and matched
comparison industries (181 industries). We match on the following four pre-reform indus-
try characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged
15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject
to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt
takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimations performed using
OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry employment.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation
within industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
174
3.C. ADDITIONAL TABLES
Table 3.C.9: Number of employees in entrants - Robustness
(1) (2) (3)
Specification Matching DiD)
Dependent variable ln(No employeest+2 in entrants)
Deregj×reformt -0.020 0.078 0.052
(0.089) (0.102) (0.075)
Share femalejt 0.158
(3.535)
Share age 15-24jt -3.520
(4.886)
Share age 25-49jt 4.333
(3.506)
Share medium skilledjt -0.452
(4.684)
Share high skilledjt -11.608
(9.201)
Share foreign non-EUjt 4.506
(5.484)
Share foreign EUjt 8.023
(9.049)
1996-2001 sales growthj 1.060
× reformt (0.939)
1996-2001 sales growthj -0.056
× trendt (0.274)
Linear pre-reform no no yes
industry trends
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 1629 1629 1629
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the deregulation on the number of
employees in entering establishments. In column 1, we control for the current industry
share of employees along seven characteristics. In column 2, we control for the interaction
of average pre-reform industry sales growth (1996-2001) with year fixed effects. In column
3, we control for linear industry trends which are identified from the pre-reform sample.
The sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and matched comparison
industries (specification “Matching DiD”, 181 industries). We match on the following four
pre-reform industry characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of
employees aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49.
The dependent variable is the annual industry-level log of the entrants’ number of employees
two years after entry. Employment is measured in full-time equivalents. The measure of
deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were subject to the 2004
reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt takes
the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimations performed using OLS, with
industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry employment. Standard
errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation within
industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level. 175
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Table 3.C.10: Number of employees - Robustness
(1) (2) (3)
Specification Matching DiD)
Dependent variable ln(No employees)
Deregj×reformt 0.028 0.023 -0.022
(0.058) (0.059) (0.014)
Share femalejt -3.141
∗∗∗
(1.056)
Share age 15-24jt 4.693
∗∗∗
(1.464)
Share age 25-49jt 1.767
∗
(0.908)
Share medium skilledjt -0.589
(1.003)
Share high skilledjt -1.401
(2.959)
Share foreign non-EUjt 0.463
(1.408)
Share foreign EUjt 3.910
(2.711)
1996-2001 sales growthj 0.024
× reformt (0.072)
1996-2001 sales growthj 0.207
∗∗
× trendt (0.080)
Linear pre-reform no no yes
industry trends
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
N (industry-year) 1810 1810 1810
Notes: In this table we show results on the effect of the deregulation on the number of
employees. In column 1, we control for the current industry share of employees along seven
characteristics. In column 2, we control for the interaction of average pre-reform industry
sales growth (1996-2001) with year fixed effects. In column 3, we control for linear industry
trends which are identified from the pre-reform sample. The sample includes the industries
affected by the deregulation and matched comparison industries (specification “Matching
DiD”, 181 industries). We match on the following four pre-reform industry characteristics:
share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24 and share of
employees aged 25-49.
The dependent variable is the annual industry-level log number of employees. Employment
is measured in full-time equivalents. The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value
one for 81 industries which were subject to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and
Crafts Code (details in section 3.2). Reformt takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008
and 0 before. Estimations performed using OLS, with industry-year observations weighted
by average pre-reform industry employment. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and
clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation within industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at
1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.76
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Table 3.C.11: Effect on incumbent establishment employment - Robustness: bal-
anced sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification Conditional DiD Matching DiD
Dependent variable ln(establishment size)
Deregj×reformt -0.045** -0.033 -0.026 0.006 0.003 0.011
(0.019) (0.022) (0.036) (0.043) (0.009) (0.032)
Deregj × reformt × smalli,t−5 -0.022 -0.067* -0.031* -0.053*
(0.014) (0.037) (0.017) (0.028)
Deregj × smalli,t−5 0.017* 0.030 0.013 0.019
(0.009) (0.024) (0.011) (0.018)
Reformt × smalli,t−5 0.019* 0.062* 0.035** 0.049*
(0.011) (0.036) (0.015) (0.026)
Smalli,t−5 -0.077*** -0.089*** -0.068*** -0.076***
(0.008) (0.023) (0.010) (0.016)
1996-2001 sales growthj -0.067
× reformt (0.050)
1996-2001 sales growthj 0.136***
× trendt (0.044)
Linear industry trends no no no no yes no
Pre-reform industry char. yes yes no no no no
× Year FE
Establishment FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
N (establishment-year) 2328774 2328774 1129935 1129935 1129935 1129935
Notes: In this table we show additional results on the effect of the deregulation on the
size of incumbent establishments. The sample is restricted to incumbents which are in
the sample in each year from 1999 to 2008 (balanced sample). The dependent variable
establishment size is defined as the number of employees (full time equivalents) in incum-
bents. Incumbents are defined as establishments with at least one employee 5 years ago.
smalli,t−5 is defined as having had up to 4 employees 5 years ago. Since last sample year
is 2008, the variable refers to the pre-reform period.
In columns 1-2 (specification “Conditional DiD”), the sample includes all 671 5-digit pri-
vate sector industries (years 1999-2008). We include interactions of year fixed effects with
the industries’ pre-reform share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees
aged 15-24 and share of employees aged 25-49. In columns 3-4 (specification “Matching
DiD”) the sample includes the industries affected by the deregulation and matched com-
parison industries (181 industries). We match on the following four pre-reform industry
characteristics: share of medium-skilled, share of high-skilled, share of employees aged 15-24
and share of employees aged 25-49.
The measure of deregulation deregj takes the value one for 81 industries which were sub-
ject to the 2004 reform of the German Trade and Crafts Code (details in section 3.2).
Reformt takes the value 1 for the years 2004-2008 and 0 before. Estimation performed
using OLS, with industry-year observations weighted by average pre-reform industry em-
ployment. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted
correlation within industries. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10% level.
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